

PERMANENCE AND CHANGE

**A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY INTO THE PROBLEM OF
RELATING NEW ARCHITECTURE TO EXISTING SETTINGS**

Volume I

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DECLARATION

**This thesis has been composed by myself
and is my own original work.**

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ABSTRACT

The man-made environment is mutually constitutive with socio-cultural life in it. Apart from its physical and formal characteristics, every setting is characterized by an idiosyncratic process of development. Relating new architecture to an existing setting is a problem which reveals the fundamental issues concerning the interpretation of this setting and intervention in its development. As such, this problem concerns the development of architecture as a whole.

Amid contemporary world-wide universalism, there is also a need for a sense of belonging to the environment we collectively live in, and for a lasting relationship with it. The current dilemma of conservation versus planning can find a satisfactory resolution - or else, be considered as a false dilemma - on the basis of a contextually concerned planning and a conservation philosophy which enhances contemporary development and can therefore be considered as a form of it.

Permanence and change are considered in this study as complementary dialectical notions capable of describing the way architecture and social life evolve. The dialectics between permanence and change as it is experienced in relating new and existing architecture is addressed through the polarities of synchronicity/diachronicity, continuity/discontinuity, constructive/destructive, and ephemeral/permanent. New and existing architecture are interrelated at several levels through these polarities in terms of imitation and contrast.

On the premises of philosophical hermeneutics, the thesis examines the dimensions of the man-made environment, the designation of levels at which collectively we understand our surroundings, and the levels at which new and old are interrelated. The dialectics between new and old architecture conceived as a lasting, contextually significant and finally open-ended dialogue penetrates this thesis as a whole, and emerges as a practical interpretative and evaluative method of inquiry.

Finally, the thesis suggests a philosophical framework to inform and guide architectural practice instead of proposing definite answers or stereotyped solutions. Architectural

theories, far from prescribing blueprints, should inform architectural practice not from a standpoint of truth but from a vision of life. Even so, theories can only enhance architectural creation - they cannot substitute for it.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

VOLUME I

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	iii
ABSTRACT	iv
INTRODUCTION-CONCEPTUALIZATION	
1. FORMULATION OF THE PROBLEM	1
2. THE PURPOSE OF THE THESIS	2
3. THE STRUCTURE AND THE CONTENTS OF THE THESIS	4
4. NOTES TO THE READER	6
CHAPTER ONE	
RELATING NEW ARCHITECTURE TO OLD: THE PROBLEM AND THE BACKGROUND	
1. 1. THE PROBLEM TODAY	7
1. 2. LOOKING FOR PRECEDENTS IN THE ANCIENT WORLD	9
1. 3. THE RENAISSANCE AND ITS REPERCUSSIONS	10
1. 4. THE AGE OF HISTORY	12

1. 5. THE EMERGENCE OF MODERNISM	14
1. 6. "THE MODERN CULT OF MONUMENTS"	15
1. 7. THE VALUE OF CONTRAST IN "THE BRAVE NEW WORLD"	17
1. 8. FROM CONTRAST TO ANALOGY	19
1. 9. THE TWO FACES OF MODERN ARCHITECTURE	20
1. 10. AFTER THE MODERN MOVEMENT	21
1. 11. IMITATION OR CONTRAST? A (FALSE?) DILEMMA AND THE CONTEMPORARY SITUATION	22

CHAPTER TWO

THE REHABILITATION OF IMITATION: A REVIEW OF THEORIES CONCERNING THE RELATION OF NEW ARCHITECTURE TO HISTORIC SETTINGS

2. 1. THEORIZING ABOUT THE RELATIONS BETWEEN NEW AND EXISTING ARCHITECTURE	24
2. 2. ROBERT VENTURI AND THE RECOVERY OF AMBIGUITY IN ARCHITECTURAL FORM	24
2. 3. ALDO ROSSI AND THE REDEMPTION OF URBAN MEMORY	27
2. 4. COLIN ROWE AND THE COMPROMISE BETWEEN THE HUMANISTIC VIEW OF HISTORY AND THE LIBERAL UTOPIA	31
2. 5. THE NEED FOR A SPATIO-TEMPORAL APPROACH TO CONTEXTUALISM	38

CHAPTER THREE

THE IMITATION - CONTRAST DIALECTICS IN RELATING NEW ARCHITECTURE TO OLD SETTINGS

3. 1. INTRODUCTION - CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK	41
3. 2. THE NOTION OF IMITATION	42
3. 2. 1. MIMESIS BEFORE PLATO	42
3. 2. 2. PLATO ON MIMESIS AND ARTISTIC CREATION	44
3. 2. 3. ARISTOTLE ON MIMESIS AND ART	46
3. 2. 4. THE MIMETIC APORIA	48
3. 2. 5. THE CLASSICAL AFTERMATH	49
3. 3. CONTEXTUALLY ORIENTATED IMITATION	51
3. 4. CONTEXTUAL DIMENSIONS	53
3. 5. IMITATING THE CONTEXT	55
3. 5. 1. THE CONTEXT AS A SPATIAL STRUCTURE	55
3. 5. 2. THE CONTEXT AS A LIFE PROCESS	57
3. 6. CONTRAST AS A NOTION DIALECTICAL TO IMITATION	60
3. 7. FROM CONTEXT TO INTERVENTION: THE DIALECTICS BETWEEN IMITATION AND CONTRAST AS A CREATIVE PROCESS	63
3. 8. CONCLUSIONS	68

CHAPTER FOUR

TOWARDS A DIALECTIC CONCEPTUALIZATION OF TIME IN THE MAN-MADE ENVIRONMENT

4. 1. RELATING OLD AND NEW IN TEMPORAL PERSPECTIVE: TEMPORAL DEPTH AS AN ENVIRONMENTAL DIMENSION	69
4. 2. CONTEXTUAL FACETS AND THEIR TEMPORAL DIMENSIONS	72
4. 3. TIME AS A QUALITY IN THE MAN-MADE ENVIRONMENT	75
4. 4. THE TIMES OF SIENA AND THE TIMES OF FLORENCE	78
4. 4. 1. THE COMMON BACKGROUND	78
4. 4. 2. THE TIMES OF SIENA	80
4. 4. 3. THE TIMES OF FLORENCE	80
4. 4. 4. TWO TIMES RECONSIDERED	81
4. 5. TIME AS DEFINED BY ARCHITECTURAL CHANGE: SOME CONCEPTUAL NOTATIONS	83
4. 6. CONCEPTUALIZING ARCHITECTURAL CHANGE DIALECTICALLY	88
4. 7. INTRODUCING SOME OPPOSED QUALITIES OF ARCHITECTURAL CHANGE	89
4. 8. EPHEMERALITY VERSUS PERMANENCE: QUALITIES OF LONG AND SHORT DURATION IN THE MAN-MADE ENVIRONMENT	91
4. 9. TIME CONSTRUCTIVE AND TIME DESTRUCTIVE	96
4. 10. THE QUESTION OF CONTINUITY:	

UNITY AND DIVERSITY IN THE PROCESS OF ARCHITECTURAL DEVELOPMENT	100
4. 11. SYNCHRONICITY VERSUS DIACHRONICITY: CONTEMPORARY AND HISTORIC DIMENSIONS IN THE MAN-MADE ENVIRONMENT	109
4. 12. CONCLUSIONS	118
 CHAPTER FIVE	
SPATIO-TEMPORAL CONTEXTUALISM & PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS	
5. 1. INTRODUCTION	120
5. 2. CONTEXTUAL ARCHITECTURE: A QUESTION OF INTERPRETATION	120
5. 2. 1. WHY CONTEXTUALISM?	120
5. 2. 2. THE HERMENEUTICS OF ARCHITECTURAL CHANGE: INTERPRETING NEW ARCHITECTURE IN OLD SETTINGS	124
5. 3. THE ONTOLOGICAL HERMENEUTICS OF HANS-GEORG GADAMER IN RELATION TO ARCHITECTURE	126
5. 4. STRUCTURATION OF LEVELS IN ARCHITECTURAL HERMENEUTICS	133
5. 4. 1. LEVELS OF INTERPRETATION IN PAUL RICOEUR'S HERMENEUTICS	133
5. 4. 2. DESIGNATION OF DIALECTICAL LEVELS IN THE INTERPRETATION OF ARCHITECTURE	136
5. 5. DIALECTICAL HERMENEUTICS AS A METHOD OF	

CHAPTER SIX

THE DIALECTICS OF HERMENEUTIC EXPERIENCE IN TWO CONTEXTS

6. 1. NOTES CONCERNING THE INTERPRETATION OF NEW ARCHITECTURE IN HISTORIC SETTINGS	142
6. 2. THE VENETIAN CONTEXT AS MANIFESTED THROUGH ALDO ROSSI'S "TEATRO"	144
6. 2. 1. INTRODUCTION	144
6. 2. 2. STRUCTURAL FEATURES - A FIRST DESCRIPTIVE READING	144
6. 2. 3. SYMBOLIC DIMENSIONS, OR ASSOCIATING THE "TEATRO" WITH THE VENETIAN CONTEXT	145
6. 2. 4. ATTEMPTING A DIALECTICAL INTERPRETATION	146
6. 2. 4. 1. INTRODUCTION	147
6. 2. 4. 2. SYNCHRONIC AND DIACHRONIC ASPECTS OF VENICE	147
6. 2. 4. 3. TEMPORARY AND PERMANENT PROPERTIES OF VENICE	150
6. 2. 4. 4. THE DISCUSSED DIALECTICAL LEVELS OF INTERPRETATION AS ONE PROCESS	153
6. 3. RESPONDING TO THE CLASSICAL IDEAL : PIKIONIS' ARCHITECTURAL INTERVENTION TO THE CONTEXT OF THE ACROPOLIS AT ATHENS	156
6. 3. 1. INTRODUCTION	156

6. 3. 2. EXPERIENCING THE CLASSICAL AND THE CONTEMPORARY: A FIRST DESCRIPTIVE ENCOUNTER	157
6. 3. 3. THE ATTIC LANDSCAPE AND ITS MATERIALS	158
6. 3. 4. MEANINGFUL PATTERNS	161
6. 3. 5. THE WALK AND THE WAY	163
6. 3. 6. ATTEMPTING A DIALECTICAL INTERPRETATION	164
6. 3. 6. 1. A MATTER OF HIERARCHY	164
6. 3. 6. 2. THE ANCIENT AND THE MODERN	165
6. 3. 6. 3. THE CONTINUITY OF THE CONTEXT	168
6. 3. 6. 4. THE DIALECTICS OF DESTRUCTION AND CONSTRUCTION	170
6. 3. 6. 5. PERMANENT AND EPHEMERAL QUALITIES	170
6. 3. 7. CONCLUDING REMARKS	172
6. 4. DISCUSSION - INTERPRETATION AS PARTICIPATION	173

CHAPTER SEVEN

DIALECTICAL HERMENEUTICS AS A VALUE JUDGEMENT THEORY

7. 1. INTRODUCTION	176
7. 2. DIALECTIC ARCHITECTURAL HERMENEUTICS AS PLAY	177
7. 3. NEW ARCHITECTURE AS CREATIVE INTERVENTION: OPENESS TO CONTEXTUAL INTERPRETATIONS AS A CRITERION FOR AESTHETIC EVALUATION	180

CHAPTER EIGHT

POWER AND LIMITATIONS OF A THEORY CONCERNING ARCHITECTURAL CREATION

8. 1. CONCLUSIONS :	
DIALECTICAL HERMENEUTICS OF ARCHITECTURAL CHANGE AS A THEORY OF/FOR CONTEXTUAL ARCHITECTURE	187
8. 2. CONTEXTUAL LIMITS AND ARCHITECTURAL CREATION	189
8. 3. LIMITS AND PROSPECTS OF CONTEXTUALISM	190
8. 4. ARTIST VERSUS THEORETICIAN: INTERPRETATION THROUGH CREATION	191
8. 5. FROM THEORY TO PRAXIS: THE SEARCH FOR VALUES	194
8. 6. A THEORY OR NO THEORY?	196
NOTES AND REFERENCES	197

VOLUME II

ILLUSTRATIONS	215
BIBLIOGRAPHY OF ILLUSTRATIONS	326
APPENDIX I	
THE DIALECTIC OF THE OPPOSITES AS A METHOD OF INQUIRY	
1. THE NOTION OF OPPOSITES IN PRESOCRATIC PHILOSOPHY	328

2. A QUESTION OF DIALECTICS	331
3. DIALECTICS OF THE OPPOSITES AS A REASONING TOOL	334
4. FORMAL VERSUS DIALECTIC LOGIC	335
5. DIALOGUE AS A CREATIVE PROCESS	336
6. DIALECTICS AS A METHOD OF INQUIRY - A DISCUSSION	337
7. THE THIRD TERM IN DIALECTICAL OPPOSITION	338
8. HIERARCHY IN DIALECTICS	340
NOTES AND REFERENCES	342
 APPENDIX II	
OPENNESS IN LITERARY WORKS	346
 NOTES AND REFERENCES	349

INTRODUCTION - CONCEPTUALIZATION

1. FORMULATION OF THE PROBLEM

The man-made environment is mutually constitutive with socio-cultural life in it. Apart from its physical and formal characteristics it is impregnated with various meanings, associations, allusions, memories, and cultural significance relating to its development. These values characterize it as an entity and constitute its identity. By virtue of human life the built environment becomes an alive entity too.

The diversity characterizing the way different people and different societies live their lives has an immediate impact on the space they live in. The way people create and domesticate space can be revealing of the values, the particular characteristics, the customs and the local traditions they are familiar with and hold dear. Due to this fact, every setting is a unique entity and follows an idiosyncratic development.

Contemporary architectural development *vis a vis* the reality of existing settings world-wide has come to a predicament. After the failure of modern architecture to fulfil the prospects for a liberal utopia, a crisis has ensued in architectural theory and practice. Internationalism in its attempt to create a universal order has deprived architecture from roots and reference. Today, commercialism advocates only the exploitable aspects of modernism, such as, standardization and utilitarianism, while the contemporary avant-garde of the architectural profession has retreated to spasmodic theoretical formulations, pseudo-scientific models and minimal participation in architectural productions.

At the same time a major shift towards history and the historic environments in particular is indicative of the inadequacy of contemporary architecture to respond to the need for meaning in the man-made environment. A growing conservation movement already concerns societies, governments and international bodies alike.

The problem of new architecture in existing settings is typical of the contemporary situation. New architecture is either imposed upon historic settings as an adjunct with no further significance, or imitates historic architecture in a slavish manner by perpetuating the forms and/or the materials of the past. Sometimes new architecture in an attempt to avoid

being totally neutral, produces "hypes" or gimmicks which cannot sustain any meaningful interaction with their context.

The problem of relating new architecture to existing settings pervades architectural development as a whole not only because every setting presents its own locally cultivated characteristics but also because major conservation schemes have come to protect a considerable degree of settings, and cities. Apart from buildings and settings of distinct historical importance, vernacular settings, farm buildings and whole areas are already considered of interest to societies and nations.

After the disillusion with any kind of universalism, response to the local seems to be the best strategy for architectural development. Despite the possible abuses and misuses that might ensue, contextualism seems to offer a starting point towards a theory of meaning capable of enhancing the interpretation and the creation of architecture.

2. THE PURPOSE OF THE THESIS

This thesis attempts to provide the philosophical basis and the theoretical framework, as well as some structuring lines along which the problem of relating new architecture to old could find a satisfactory solution.

The prevailing dualism between old and new architecture seems to be based on a false conflict between them. The broader issue of planning vs conservation seems also to be a false dilemma. There is no good reason to justify why new architecture should not develop in parallel with the conservation of the past and be informed by the same theoretical premises. There can be new architecture and conservation at the same time without fragmentation in our relation with the past, as happens to be the case today with a considerable number of settings.

There is a need for both historical and novel qualities in the built environment, if only to express the human need for permanence and change alike. New architecture cannot be considered as "new" in a vacuum. It can only introduce novelty and suggest a change in relation to an already established and significant context. In parallel, there can be no conservation scheme devoid of a planning attitude. Conservation is a mode of planning and despite its past orientation is a strategy for the future.

Far from any idealistic reconciliation of these attitudes, this thesis attempts to establish a communicative basis and a lasting dialogue between them. There is no such a thing as a perfect fusion between new and old and there is no necessity for such a fusion, since life

itself is in constant change. What is important, however, is a lasting dialogue between existing and new architecture if continuity in the man-made environment is valued. Dialectics of the opposites as a method of inquiry will be adopted in this thesis to interrelate the antithetical, and congenial qualities that ensue with every architectural change.

The notions of imitation and contrast will be developed as antithetical, but equally necessary, conceptual tools in our attempt to assess the relations between new and old architecture. The mutual interdependence of these two notions calls for a clarification as to the levels at which they can operate. Imitation of one characteristic necessarily implies contrast to some other since we always relate two entities however congenial. So, the dialectics between imitation and contrast becomes meaningful if the level at which they interact is also assessed. For that purpose four pairs of antithetical designations are suggested. Synchronic and diachronic, unifying and diversifying, constructive and destructive and, ephemeral and permanent, are some oppositions indicative of a much wider range of oppositions created from the initial opposition between new and old that any architectural change carries along. Through these polarities and with the aid of basic notions like imitation and contrast, this thesis will seek the conditions under which contemporary architecture can embrace values in existing settings.

Interpretation is considered in this thesis of fundamental importance to human life as a whole. In following the ontological hermeneutics of Hans-Georg Gadamer it is argued that interpretation of new architecture in relation to its context can also guide the creation of new architecture by discouraging inappropriate and irrelevant intervention in them. Apart from its use as an interpretative tool in assessing new architecture *vis a vis* its context, the theoretical framework suggested in this thesis can also contribute towards a value judgement theory.

The potential of a lasting dialogue with the architecture of the past can be a criterion to assess the adequacy of new architecture. Since new architecture will be necessarily grafted into some existing context, it is useful to examine under which conditions this cohabitation can be a coexistence. A ludic interpretative process between old and new architecture can lead to what is considered in this thesis as an ultimate goal for new architecture, the openness of its dialogue with its context. Human experience itself has its fulfilment not in some definite knowledge but in that openness to experience that is encouraged by experience itself and there is no reason why architecture should not express this openness also.

Dialectics, as initiated by the presocratics, as implemented by Socrates and as formulated in the Platonic dialogues - and not as a subordinate element in knowledge in the

Aristotelian conception - has still today something valuable to offer and architecture could also benefit from it.

3. THE STRUCTURE AND THE CONTENTS OF THE THESIS

This thesis has eight chapters and two appendices. Chapter ONE examines the multi-issued problem of contemporary architecture, especially as it appears in relation to historic settings. It traces back in history some of the ingredients of the problem, such as antiquarianism, revivalism and the idea of the modern. It introduces the concepts of imitation and contrast as they appeared in several periods in the past and as they are today.

Chapter TWO provides a critical examination of some influential theories concerning the relation of contemporary architecture to the architecture of the past and assesses their merits and their limitations. In these theories some important issues for the purposes of this thesis are pinpointed, which are to inform the argument in this thesis in its following development.

Chapter THREE establishes the notions of imitation and contrast as the kernel concepts in discussing the relation of new architecture to old. Conceptualized as dialectical notions, imitation and contrast finally show that they can be considered as creative tools in assessing and guiding a rapport between new and old architecture.

Chapter FOUR introduces some dialectical polarities, indicative of the antithetical nature of architectural change. These polarities are traced as existing qualities in the built environment, although in a hybrid form. As such, despite their inevitably abstract mode, these antithetical issues do justice to the particular qualities that every setting is endowed with. The nature of these qualities is examined and assessed in an attempt to approach the identity of existing settings. Architectural change is seen as giving birth to sets of antithetical qualities, which both characterize a setting and constitute its identity.

Chapter FIVE attempts a graft from philosophical hermeneutics to the problem of relating new and old architecture. The importance of interpretation is considered as a phenomenon characterizing human life as a whole. The particular problem of architecture is seen as embedded in much wider philosophical issues and an attempt is being made to assess the implications of hermeneutics for architecture. Hermeneutics of architectural change becomes a viable theoretical framework capable of linking new and old architecture in a comprehensive sense. In this chapter, the levels at which people designate and assess changes in their environment and the way these levels can be incorporated in the interpretative process are also examined.

Chapter SIX exemplifies in a non-technical sense dialectical hermeneutics as a theoretical framework capable of revealing the antithetical, yet equally significant, properties in the built environment. The case of Venice exemplifies *par excellence* the mortality of architecture, which to a certain extent pervades architecture and human life as a whole. The case of Athens exemplifies, again in exaggeration, the permanent qualities of the built environment, which also characterizes, to different degrees for every setting, architecture as a whole. Both cases are exaggerations of what every setting actually is: a living entity which changes, loosing and gaining values, while being itself.

Chapter SEVEN examines the possibility for a value judgement theory for architecture out of the dialectical hermeneutics of architectural change. It also does justice to the open-ended nature of dialectics by assessing its ultimate value in an open ludic process.

Chapter EIGHT attempts an appraisal of the potentialities and the limitations of a theory *qua* contextual and *qua* a theory. A suggestion is made that theories of/for architecture should be orientated towards constructing a theoretical framework capable of enhancing architectural creation. Far from prescribing blueprints, theories should be inquiries capable of informing architectural practice not from a standpoint of truth but from a vision of life. Finally, architectural practice is considered to be the touchstone for any theory of/for architecture and socio-cultural life the touchstone for the importance of architecture.

4. NOTES TO THE READER

This thesis, in response to the need for a comprehensive consideration of the problems facing architectural development today, involves the examination of a wide spectrum of theoretical problems. The argument sometimes cannot be as smooth as it ought to be. The reading occasionally might become a laborious process. The nature of the problem, as well as the limitation of a thesis and its writer, often lead to less than a straightforward flow of the argument.

Major philosophical issues enter the debate developed in this thesis and they necessarily lead to problematic points. It is in the nature of a thesis to present an argument in a most rigorous manner. Yet, all too often theses contradict one another, however clear the argument and despite the fact that they might deal with the same problem. This thesis, at the expense, perhaps, of a technically concrete exposition of an argument, attempts to suggest a *theoretical environment* rather than a falsifiable theory. This does not mean, of course, that it fulfils its task in the best possible sense. Towards this end this thesis can only anticipate its further development and elaboration, or its supercession.

CHAPTER ONE

RELATING NEW ARCHITECTURE TO OLD: THE PROBLEM AND THE BACKGROUND

1. 1. THE PROBLEM TODAY

The current interest in relating contemporary architecture to existing settings can hardly be traced in history as a conscious, premeditated activity and less so as a problem. It is mainly through the contemporary perspective that a similar problem is supposed to have existed in the past.

Historical consciousness is a characteristic particularly of "Western" societies and appears as a necessary complement to their obsession with future orientated progress. In this situation, the insertion of new architecture in historic settings reveals *par excellence* the question of history as a general problem and as an architectural one in particular. The concept of the "antique", oldness or historicity for its own sake, is modern (1). People used to relate to their past as a constant source of values or as an ideal to be imitated or re-enacted; but the past as totally distinct from the present and as something to be slavishly copied or feel nostalgic about, has been an attitude that originated in the West and became the idiom of this century. There is little doubt that people must have always felt nostalgic for familiar artefacts when they were rendered time-worn, became obsolete or were destroyed. However, renewal must have been customarily unquestioned and inevitable.

In the contemporary situation we witness what could be called an unparalleled "schizophrenia". On the one hand, architectural development takes place at a rapid rate at the expense of familiar environments; on the other hand, societies that value modernity and pursue development, realize the loss of familiar places and crave for the restoration, conservation of historic and vernacular buildings and settings.

Although this situation has emerged due to developments particularly characteristic of "Western" societies, the same remarks hold also true for the so called "developing" world. The Western model has been adopted there as a panacea for all problems posed by

contemporary life and for that reason architectural development there takes place at an even faster speed and in an even more uncritical way, totally alien to, or at best, disrespectful of, local characteristics.

Some settings are listed as historic or vernacular and they are preserved in a mummified condition, while uncritical development takes place in most of the unlisted settings. In Chester, England, even a new coat of paint in a historic building is subject to strict Building Regulations and in the Greek island of Hydra virtually no change is allowed. At the same time nearly everything can be built in Manchester city or the suburbs of Athens, provided that it complies only with the most basic Building Regulations. In Edinburgh, the Georgian buildings of the new town are meticulously kept, and recently the Mediaeval part of Edinburgh too, while the university buildings in the centre of the city are totally alien to their most distinct surroundings. This is not to claim that every setting should be listed; on the contrary, new architecture should relate to whatever setting it is being grafted into. If all settings matter the same for the people inhabiting them, then any selective listing cannot address the problem of architectural development as a whole.

In the market dominated societies of, at least, the "Western" world, the built environment is treated as a commodity. Technological development and economic efficiency have led to, and still determine to a large degree, commercial architectural development and a meaningless built environment. In parallel, a major conservation movement sweeps governments and individual enterprises across the world and confronts architectural development in most settings listed as architectural heritage. In both cases people witness a fragmentation in the environment they live in. Low-cost housing in most British cities is solely determined on an economic basis and planned to facilitate only utilitarian needs. Yet, the same people who live in an environment destitute of any quality are the tax-payers for the conservation of uneconomical railway stations, which are meticulously conserved and kept in operation because of their Victorian railings and benches (2).

It seems that whatever is appreciated as a quality in the man-made environment is gradually moving to a museum situation, while the environment most related to everyday activities, such as houses, offices, workplaces, become more and more stereotyped, dictated mainly by ergonomic and economic considerations.

All historic settings seem to have similar problems: unless they are turned into museums, they are doomed to vanish under contemporary development. Although there is nothing wrong with this museum phenomenon as such, it comes to be a negative strategy for urban renewal, if it only takes the role of a poor compensation for lost qualities in the man-made environment.

The museum phenomenon increasingly dominates modern societies and tourism gets a place in everyone's thinking from governments to individual enterprises. The Australian writer Donald Horne in an illuminating essay deals with museums as rhetoric vehicles for the representation of history and with tourism as a consumerist attitude towards the past (3).

The problem arising from the confrontation between old and new architecture pervades contemporary life as a whole and relates to the more general problem of our relation to the past. As Horne succinctly observes:

-...each (of the styles of the Modern...suited to an industrial age) was based on a fundamental need to be different from the past, and therein lies the paradox of modernism: if to be different is the aim, then difference breeds difference, and nothing new lasts. The contradictions of "revolutionary" modern societies throw taste into permanent revolution, while the past^{is} preserved with increasing diversity; it is only when a "modern" style sinks out of fashion and then is later rediscovered - as part of the past - that it becomes permanent. (4)

1. 2. LOOKING FOR PRECEDENTS IN THE ANCIENT WORLD

Looking back in Western history in order to assess the problem today, we find new and old buildings to coexist in harmony in ancient Greece. Additions, repairs, transformations and substitutions in the built environment occurred as matters of course, without any consideration and reflection of what was there before. Ancient temples, not to mention civic architecture, succeeded one another organically, despite differences in materials and forms.

Pausanias refers to the Heraeum at Olympia as having been initiated in the end of the 7th century B.C. and as being constantly transformed ever since, until at least his time around 173 A.D. What is particularly interesting for our study from the history of this temple, is that its decaying wooden columns were substituted according to the aesthetic criteria of the times regarding materials, proportions or morphological features. Piecemeal alterations were conducted regardless of the non-homogeneous appearance of different parts. Two adjacent columns could differ in diameter or have different numbers of flutes (5). At the time of Pausanias only one wooden column was left, while the rest had been replaced by porous-stone ones.

In general, the remains of old buildings were used as a convenient source of materials

needed for the construction of new ones. Only in exceptional circumstances old buildings or parts thereof were preserved for symbolic reasons. The history of building activity on the Acropolis at Athens is particularly illuminating in regard to these points. Every temple on the Acropolis rock differed considerably from its predecessor. Yet, despite the massive renewal operation during Pericles' times, drums from the columns of the temple of Athena were deliberately built into the N.E. wall to remind the people of the agora of their past. Instances of preserving and reusing a part of an old building to remember a specific event in history were not infrequent, but all were done for a particular reason and as an exception amid a continuous process of development. Thus it would be misleading to consider these instances of preserving the past as a substitute for being contemporary.

The practices of the ancient Greeks deserve attention, because they have always provided the alibi for the modern historical consciousness. The very idea of progress has been attributed first to the Greeks, but it has also been convincingly argued that the modern era not only saw in history what it wanted to see but also created the Greek society as its predecessor (6). The idea of history itself was conceived by the Classical Greeks in a different sense from the contemporary Western one. Ancient Greek society did not conceive the past within a future orientated process of development. As far as its relation to the past is concerned, we can trace little difference from other traditional societies in the sense that, contemporary life for ancient Greek society was rather a prolongation of the past than anticipation of the future (7).

Another predecessor of the contemporary historic consciousness can be traced in Hadrian's villa at Tivoli, where we find an attitude displayed that was rare for the times. The Roman emperor Hadrian collected in his villa architectural fragments from all the places he had visited (Figs 1. 1-2). His villa curiously resembles a modern museum in that dislocated fragments coexist in one place (8). But, we can only consider this as souvenir collecting rather as a historically-orientated perception of the value of old artefacts. In any case, Hadrian's villa should be considered as only a marginal case amid a massive Romanization of architectural development in all territories under the Roman empire.

1. 3. THE RENAISSANCE AND ITS REPERCUSSIONS

The Italian Renaissance of the 15th century has been often referred to as the precursor of modernity (9). As the term Renaissance indicates it was a cultural regeneration in the light of Classical antiquity. For the first time in history, explicit reference to a past era on a comprehensive scale was taking place. Man was placed at the centre of the universe and the Renaissance culture was juxtaposed in its full spectrum to the preceding Gothic

era. The Catalan architect Ignasi de Solà-Morales in a lecture given at 1977, dealing with the problem of architectonic intervention as a problem of interpretation, characteristically argues that the Renaissance *par excellence* adopted

-...a dualistic awareness of history, in which there is a mythicized past which is Antiquity and another gloomy, negative reality which must be rightly conceived as the counter image of that positive reality embodied by Antiquity, which is the whole reality of the city and the Medieval constructions. (10)

Solà-Morales refers subsequently to *conformitas* as a conscious activity to achieve coherence of the new and the old, or as a way of critically interpreting the old in order to define and shape the modern. On the other hand, new architecture is always seen as imitation of an ideal model. As he puts it:

The interventions, punctual or more intensely unitary, always mean the attempt to make a new reading of this already existing built reality in order to intervene in it with a specific tool which is the project of architecture, in order to, through this intervention, attain the unification of the city space. (11)

The conversion of San Francesco church at Rimini into a temple for the Malatesta family by Alberti (Fig. 1. 3), is a clear example of the tension created between the Renaissance ideal model for a temple and an already existing Gothic building (12). Alberti was conscious of this tension between old and new architecture and dealt with it in his treatise *De Re Aedificatoria*. But he mainly exemplified his concern for integrating Renaissance and existing Gothic architecture in all his projects, which were interventions in existing buildings. Such interventions were carried out at Santa Maria at Gangalandi, Palazzo Rucellai, Santa Maria Novella and Capella Rucellai, to mention a few (13). In his description of an ideal town, he also argued for the preservation of the Roman ruins, which are considered as an integral part of his ideal town (14).

The architectural historian Manfredo Tafuri approaches the Renaissance in a similar way to that discussed here and points out that:

-...one of the best lessons to be learnt from Brunelleschi's humanism is its new conception of the pre-existing town as an available and passing structure, ready to change its global meaning as soon as the introduction of compact architectural objects altered the balance of the Romanesque-Gothic "continuous narrative". (15)

Tafuri, in short, sees the Renaissance architecture as having been able to compromise with pre-existing settings in the sense that even partial intervention is enough to show the prevalence of Renaissance architectural qualities over the multi-stratified Mediaeval texture of the cities. Tafuri thus ascribes to the Renaissance the role of the first dehistoricizing architecture, creating rupture between past and present.

We agree with Tafuri that indeed it was the Renaissance that mainly contributed to the formation of our contemporary problematic relationship with history. But we cannot accept that the relation of old and new in architecture at the Renaissance period was as conscious a problem as it is today. Architectural intervention during the Renaissance, based on geometrical perspective and centrality of space, even at a smaller scale, was enough to prove that reason and humanism were the cornerstones of the new universality in juxtaposition to the theocratic Mediaeval society. Rationalism was enough to sustain the apparent gap. The Renaissance had the power to bifurcate history and for this very reason dehistoricization was not a problem at that time. It was the strong credo of an era that created an intended change from old to new and this cannot be paralleled to the contemporary situation, where rupture between old and new is conceived as an inherited problem.

Tafuri describes the relation between old and new architecture during the Renaissance as dialectical, in the sense that the new succeeds the old. He distinguishes between complementarity and dialectical relation, since he adopts the term "dialectic" in a Marxian sense as the rivalry of the "good" Renaissance against the "bad, barbaric" Gothic (16). This is exactly the point which differentiates the Renaissance from the contemporary situation. Today, old and new are considered as dialectical in the original meaning of the term, as of equal importance, yet opposing each other. Today we really do not know if the new is better compared to the old and this ambiguity creates the problem and remains with it.

1. 4. THE AGE OF HISTORY

The self-sufficiency of the Renaissance, based on the Classical heritage, survived even the Baroque era. After that, Classical ideals and models could accept no more development and this necessarily led to periods during which revivalism, scepticism and romanticism were added to the Renaissance humanism and became ingredients of the contemporary situation. The notion of "antique" in particular was originally a conception of the 19th century which still survives today.

The beginning of the 19th century is characterized by a tendency towards historicization of human knowledge, which gradually became a main characteristic of the times.

During that century, the age of historicism *par excellence*, a new turn to antiquity was initiated and neo-Classicism became the prevailing style. But this time it was considered to be remote from its sources. Historical consciousness made it possible for neo-Classical fascination to develop in parallel with the first proclamation for the preservation of monuments, which took place in France in 1794.

During the 19th century the first museums opened in Europe. The preceding industrial revolution and its aftermath had a devastating effect on human settings. Cities grew at an unparalleled rate and urbanisation advanced in a manner that was uncritical of local characteristics. The development of communications and the zoning system in town planning destroyed the old cities and their traditional characters gave way to rising capitalist investment in standardization. The Romantic movement represented a reaction to this situation and went back to the Mediaeval model to trace and re-establish social integrity.

In architectural aesthetics of that period two antithetical schools prevailed. Viollet le Duc (1814-1879) in his "DICTIONNAIRE" argues for the architecture of France from the 11th to the 16th century. His restoration projects manifest a return to the purity of the Gothic style (17). In contrast to Viollet le Duc's approach to architecture as a program and a structural system, John Ruskin (1819-1900) adhered to an organic attitude towards monuments. Ruskin argued that buildings follow the human life cycle of birth-growth-death and that monuments should be allowed to decay in a natural way.

In Italy, Camillo Boito (1834-1914) sought a compromise between the two attitudes, arguing that any addition or alteration to an already existing artefact should be differentiated from it (18). In this way, past and present could equally claim their values. In the restoration of Titus' arch in Rome and in the reconstructions of the Roman agora he had already seen for the first time a conscious distinction between the old, authentic parts of a building artefacts and the new additions. Valatien and travertine were used for the reconstructed members of the buildings in juxtaposition to the original white marble, while unrelieved friezes, unfluted columns and simplified ornamentation characterized each newly added member.

Boito argued for the uniqueness of every monument and postulated the differentiation in terms of materials and morphology between every new addition and already existing monuments. This integrated approach with the proclamation against fake reproductions or additions to authentic monuments has been considered as the fundamental thesis of modern restoration. The Athens Charter of 1931, the Venice Charter of 1964 and the Amsterdam Declaration of 1975 came later to complete the framework concerning architectural heritage, its conservation and its relation to new architecture (19).

There is little doubt that the major shift in theorizing about the relation between old and new in the man-made environment was due to what Riegl later called "the cult of monuments". This focus on monuments, which was formulated in the age of historicism as compensation for the growing dangers of urban development, was to affect considerably the development of architecture.

One major change in the appreciation of architecture was that buildings were not any more conceived of as solitary objects, conveying the principles of their times. Instead, they were considered *in context*, which necessarily carried values of the past as well. The emergence of the *picturesque* endowed architecture, at least in its depiction, with a "natural" context, whether this was nature or existing settings (20). Architectural novelty was now seen against its context whether as imitating it or contrasting to it (21). In 1836 Pugin, in his "Contrasts", compared Mediaeval buildings to revivals, talked about "optical pollution" and architectural novelties "irrelevant" to their context (22).

1. 5. THE EMERGENCE OF MODERNISM

Debate on the culture of monuments was the main theme of the 19th century that survived in the 20th. The Classical idea of *mimesis*, was the dominant notion in art history and aesthetic appreciation. However differently from the Classical times, the artist of the Enlightenment consciously followed the same path as the Classical artist.

Some radical changes occurred in Vienna at the end of the 19th century and the dawn of the 20th. Gottfried Semper in his attempt to categorize works of "minor" arts, such as, textiles and furniture, according to their function, following Cuvier's new taxonomy, came to realize the problems and subsequently the inadequacy of the style typification as variations on the Classical theme (23). Art was divorced from the artistic objects of the past, typified in styles, and came to embrace artistic activity in its full spectrum. Based on these observations, Alois Riegl reconsidered the historic hypothesis of styles and argued for a *theory of aesthetic perception* instead of a theory of art-objects.

Art by the end of the 19th century was no longer considered passive imitation but creative production. Within this context, another decisive point for the advent of Modernity was the Romantic movement, which emphasized the closeness between man and nature and rejected nature as a model for art. Artists should express their senses rather than subordinate to the Classical ideal (24). The philosophy of Fiedler, Riegl's theory and the experimental psychology of vision in Vienna were only the inevitable consequences of these changes in art theory (25).

Art as novel creation, and *kunstwollen*, the will for art, as the means of every culture to approach reality - implying the relativity and openness of every *kunstwollen* - were the basic strongholds of a new approach to art and art objects. Art as imitation within a cyclical historical process gave way to modernity. As Solà-Morales argues:

The culture of modernity apparently detached from its historical roots, tried to understand and to make form according to its own vision of history, which was, precisely, the history of vision.(26)

1. 6. "THE MODERN CULT OF MONUMENTS"

A brief account of Riegl's theory will illuminate and put in context the culture of modernity. At the turn of the century Alois Riegl, curator of the Vienna museum, in discussing the role of monuments, distinguished between historic values and contemporary ones. For Riegl, all the works of the past were considered valuable. For this reason his views are particularly relevant to our argument (27).

Denkmalswert, monument value, in Riegl's terminology, is the quality of intentionally commemorating a specific event in history; deliberate monuments are characterized by this quality. *Denkmalswert*, as a temporal quality in an established setting, of whatever scale, refers to the appreciation of a specific monument in history which itself claims immortality through the preservation of single human deeds or events connected with them. In Riegl's terms a monument makes "a claim to immortality, to an eternal present and an unceasing state of becoming" (28).

The *kunst-historiches*, artistic-historic, quality in monuments refers to the appreciation of a particular stage in the life of a setting, according to the current interpretation of history at each time.

Alteswert, age-value, refers to the quality of antiquity for its own sake. It refers to the historicity of an artefact, or a context as a whole, *qua antique*. Age value is solely due to the passage of time, and it is independent of the original value that a work of art had at the time of its creation.

According to Riegl, *Denkmalswert* was initiated by the Renaissance and it was originally restricted to Classical monuments which were thought to be of permanent value. The 19th century, the age of the historicism, sought to protect all historic buildings. In an era dominated by the idea of historical development every step in cultural development was

considered irreplaceable. The emergence of historicism as a product of the Enlightenment was to define the irreplaceability of every stage in the human enterprise. During the 20th century the past came to be anything old, anything not contemporary. Henceforth what we refer to as diachronic values today, and in this study in particular, encompasses this broader, comprehensive appreciation of the past, where anything already existing is worth consideration and critical evaluation.

The establishment of the *kunsthistorisches* value allows virtually all periods of art to claim their own independent significance without entirely abandoning the belief in ideals according to the *kunstwollen* of a particular time. Yet, the ideals of the 19th century, according to which the *kunsthistorisches* value was attributed to monuments of the past, were not at all unrelated to the art and culture of this period. The notion of *Kunstwollen* denotes for Riegl this cultural horizon of an era which dictates both, the expression in contemporary art and the appreciation of a particular part of the past alike (29).

If *denkmalswert* is a monumental value of permanent significance urging to be imitated and *kunsthistorisches* a selective attitude to the past leaving space for revivals today, age value is purely a value incapable of being redeemed. It can only be appreciated *in contrast* to new architecture. Preponderance of the age-value marks the eclipse of imitation as a principle in the creation of art. With relativity characterizing the contemporary condition, modern architecture is left without precursors, open to research and everyday practice but also in desperate need of roots.

The diagnosis of age value in our century by Riegl is of great importance in our attempt to trace the development of the notion of imitation and contrast in the creation of architecture. Riegl's age-value can be the touchstone for the distinction between historic and present-day values.

Contemporary values for Riegl are the use-values, referring to the current practical and utilitarian needs, and art-value. Art-value refers to the intellectual and spiritual needs coined by Riegl *kunstwollen*. *Kunstwollen*, literally meaning the will for art, emerges as a selective filter ascribing relativity to what every era recognizes as its historical and contemporary values. This relativity of the *kunstwollen* is exactly what renders interpretation of the past so important in order to relate appropriately to it.

What deserves our attention is the dialectical structure of age-value as a comprehensive characterization of historic values and present-day values as everything relating to today. Age-value as the final stage of historic values is the development of the previous *denkmalswert* and *kunsthistorisches* values and in a sense embraces them without totally comprehending them. Riegl himself realizes that in artefacts today we may find

monumental and age-value together or historical and age-value or all three together. The dialectic structure of these qualities alone is enough to legitimise contrast as a value of the 20th century established in juxtaposition to the past. The other important feature in Riegl's theory is that age-value and present-day value are *interrelated*, or rather they constitute aspects of the present-day *kunstwollen*. This *kunstwollen* forms the common denominator, what in Chapter Five we will discuss as the third term of dialectics, of what diachronic values are to be evaluated and what contemporary values to be expressed in art. It necessitates an active perception of the past in the light of, and in strong relation to, what is new. *Kunstwollen embraces all aspects of a particular culture and constitutes* what Gadamer calls the fusion of the horizons for a particular society.

1. 7. THE VALUE OF CONTRAST IN "THE BRAVE NEW WORLD"

Vienna witnessed the basic break with tradition and the beginning of modernity. Initiated by Wolfflin, as the culmination of the reaction to the theories of art objects, it expressed the complete opposite; the shift of importance from the art object to the subject who appreciates art. For Riegl, in particular, the subject is permeable by history and culture. The emergence of modernity thus closes a circle starting with the Renaissance's placing of man in the centre of the universe and culminating in Riegl's theory, where man has the power to produce knowledge and not just reflect reality.

Formalism marked a major shift of focus from the work of art as dependent on the artist and his ability for *mimesis*, to the work of art itself and its appeal to human subjectivity. It was inaugurated in Vienna, but it was in post-revolutionary Russia that it was rendered into *praxis*. Independence of art was to reinforce human emancipation and accelerate future orientated progress. Radical changes in technology and technology of materials in particular, in economy and in politics, were aspects of an emerging new world.

Modernity in Europe followed the path of early formalism and constructivism in post-revolutionary Russia. In El Lissitzky's "victory over the sun" whatever could be differentiated from the past was automatically better and more suitable for modern society. The Modern Movement adhered excessively to this principle. Right from the beginning, it established itself more in terms of opposition to the past than in its own terms. El Lissitzky emphasizes the verticality of modern architecture as opposed to the traditional horizontality, and new purposes in contrast to old, and he regrets that:

Just as in the past, houses follow a continuous street line, as if the individual lots of private owners still existed. (30)

Everything new was emerging as an *anti-*. Anti-monumental, anti-academic, anti-decorated, were instances of the new ideology. Le Corbusier's "Towards a new architecture", written in 1923 is a manifesto pleading for modernity. What is important for our purposes in the modern horizon, is that architecture as an art traditionally pertaining to the realm of *mimesis*, is now totally directed towards *contrast*. Contrast to the past constitutes the visually grounded aspect of an *antithesis* between modern and past architecture. This visual aspect of opposition, relating to new discoveries in the psychology of vision in Vienna, was to acquire major importance through the notion of transparency.

The notion of "transparency" fashioned with the new materials out of the extensive use of glass and light metal constructions, was to be extended from the qualities of the new materials to the realm of knowledge. Phenomenal transparency, related to Cubism and the early Dada invention of photomontage, was to be one of the decisive qualities sought for and acknowledged in the modern world (31).

Modern architecture could not but express this new world. In its attempt to justify its existence in contrast to the historic core of the old European cities, it introduced the idea of *context*. The context of new architecture was introduced and established in architectural representation, as a negative background in visual terms, to be permeated by the new building. Lissitzky wrote that even one modern building was enough to transform an old city and Le Corbusier's idea of "planting" modernity was equally pervasive and powerful (32).

Sola-Morales, in discussing the concept of "contrast", argues that Le Corbusier's project for the centre of Paris in 1936 interpreted historic architecture without repudiating it. He quotes Le Corbusier commenting on his project:

-...the new modern dimension and the showing to advantage of historic treasures, produce a delightful effect. (33)

But, even if historical architecture was the point of departure, reference and counter-image of modern intervention, it is hard to accept that it was interpretation in a positive sense. Although historic cities were necessary for Le Corbusier to measure Modernity against, it is far more probable that contrast was not a way of appreciating the past by critically opposing to it, but rather that of opposition for its own sake and as its only merit (34).

1. 8. FROM CONTRAST TO ANALOGY

Contrast, in terms of materials, forms, or the ideology they express, dominated Modern architecture as the means of opposition to traditional architecture. In an imperfect dialectical sense, the modern was considered to be of positive value, while the historic was negative. For that very reason, modern architecture and historic settings cannot interact on an equal basis. Contrast as analogy was to come when historical architecture, the architecture of established settings, acquired equal importance with the new. Analogy became the new paradigm only when Modernity could no longer be supported by *euphoria* about the future, when the creation of the new had to be mediated in a hermeneutic horizon where the historicity and the relativism of understanding and creation were evident.

Contrast as a response doing justice to both old and new appears in the Fifties in Italy. In the historically dense Italian cities and villages, the modern is appreciated not for its intrinsic qualities but in contrast to the existing settings. Restoration had been along this path long before, but it was only when it appeared in architecture after the Second World War that attention was paid to the quality of contrast. Terragni's peoples house in Como (Fig. 1. 4), is a characteristic example of new architecture justified because of its contrast to the old.

To begin with an existing building and create a modern place, to be modern and fit into the existing, to base one's work on the existing and not simply level everything-this was a giant step ahead. (35)

The Moderns started with the attempt to completely rebuild the old cities but after the catastrophe of the Second World War there was a turn-back to historical tradition and a gradual abandonment of utopian ideals. The originally envisaged universality of geometry and function gave way to piecemeal intervention. Under this relativisation, what used to be the result of modernisation (namely that of contrasting to the old settings) was now adopted as the aim. Contrast was no longer just an aspect - and then not the most important - but the focus of modernity. The problem was and still is evident. Is contrast enough to renew historic settings? Or else in what sense could it be a creative response to established environments? Even if the tools of modernity are still there, the system of using them is lacking and that creates the present predicament.

1. 9. THE TWO FACES OF MODERN ARCHITECTURE

By the beginning of the 20th century modernity had well established its main stronghold that art is not imitation but creation contrasting to whatever the past had produced before. As a consequence, architectural form came to be significant on its own as a creation out of nothing and different from the past forms. A new formal vocabulary, based on pure geometrical forms and primary colours, was supposed to liberate architectural morphology from the reiteration of the Classical repertory and the stylistic patterns of the academy. For the functionalists though, modern architecture could only reach universal reason and validity through function. The architectural program, expressing the content of architecture, was considered the only real basis for the new architecture.

This opposition between formalism and functionalism characterized the Modern Movement in architecture right from the beginning. It was first expressed as the antithesis between the formalists and the constructivists in post-revolutionary Russia and since then it has not been resolved. This antithesis can be expressed as follows. Should the Modern Movement, in opposition to the previous eclecticism, seek for a new formal system devoid of any traditional connotations and references, culturally neutral and therefore universal? Or, was pure functionalism, perhaps, the only reliable basis for the new architecture? However antithetical these tendencies within the Modern Movement, they both aimed at a universal system for architecture and a break with history (36).

The Italian architect Giancarlo de Carlo, provides a short but excellent discussion of the contemporary predicament as a natural outcome of the congenital schizophrenia of modernity.

-...on the one hand, the abstractions of statistical calculation, technological hazard, and formalistic sophistication; on the other hand, the pseudo-realistic attempt at rationalizing everything, thus complying with all the expectations of capitalist speculators and state bureaucracy. Similarly, the conceptual level also broke into two parts: on one hand, rejection of the everyday, the personal, and different; on the other exaltation of the universal standardization, and unification. This dualism (in a movement that aimed at making architecture universal) robbed human beings of the chance of using architectural language to express themselves, to communicate, and to organize and shape their space to the measure of their individual and social existences.(37)

1. 10. AFTER THE MODERN MOVEMENT

Some of the pioneers of the Modern Movement had attempted to remedy the situation and often had found themselves in radical divergence from the proclamations of their manifestos. Some other architects had never espoused the Modern Movement. Le Corbusier, Alvar Aalto, Aldo Van Eyck and Jorn Utzon were some of the former group, while Frank Lloyd Wright and Louis Kahn can be taken to represent the latter group. Architects from both groups became aware of the antithesis between means and ends in modern architecture and searched for a new paradigm for new architecture in its local context. As Aldo Van Eyck has expressed it:

-...architects have been harping continuously on what is different in our time to such an extent that they have lost touch with what is not different, with what is essentially the same. (38)

These architects gave the inspiration and showed a way out of the problems created by the Modern Movement.

During the Fifties and the Sixties, and in parallel with a passing euphoria and a fresh futurist outlook, the modernistic image came under criticism. Contrast as the blueprint of modernity had produced monotony and meaningless multiplicity and the self-sufficiency of the modern architectural object had created rupture with the historic setting and the local contexts. Post-modernism has since attempted the recovery of meaning. Robert Venturi's empirical approach to popular diversity and Aldo Rossi's rationalist approach towards a recovery of urban memory marked the frame of the Post-Modern field. As a counterpoint to the Modern concept of contrast, Venturi argues for adaptation and assimilation to popular imagery, while Rossi argues for the analogic city. In other words Rossi is seeking for a new universality to imitate and Venturi for a fashionable way of following popular trends and culture.

Post-Modern architecture craved for a return to analogy. Criticizing Modernity but not totally away from it, it sought to establish bonds with historic settings. In terms of forms, memories, functions and socio-cultural values, imitation is introduced alongside the already established contrast. Contrast thus becomes a way of responding and not imposing while the new architecture seeks compromise, absorption, legitimatization and discourse rather than imposing monologue and formal or functional rhetoric. The aim of architecture still remains to recover the loss of place and the establishment of continuity. Imitation and contrast will be used in this thesis as our conceptual tools to relate past and present in many ways. A continuity is needed not only in visual and utilitarian terms but also concerning the memories, the dreams and the culturally significant aspects of the built

environment, which are part and parcel of socio-cultural interaction and human collectivity.

1. 11. IMITATION OR CONTRAST? A (FALSE?) DILEMMA AND THE CONTEMPORARY SITUATION

So, it seems that whatever the inner conflicts of modern architecture or, perhaps, because of them, an abrupt break with history has resulted. As Norberg-Schulz observes:

Monotony and chaos are apparently contradictory phenomena, but at a closer scrutiny reveal themselves as interrelated aspects of a more general crisis which may be called the "loss of place". (39)

In order to compensate for the loss of place and due to the increased awareness of the lost qualities in the built environment, a massive conservation attitude has evolved after the Second World War. So, the contemporary scene witnesses a bifurcation in the process of architectural development. On one hand, market dominated urbanization irrelevant to the local settings; on the other, increased policies to protect the past from new architecture in it.

It is ironic that the contemporary search for continuity has resulted in a series of pastiche, reproductions and fakes which negate contemporary times as much as the past ones they are attempting to be coherent with. Contrast, on the other hand, has resulted in a self-referential state. The world of imitation and the world of contrast are kept apart in the contemporary architectural debate and contemporary architectural practice. The former is represented mainly by copying and pastiche, while the latter relies upon the world of high-tech engineering. Both attitudes are too one sided to be considered satisfactory. In most of the historic centres of Europe and North America stubborn conservation which neglects the contemporary needs, is worlds apart in theory and practice from uncritical commercial architecture. Yet both attitudes coexist in the same setting, the same street, the same place, the same building. For instance, in London, carefully preserved Victorian buildings coexist with R.Rogers' high-tech Lloyd's bank. One can argue that this situation is exactly our contemporary identity, a split one, expressed by antithetic philosophies, attitudes, practices and image: those of a well preserved past and of pure commercialism. But if this is the case why is there so much dispute over the problem of contemporary architecture in old, historic settings? Why is there a problem?

On one hand modern architecture seems incapable of recovering the loss of place; on the other, the historic buildings, which play a vital role by providing stability, reference

and familiarity in our environments, cannot stand for ever, however well preserved they are. However well preserved, they cannot provide stability, reference and familiarity in our environments for ever. Commercial buildings will finally be the main theme and the loss of place an undisputable fact. Irrelevant Modernism or contemporary architecture with borrowed existence will finally be empty rhetoric. Glass buildings using as a pretext for their responsiveness to their setting by reflecting their historic surroundings will finally reflect other glass buildings. The self-referential attitude of Modernism will finally deprive us from our anchorage in place.

CHAPTER TWO

THE REHABILITATION OF IMITATION: A REVIEW OF THEORIES CONCERNING THE RELATION OF NEW ARCHITECTURE TO HISTORIC SETTINGS

2. 1. THEORIZING ABOUT THE RELATIONS BETWEEN NEW AND EXISTING ARCHITECTURE

In this chapter we will examine the theoretical work of Robert Venturi, Aldo Rossi and Colin Rowe. Venturi's theory is more a "look at a theory"; Rossi's theory is a consistent yet unsystematic body of profound intuitions on the meaning of architecture, while Rowe's theory is the most systematically constructed, however far from precisely defined and intelligibly exposed. So, we can call all these "theories" only if we can allow for a very general definition of a theory.

The relevance of these theories to this thesis will be evident in the following exposition and critical appraisal of them. Conversely, their critical appraisal will be done *vis a vis* the purposes of this thesis. Yet, some general points can be mentioned to indicate why they are examined here. All three theories deal with the antithetical qualities of architecture in an attempt to rehabilitate the past and remedy the contemporary situation. Whether these theories aim at a synthesis of these antithetical qualities, or they just appreciate the dialectical interaction between them, they nevertheless deal with the relation of new to old architecture in a way congenial to the one adopted in this thesis. They all deal with the relation of new to old architecture in a profound sense and they all provide critical observations about the possibilities of a contextually meaningful architecture.

2. 2. ROBERT VENTURI AND THE RECOVERY OF AMBIGUITY IN ARCHITECTURAL FORM

The American architect Robert Venturi in his seminal book "Complexity and contradiction in architecture" deals with the antithetical qualities of architectural form (1). In

contrast to the modernistic purism he advocates a pluralistic attitude, where ambiguity is considered the real value of architectural creation. In his "gentle manifesto" Venturi states:

I am for messy vitality over obvious unity. I include the non sequitur and proclaim the duality. (2)

and elsewhere:

A valid architecture evokes many levels of meaning and combinations of focus; its space and its elements become readable and workable in several ways at once. (3)

Venturi rejects the straightforward, the determined, the complete in itself architectural form and seems to be in favour of the ambiguous and the pluralistic, which characterizes everyday reality. He clearly proclaims that the fallacy of modernity has been the search for purity in terms of functions and forms. This opposition to modernism becomes eloquent in his appreciation of the Classical temple. Le Corbusier had expressed his appreciation of Classical architecture as follows;

The Greeks on the Acropolis set up temples which are animated by a single thought, drawing around them the desolate landscape and gathering in into the composition. Thus on every point of the horizon, the thought is single. It is on this account that there are no other architectural works on this scale of grandeur. We shall be able to talk "Doric" when man, in nobility of aim and complete sacrifice of all that is accidental in Art, has reached the higher levels of the mind: austerity. (4)

For Venturi the Greek temple is appreciated for quite the opposite reasons:

...aesthetic simplicity, which is a satisfaction to the mind derives, when valid and profound, from inner complexity. The Doric temple's simplicity to the eye is achieved through the famous subtleties and precision of its distorted geometry and the contradictions and tensions inherent in its order. The Doric temple could achieve apparent simplicity through real complexity. When complexity disappeared, as in the later temples, blandness replaced simplicity. (5)

Venturi prefers what is central yet directional, big yet small, open yet closed, pure yet distorted. He prefers what finally results in a potential ambiguity. But although he

acknowledges, in quoting Empson, that ambiguity is not always a virtue, he offers no criteria for evaluation. Venturi's approach remains an unconnected multiplicity of architectural expression. What remains important despite these reservations is that he clearly breaks with modernistic purity in order to overcome the duality between the rich historical and popular repertoire and the bareness of modern buildings. By advocating the coexistence of contradicting elements, he attempts to rehabilitate history in a pluralistic sense, but nowhere does he show what elements are in contradiction and in what sense.

Venturi's approach attempts to recover morphological multiplicity in contemporary architecture; multiplicity in terms of materials, colours, as well as, of references and meanings to address human reality forgotten in the abstraction and the geometric purity of the moderns. His insights are of particular importance to our study, insofar as they seek to relate contemporary architecture to the richness of the historical layers of the urban fabric. Architecture in Venturi's view should not be revolutionary and heroic. In contrast to the utopianism of the Modern Movement, he proposes the ordinary, the casual and real as it appears, for instance, in the main street of the American city. He remains sceptical of any sort of order and advocates instead that :

....abstruse architecture is valid when it reflects the complexities and contradictions of content and meaning. Simultaneous perception of a multiplicity of levels involves struggles and hesitations for the observer, and make his perception more vivid. (6)

In general, for Venturi, truth in architecture is bound with duality. Thus, Venturi's ironic attitude to architecture, recalls the mannerists' *capricci*, and is as remote from truth as from any search for rational objectivity and unitary method.

Although Venturi's contribution towards the communicative - and therefore humanistic - dimension of architecture must be acknowledged, reservations and objections arise as to how these levels of multiple reference are interrelated in a meaningful way for the local context at a given setting. What initially appears, in his buildings, to be an openness to the public realm, finally fails to be powerful enough to suggest and evoke multiple readings in a self-generating sense. Venturi's architecture is multisided and multireferential but fails to keep an identity amid this pluralism of forms and meanings. If the dynamics of the main street environment is what he is after, he clearly imitates the final image and not the process behind it, which resulted in this multiplicity . If architecture is to relate to an established environment, it should rather do so in such a way that while addressing contextual levels, it could never fail to present an integrated whole, a complete statement of its intention to relate and the way it attempts to do so, in order to renew it.

In a recent interview Venturi announced that the extension of the National Gallery in London is being conceived in Elizabethan style. It remains with the architect to answer the questions: why Elizabethan? and what could Elizabethan possibly express today? Even if approaches like this can be successful in some cases, they certainly cannot suggest any contribution to the general problem of contextual urban renewal.

2. 3. ALDO ROSSI AND THE REDEMPTION OF URBAN MEMORY

Aldo Rossi's "Architecture of the city" appeared in 1966 and it has been since then the basic text dealing with the problem of urban history and urban memory, as two different routes to the past (7). Urban memory, for Rossi, as a rather subjective redemption of the past, came to compensate for the loss of a rather objective history (8). Rossi's analysis of the temporal qualities of the cities remains of fundamental significance, as far as contemporary intervention in historic cities is concerned. His proposed neo-rationalistic typology however has raised considerable dispute. Rossi's view of the analogic city suggests clearly a rehabilitation of the local elements in terms of a typology which goes beyond specific localities. Analogy, as an approach to architectonic intervention, suggests the importance of the imitative aspects of contemporary architecture alongside the dominant contrasting ones, embedded in modernity. Analogy, as a mode of relating new architecture to old implies a will for a creative dialogue with the past in the place of the modern purity. Rossi's analogic city is similar to, but also different from the historic city and as such it respects both the unity and the diversity of urban life, for every socio-cultural entity. Although Rossi's theory remains unsystematic (9) and highly subjective, he manages to introduce into the debate about contemporary architecture a temporal perspective in its full spectrum of dimensions and nuances.

What is important in Rossi's theory for our purposes, is his insight into the temporal dimension of the city. In his rejection of self-sufficient modernity he seeks to rehabilitate the temporal dimension in the urban environment. He takes for granted the separation of object and subject, (i.e. architecture and architect), and seeks instead to discover the essence of architecture in its process. The process of architectural development *qua* urban history acquires fundamental importance. The city becomes an autonomous entity with its self-generative forces acquiring ultimate significance. Until the 19th century, architectural development was considered to follow natural laws and ever since the laws of historicism. Rossi proposes the idea of urban memory instead. History exists only as long as a building is being used and its form relates to its function; after that, history shifts to the realm of memory. The Roman amphitheatre which determined the shape of the central public space in Lucca belongs to the memory of the place today and is there as its real quality. The

series of transformations which happened to Diocletian's palace in Split are also indicative of the duration of forms, while memory is being embedded in them.

The importance of architectural form, so dominant an issue in the Bauhaus *manifesto*, gives its place, in Rossi's theory, to the process that a form is going under. Changes of use, modifications, transformations of the urban fabric and additions to it, are considered to be more important than architectural form itself. Every building is a carrier of multiple transformations due to socio-cultural life. Rossi makes that clear when saying:

An investigation of the meaning of the relationships between the singularity of form and the multiplicity of functions was the principle object of this study. I still believe today that this relationship constitutes the meaning of architecture... Buildings are seen as structures that have formed and still are forming the city, offering the maximum adaptability to new functions over time. (10)

Meaning in the urban environment resides not in the forms, but beyond them to their "life" as history and memory. Architecture is not the visual image of the cities but the confrontation of precise forms with time. So, architectural form is important because of its specific function at a particular time, but also because it permits other functions, at different times, as well. Rossi clearly shifts emphasis from the morphological and spatial quest of the Moderns to the urban events which legitimize architecture. He tries to define architecture as an organic process and to introduce the importance of time in understanding and contributing to the urban reality of cities.

In his essay "Architecture and the city: past and present" he wrote in 1972:

Whether urban or natural setting, the question cannot be posed solely from the point of view of the relation between old and new, but from the point of view of the necessary modification which is produced with every intervention. In any case the relation with the surrounding world (Umwelt) cannot be an operation of camouflage or imitation; if it is, it is a sign of inadequacy and cultural weakness, whose effects can only be negative. (11)

Rossi's contextual concern is evidently far reaching and profound. He seeks the essence of a place not in its image but in its life process. He comes to realize the creation of buildings in their becoming; the forces which shape them, the events which modify them and the life which sustains them. He considers them responsive to human life. He expresses this eloquently:

In reality architecture is formed with all its history; it grows with its own justifications and only through this process of formation does it fit into the built or natural world which surrounds it. It works then, through its own originality, it establishes a dialectical relationship; then it shapes a situation. (12)

Carrying the importance of the urban process to its extreme, Rossi invents a typology of pure geometric form. Since meaning goes beyond form, the more abstract architectural form can be, the more catalytic it will be for invention and multiple memories. Rossi seeks to avoid types loaded with any particular historical significance. He wants types open to history. Types which mean something are dead and unresponsive to a life process, which is to come. For this reason he introduces pure geometric types so unreal as to be capable of gathering meaning and fill up with memory. Rationalism for Rossi is the best way to understand irrationality and unreal types to address real life. In the formulation and implementation of his types there is a need to avoid any specific history in order to address and anticipate all history, and a need for no specific scale so that his typology to be responsive to all scales. Rossi's types are a-historical and universal.

The dialectic relationship of type and history remains an internal matter for architecture, which is separated from the architect. If modernity attempted to create a heroic image of the architect, the role of the architect for Rossi is almost obsolete since what is important is not the final architectural object but its vitality due to the multiplicity of its possible uses and meanings. Buildings are vehicles for events and not frozen images of them; they actively participate in everyday life and they do not simply follow it.

Rossi dwells on another significant dimension of time, namely, the constructive dimension of time alongside its destructive one. Time conceals rational types and time again reveals them across history. As Rossi expresses it:

Thus the temporal aspect of architecture no longer resides in its dual nature of light and shadow or in the aging of things; it rather presents itself as a catastrophic moment in which time takes things back. (13)

An appreciation of Rossi's theory necessarily raises objections about the role of the architect. Eisenman acknowledges this in his preface to Rossi's book when saying: "This redefinition of the architect as a neutral subject is problematic" (14). Indeed Rossi ascribes to the city a rather idealistic autonomy and self-propelling ability through history. His types acquire a pivotal role to propel the past into the present or anticipate the future. Rossi's concept of the neutral architect can only be justified as an overreaction to the heroic

architect of the Bauhaus. Yet he still acknowledges that the architect is finally the catalyst for the re-emergence of types and their implementation in construction, while in relating new architecture to old:

Every operation carried out in historic centres entails a judgement, and this judgement must be given in the first place in the terms of urban analysis and architecture; situations are too various to be generalized about. (15)

Another objection related to these points, is that Rossi is reluctant to consider the historicity of understanding in general and of the built environment in particular. He clearly attempts to anticipate the future, while he can only be within the limits of a horizon defined by the present. Nostalgic of the future as he appears to be, he creates it in advance. The Modern utopian seems to persist, only this time it appears to emerge from a timeless past.

In seeking to address metaphysical typologies, as the only permanence amid the constant process of architectural development, Rossi does not pay adequate attention to the immediately important local situation in the settings he builds into. His buildings become, because of that, far too eclectic and elitist. Although his analysis of the cities hints at and addresses the profundity of urban life, his buildings fail to articulate a meaningful statement in their specific context and his autobiographical reading of history scarcely results in communicative buildings engaged with local spatial and temporal qualities.

History is full of examples of buildings surviving their original use and outliving their original use. But all these buildings were, at least at the time of their creation, genuine expressions of the times, then subsequently legitimized in the following periods of time they survived. Rossi's types, in contrast, belong everywhere and for that reason nowhere in particular. Their intention to go beyond history places these types more comfortably in history, since they relate only to the time of their creation. They remain monuments of events that never happened! Rossi's types aim at permanence through their repetition but this alone is not enough to validate them.

A repetitive typology alone is not sufficient to generate meanings in the built environment. Rossi's interpretation of historic settings in terms of recurrent types and their potentiality to acquire several meanings across time cannot be taken as a justification for his proposed typology, or as a suggestion for new architecture in historic settings. Rossi seems to equate his personal reading of the process of architectural development with the process itself. We can illustrate this point by using here one of his analogies.

In his "Scientific autobiography" Rossi recalls that in pursuing the experience of this permanent quality of repetition he used to go to the cinema when the film was half over or just ending in order to:

...meet the characters in their conclusive moments...rediscovering the action that happened earlier or imagine an alternative. (16)

Although his personal adventures suggest a highly creative reading of films it is dubious if this could be a suggestion for film making. Were films made incomplete, Rossi's personal reading, if possible, should become problematic.

2. 4. COLIN ROWE AND THE COMPROMISE BETWEEN THE HUMANISTIC VIEW OF HISTORY AND THE LIBERAL UTOPIA

The theory developed by Colin Rowe and the Cornell School of Architecture can be considered as the most comprehensive attempt to deal with the relation of contemporary architecture to existing settings.

In dealing with the Modern movement and the work of Le Corbusier in particular, Rowe as early as 1947, came to realize the problems of modernity (17). The normative, rational and liberal utopia of the Moderns, by the Sixties, produced rupture with the historic centres and a discontinuity in human life. At the Cornell School of Architecture, Camillo Sitte's "town planning according to artistic principles" became the subject/object of extensive study and the theory of contextualism was gradually formulated in projects and theses (18).

According to this theory urban space is divided into two types, the traditional space considered to be carved out of a solid traditional mass and the Modern space considered to be Le Corbusier's "city in the park". The traditional city fails to meet our needs for open space and autonomous artefacts; the Modern city, the city in the park, lacks the profundity and the vitality we associate with urban experience. On the basis that the coexistence of both spaces could solve the dualism and reconcile the traditional with the Modern in the urban realm, contextualism basically seeks to introduce the communicative dimension in architecture and a gesture of consent to its mimetic element alongside its plea for contrast (19).

Modern artefacts had been considered as complete in themselves, in the manner of the vest-pocket Renaissance utopias. Dealing with ideals and prototypes Modern

architecture had forgotten how to conform to the site. Thomas Schumacher wrote characteristically:

It is precisely the ways in which idealised forms can be adjusted to a context or used as collage that contextualism seeks to explain and it is the systems of geometric organization which can be abstracted from any given context that contextualism seeks to divine as design tools. (20)

The design tools of contextualism appeared in a thesis explaining the nature of the void as figure and the solid as ground (21). Deformation of ideal types could happen only through their very coexistence with the traditional urban fabric. Interaction and coexistence of unrelated or familiar things in alien contexts in the manner of cubism and collage became the main strategy for juxtaposing established contexts and Modern ideals. But now the ideal types were not new creations of the mind, as they were for the Moderns, but a selection from the most celebrated periods of European architecture. In Colin Rowe's and Fred Koetter's book "COLLAGE CITY", contextualism theory, in the form of a speculative field, is presented and the following discussion will basically refer to that.

The Modern utopia once again is defined as the departure point for contemporary architecture, although a profound need for a new interpretation is acknowledged. The main dualism that this Modernism carries, is the one between science and people or in Rowe's words:

...for this was a city (the modern) in which all authority was to be dissolved, all convention superseded; in which change was to be continuous and order simultaneously complete. (22)

And furthermore:

...modern architecture professing to be scientific displayed a wholly naive idealism... Or, alternatively, modern architecture, professing to be humane displayed a wholly unacceptable and sterile scientific rigour. ... For the two increasingly desperate obligations of the architect- on the one hand to "science" and on the other to "people"-continue to persist;... Let science build the town and let the people build the town are both of them profoundly neurotic. (23)

The basic thesis of contextualism formulated out of this duality is:

A proposal for constructive dis-illusion. It is simultaneously an appeal for order and disorder, for the simple and the complex, for the joint existence of permanent reference and random happening, of the private and public, of innovation and tradition, of both the retrospective and the prophetic gesture. To us the occasional virtues of the modern city seem to be patent and the problem remains how, while allowing for the need of a "modern" declamation, to render these virtues responsive to circumstance. (24)

The changelessness of the Renaissance utopia and the progressivism of the Modern utopia seem to be the two poles of the architectural pendulum.

Utopia may instruct, civilize and even edify the political society which is exposed to it. It may do all this, but for all that it cannot any more than the work of art, become alive. It cannot, that is, become the society which it changes and it cannot therefore change itself. (25)

The contradictions of the Moderns seem to be recapitulated in the problem of putting together contradictory ideas; a combination of progressivism and classicism, evolution and perfection, utopia and freedom. In such a predicament there are two ways out: "utopian myth and the reality of freedom or, the reality of utopian and the myth of freedom" (26). Architecture should mediate between the city as theatre of memory and the city as prophecy. Without prophecy we do not have hope, while without memory we do not have communication. So there is a need for the process of anticipation and retrospection to be complementary, and for novelty to be related to the known, mundane and memory-laden (27).

Rowe argues throughout his book that the whole theoretical debate and specifically the problem of dualities penetrates the planning debate. Traditional city vs modern city, space vs object, accident vs archetypes, void vs solid; and as far as the architect is concerned, "scientist" of the Versailles vs the "bricoleur" of the villa Adriana - Versailles being the typical example of central vision utopia, while Tivoli represents the accumulation of set pieces in collision. As far as the architect as scientist or as a bricoleur is concerned, Rowe explains:

...the artist is both something of a scientist and of a bricoleur but if artistic creation lies mid-way between science and *bricolage* this is not to imply that the bricoleur is backward. It might be said that the engineer questions the universe while the bricoleur addresses himself to a collection of oddments left

over from human endeavours but it must also be insisted that there is no question of primacy here. Simply the scientist and the bricoleur are to be distinguished by the inverse functions which they assign to events and structures as means and ends. The scientist creating events by means of structures and the bricoleur creating structures by means of events... If this is the situation...then why should this dialectical predicament be not just as much accepted in theory as in practice. (28)

So, the strategy of bricolage or of collision city emerges. Ideal types can be fused together with existing settings to produce their own dialectics. Piranesi's Campo Marzio can be considered the archetype of this strategy (29) (Fig. 2. 1). Collage can be considered a further elaboration of the politics of bricolage if the latter is intended differently from a capricious attitude. According to the approach chosen, each object can retain its identity while gaining a new impact from the context.

The dialectic interaction of utopia and tradition as the only reservoirs for human life, seems to constitute the hub of contextualism. The dialectics of new and old remains unresolvable because both are equally important. There is no such a thing as a synthesis for contextualism; only coexistence, and there is nothing wrong about it. For Rowe, utopia and tradition : "Whether separately or together, positive or negative have been the ultimate servicing agents for all the various cities of science and people "(30).

The dialectics of opposing realities, that is, between the reality of tradition and the reality of utopia, seems to be the ultimate human situation: a constant oscillation between order and freedom. In this sense contextualism offers profound insights for the critical examination of the problem of how to relate contemporary architecture to existing settings. Dialectics between what is there and what is introduced must be kept alive if architectural process is to keep up with socio-cultural life. Nevertheless, the design strategy of Rowe's contextualism seems inadequate to achieve a balance within this laborious process. Utopia must supersede the existing reality - in Mannheim's terms - but this does not mean that it can be the same everywhere. Utopia has to be differentiated too, since its atypicality must relate in antithetical terms to the topical idiom and in this sense it is hard to agree with the contextualists' credo that:

The objects can be aristocratic or they can be folkish, academic or popular, whether they originate in Pergamum or Dahomey, in Detroit or Dubrovnic, whether their implications are of the 20th or the 15th century is no great matter. (31)

Contextualism being a theory in the sense of a broad speculative inquiry into urban dialectics, defies any criticism in the analytical tradition. More specifically it defies its refutation on the basis of its contradictions since it is an attempt to show the positive value of realities acknowledged as opposite, for instance the reality of utopia and the reality of tradition. Any critical remark could only emerge on the same speculative level if it is to be constructive towards the contradictory truths postulated by contextualism. Yet, it should not fail to identify errors or false truths. Acceptance of opposing truths does not mean uncritical legitimization or an impasse for validation (32).

Novelty and change, professed by modernity, are human needs and the Modern Movement in architecture expressed these needs and still constitutes our only resource towards that end; but it must be endowed with a responsiveness to the local. Current movements, such as post-modernism and neo-rationalism, to mention two, although they critically expose the illusions of the Moderns, have no alternative, but to feed on it. Contextualism attempts to mediate between social perfection and social continuity by the incremental insertion of the modern utopia, with further possibilities either to be absorbed by gradual modifications in the context or acting as a collage. A discourse between ideal objects and pragmatic contexts is attempted by using the whole arsenal of modern object typology as the only way towards urban renewal. According to Kevin Lynch, Colin Rowe ...

... manipulates applied symbols in a free and eclectic way meaning by such allusions to deepen the symbolic resonance of his buildings. Under the fond illusion that meaning resides in the object, he plays an esoteric game, whose messages may shortly be exhausted or become incomprehensible once the shock is over. (33)

In all the projects of the Cornell school we find the implementations of fixed types as, for instance, the "linear type" (34). These types are to be inserted in the traditional context and afterwards to be modified in trying to achieve unity with their context. At the same time they will introduce the Modern utopia into the traditional contexts, as a means of changing them and rendering them contemporary.

The question which remains unanswered throughout contextualism as a theoretical discussion and a strategy for design is: what about the derivation of the types? Where^{do} these types or ideals or fragments of utopia come from? What about their dimensions and levels of dialectical interaction with the fabric of the historic city?

Rowe's references to Popper do not help, because the modern fallacy of architecture as science seems to creepⁱⁿ again despite Rowe's arguments that architecture is between

science and bricolage. The scientific analogy is inadequate to explain the process of architectural development. Science progresses by explaining more and more^{and} by testing new theories. A new theory takes the place of an earlier one, if it explains more phenomena than its predecessor. It cannot be the same with arts and architecture in particular, where aesthetic criteria are always historically and culturally determined without reference to objective data and quantified reality.

The concept of the existing traditional city as a two-dimensional canvas of solid-void serves the abstraction needed for the insertion of the set-pieces. Even if we accept Rowe's dialectical process between typology and context there can be much dispute as to the possibilities of such an interaction. Dialectical interaction is an active process of assimilation and for that reason every typology must have the prerequisites to establish such a dialogue. Here again, we have to emphasize that the opposites must have a communicative basis, in order to establish a dialogue. Furthermore these opposites must be complementary at the same level, for their dialectics to be revealed; otherwise any new element selectively chosen could be justified through dialectics. One further quality of the opposing elements must be their equal importance. They must be opposing realities not a reality and its negation. Dialectical opposites must ensue from their interaction and not^{be} assumed as such.

The figure-ground plan of cities does not offer the best possible comprehensive field towards establishing a convincing dialogue between the existing settings and architectonic intervention. In general, contextualism seeks another universal method for intervention instead of searching for local contexts and local utopias. Even if the local identity is addressed through various modification of the types, we cannot accept the value of any pre-conceived type independently of the place where it is going to be inserted, no matter what modifications it is going under. It makes no difference if the realm of ideal types consists of the world's most celebrated "set-pieces" as, for instance, types of the Italian Renaissance. These pieces do not necessarily "add" meaning to cities in North America.

Collision, collage and final resolution cannot happen necessarily, because of some intrinsic value of the types, or if they can indeed, wherever ideal types and any setting are juxtaposed, we no longer talk of the value of collage since the whole merit goes to the value of the types and not the way they are modified to relate. The cubists' notion of collage, so often referred to in "Collage City", refers to the synthetic elements of collage, the way these elements are interrelated and interacting to create a unity. Disparate objects, selectively chosen, cannot necessarily - and indeed should not - constitute a collage synthesis, if collage is to remain a creative act.

In the Minneapolis project there is a profound concern to mine architectural history

for prototypes in order to change the existing context. Fragments of Padua and Isola Bella are used as the "set-pieces" of utopian fragments. In this project, formal and monumental attitudes are revealed. Criticism seems to be surprisingly easy.

Even if we accept architects' tendency or fascination for monumentality, for some reason the problem remains as to how this result can be achieved. First of all, a communicative basis must be established so that any statement from the artist, as for instance indication for monumentality, ^{is} to be of some meaning. This holds true even if we want to create something alien and contrasting to a specific context. Acknowledgement of the context must precede every intervention whatever the intention of the intervention should be. The context could be the social, cultural or spatial dimension of a setting to whatever degree of the adjacent buildings and the specific user or the cultural identity of the whole setting and so forth. In any specific project, we cannot accept that fragments of Padua will have any meaning and there is no obvious reason why they should have. The neutral grid of the American cities does not imply that we can introduce anything and Padua fragments cannot be considered as something more than anything else.

Following the same argument we cannot introduce Hadrian's villa somewhere else in the world for several reasons. First of all, why is Hadrian's villa considered of objective, undisputable value? Even if it is somehow, why should it create equal fascination, or be considered potential enough to enrich any other place? In any case, how many types like this can an urban tissue resist?

If Rowe does not make use of the specific, historical - and unique - significance of the type, then what is it that qualifies this type as significant? On the other hand, if he makes use of its specific characteristics then what are the connections with the different contexts, where does it intend to be applied? These questions hold true and stubbornly haunt the use of all types and parts of them. Types out of context can only create a city museum and this kind of substitution of the life process of a setting by a static image of phenomenal plurality, can only infer rupture between socio-cultural life and its environment. It might create an interesting allusion and could even be appropriate in a certain case, but it does not - and cannot - constitute a strategy for urban renewal. If a type is to be relevant for a setting, a dialectical process between this type and its context must precede and penetrate the process of its formation. It has to be partially shaped by the context, before it can communicate with it and subsequently change it.

2. 5. THE NEED FOR A SPATIO-TEMPORAL APPROACH TO CONTEXTUALISM

In discussing the theories of Venturi, Rossi and Rowe, we have come to realize the most important shortcomings of the Modern Movement in architecture for the present study. It has become evident that a redefinition of contemporary architecture in relation to its past is necessary, in order to assess the situation and stimulate proper intervention in historic settings. Venturi's insights draw attention to the antithetical values in architecture and advocate the reconsideration of architectural qualities lost due to the "scientific" rigour of Modernism. Rossi argues for the coherency between old and new that ensues after a proper understanding of the architectural process. Rowe reconsiders the Modern ideals in relation to existing contexts. These approaches are indicative of the broader field of the Post-Modern debate and cover a number of theories for the reconstruction of the city. What they show us is that a new theoretical framework is needed to address the problems of contemporary architecture (35).

All three theories deal in their own way with the problem of relating the new to the old in architecture through the redefinition of the new in the light of the old. They all argue for a dialectical relationship between contemporary architecture and established environments, either in formal terms (Venturi) or in terms of history and memory in the diachronic urban process (Rossi) or in terms of utopian ideal and freedom in human reality (Rowe). Venturi helps us to re-evaluate ambiguity in architectural form and understand its inner dialectics, Rossi helps us to understand that the essence of architectural heritage resides in its process propelled by permanent types, while Rowe guides us to reconsider history in order to legitimize utopia.

The limitations of each theory also deserve our attention. Venturi argues that the "main street architecture" is good and does not provide any suggestion as to how contradictions on several levels are to be interrelated in a building, so as to receive a multiplicity of meanings without losing its identity. He gives no indication on how ambiguity and complexity as positive qualities are to be safeguarded against chaos and haphazardness.

Rossi, in his buildings, becomes very selective when it comes to addressing the urban memory of a place. Aiming at an objective memory, he fails to acknowledge the multiplicity of temporalities which characterize every place. His abstraction of the temporal qualities of places into selective types finally reduces the vitality of places and remains meaningless monumentality. Furthermore, meaning for Rossi resides only in history and memory and the best any contemporary architectural novelty can do, is to revive the memory of the place.

Rowe softens the utopian ideal in terms of scale and intervention process but fails to relate a particular place to its particular utopia. Rowe's utopian fragments are so alien to the specific localities that any engagement is impossible or at least equally possible with anything else. The context and its history for Rowe remain as a background and not a creative source. We do not imply here that novelty comes totally from what is there already, but rather that not any novelty will do anywhere. For Venturi there is no utopia, for Rossi it is hidden in the urban memory while for Rowe it is always important as a change agent, through collision, collage and final assimilation to established environments.

This discussion provides the background for the approach proposed in this thesis. A theoretical framework is needed to encompass the above contributions so that novelty in historical environments could be communicative, meaningful and important. Imitation of the past, on whatever level, is equally important as contrast to it, on the same level of consideration. Anchorage of any architectonic intervention to the past of its specific locality, is equally important with the anticipation of future architectural development.

Rossi tries to establish a permanency in the built environment through the repetition of archetypes established in an axiomatic sense; Venturi tries to establish the ephemeral as permanent; and Rowe tries to borrow the permanence of the past. In terms of imitation and contrast, Venturi's buildings contrast with the purity and coherence of single buildings in order to imitate -in one building- the complex vitality of the urban environment. Rossi's buildings contrast with the image of the city, in order to imitate what he considers to be the essential permanent characteristics of the cities, which are hidden, transformed and may be forgotten, but are nevertheless alive. Rowe's urban projects contrast with the existing plan only in order to imitate the process of absorption into the process of architectural development.

What appears to be problematic, is that imitation and contrast are used as widely and vaguely as they could be. Both notions achieve such a wide range of meanings that they are finally rendered meaningless. If Venturi imitates the main street and the billboard, how is his architecture to be conceived as ambiguous as he appears to intend? It is not ambiguous, it is the architecture of the provincial American city. If Rossi wants his types to address the essence of urban history and memory, and not the image of it, why does he render timeless archetypes as historically appearing artefacts? Finally, if Rowe intends to imitate the dynamics of urban development through collage, what are the qualifications of his ideal types for such a purpose?

In the light of these problematic issues a redefinition of imitation and contrast as modes of relating contemporary architecture to existing settings is needed, so as to operate

in a contextual consideration aware of local qualities, particular characteristics and a unique identity. A profound and far reaching discourse has to be established if architectural novelty is to become as important and meaningful as the existing architectural heritage. Such a confrontation between new and old could be the best possible filter for the redefinition of existing settings and the reconsideration of new contributions to them. The following chapters make some proposals towards this end.

CHAPTER THREE

THE IMITATION - CONTRAST DIALECTICS IN RELATING NEW ARCHITECTURE TO OLD SETTINGS

3. 1. INTRODUCTION - CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

In this chapter we will attempt to formulate a dialectic theoretical schema between the notions of imitation and contrast. The relations between new and old architecture could then be considered and described more adequately as instances of the dialectical interplay between imitation and contrast.

Imitation as an attitude implies an intention for sameness with something, whether we refer to the designer's intention or the interpreter's, as far as the product of imitation is concerned (1). Contrast on the other hand implies an intention for difference. Again, contrast is not whatever cannot be considered as imitation; if such would be the case even indifferent attitudes could be taken as contrast. Contrast is used in this study as an intentional attitude either on the designer's side in his attempt to produce new architecture, or on the interpreter's side in his attempt to understand and evaluate new architecture in old settings.

Imitation and contrast, as well as other attitudes which could be conceived as 'in between', with imitation and contrast considered as dialectic opposites, imply relation to something. Whether we imitate something or contrast to it, we nevertheless relate to that thing one way or another. The notions of imitation and contrast in that sense arise as dialectical entities in relation to a common context which unites them and provides the basis for their opposition to operate.

A theoretical account of imitation and contrast in their full philosophical implications and dimensions are beyond the limits of this study. Nonetheless, a theoretical discussion of them will put the specific problem of architectural renewal in a broader perspective and provide a useful basis towards a solution.

The notion of identity is here used in relation to the notions of imitation and contrast, i.e. the ability and the quality at the same time of something to be recognised as an imitation to some extent of something while at the same time is also recognisable as a contrast to it. In other words, it will be conceived as identity of the new architecture in an old setting the property of being itself while relating to the broader context where it is being grafted and belongs to. Imitation in that sense bestows sameness and renders something familiar, recognizable and meaningful in context i.e. in relation to what it imitates, while contrast in an already recognised thing bestows difference and renders it individualistic and meaningful because of its particularity within its context.

A central question to the whole debate is: Who intends to imitate or contrast and who judges the result? The architect's role, as it is conceived in this study, is to present an intentional attitude towards relating new and old in the built environment, although in the end the new building itself *vis a vis* its context will be interpreted and evaluated by people experiencing it.

Imitation and contrast thus are the conceptual tools^{with} which we assess the relations between new and old architecture. In the first part we will deal with the importance of imitation in artistic creation -why imitation, as well as a consideration of imitation and its context-what is being imitated, in relation to the problem of how do we imitate after having defined what do we have to imitate - how to imitate.

As far as we consider the relations between contemporary architecture and old settings, we have first of all to consider what should be related i.e. What aspect, part or dimension of the old setting is to be the object to be imitated in new architecture. Furthermore we have to consider how to imitate, because even if what is to be imitated is defined, several imitational responses are still possible. In the final part we will suggest a dialectic conceptualization of imitation and contrast and will examine the potential of their interplay in relating new architecture to old.

3. 2. THE NOTION OF IMITATION

3. 2. 1. MIMESIS BEFORE PLATO

The notion of imitation can be traced back to the Latin *imitatio* and the Greek *mimesis*. By exploring the meanings it has acquired in the course of time in relation to the arts we can justify and show the importance ascribed to the term in the present essay. This discussion of imitation in its full spectrum of meanings and connotations seems important

for the purposes of this study especially because imitation as a term has been misused and abused extensively by architects in their attempt to justify their new architecture in old settings. It is not totally far from truth also that imitation sometimes implies a pejorative attribute.

Mimesis was a very popular term in ancient Greece and embodied all sorts of different meanings. Etymologically, it is the acting of a *mimos*, and it was generally attributed to mean, and still in modern Greek means, somebody who expresses something by acting.

Connected originally with the Dionysian cult of expressive ritual mimicry in the dances of priests signified the 'expression of feelings and the manifestation of experiences through movements, sounds, words' (2).

Later with the gradual transformation of the Dionysian cult into the Apollinian (3), the term came to mean 'acting' in a theatrical sense. During the classical period its meaning shifted from the expressive arts to the constructive ones, of which architecture was the most important (4). This shift was followed by a third one which attributed to *mimesis* the meaning of likeness of appearances in paintings and words, shifting the meaning of *mimesis* from expression to representation (5).

Heracleitus was probably the first to employ the term *mimesis* to describe the imitation of nature in her ways of action (6), followed later by Democritus who not only related art and nature through *mimesis*, but also defined art as dependent on nature, in accordance with the second meaning of *mimesis*, i.e. how do we build and construct things imitating nature's ways (7).

Before Democritus but belonging to the same Dorian tradition, in opposition to the Ionian theorists of nature, Pythagoreans dealt with the establishment of objective mathematical canons in art in the model of music. For them *mimesis* in art was synonymous with the imitation of harmony inherent in numerical proportions which regulated the *cosmos* (8). *Rhythms were likenesses, homoiomata* of the psyche, through which psyche conformed to nature (9). Art was a formal manifestation of mathematical proportions which were unique and objective and *mimesis* the expression of their inner character (10).

Parmenidean philosophy inaugurated a decisive turning point in the history of philosophy. It separated the 'way of truth', the objective essence of things from the 'way of seeming', the appearance of things perceived by the human senses. This dualism is the basis of the relativism which later was employed in the aesthetics of the Sophists, who moved away from naturalistic philosophy and centered their philosophy upon man (11).

The famous Protagorean motto 'man is the measure of things' marks a shift towards humanization in philosophy and art shared also by Socrates. For the first time the arts, as purposeful products of man, are considered to be opposed to nature. The Sophist Gorgias went so far as to say that all representations are illusions and *mimesis* creates such illusions. For the Sophists, tragedy, by means of legends and emotions, creates a deception in which the deceiver is more honest than the non-deceiver and the deceived is wiser than the non-deceived. In tragedy and in painting those are best who are the best at leading into error by creating things which resemble real ones (12).

So, for the Sophists *mimesis* of real things although *apate*, i.e. deception, hallucination or delusion, acquires a creative character and a positive value. This creative character of *mimesis* liberated it from dependence upon nature and inferiority towards her. Through the humanistic, relativistic philosophical framework of the Sophists *mimesis* was not just copying a part of nature but adding, transforming and improving on her as well.

Socrates distinguished between arts that create things which do not exist in nature and arts which have an imitative and representational character. Arts of representation, in their attempt to imitate nature, compensate for their partial view with a selection of elements and a idealization of the work of art. *Mimesis* came to mean representation in the form of copying reality through selections havingⁱⁿ mind an aim at an ideal form (13).

Art in Socratic terms acquired a humanistic character and became capable of expressing individuality. *Mimesis* ceased to be an abstract notion and referred to physical things. But, nevertheless Socrates distinguished between a thing beautiful in a rather objective way, of perfect form *eurhythmon kat' eauton* and a thing which was beautiful due to its purposefulness and utility *eurhythmon pros ton chromenon* (14). So, *mimesis* for Socrates was representation, reproduction of reality and bearer of its ideal image ^{the} at same time.

3. 2. 2. PLATO ON MIMESIS AND ARTISTIC CREATION

In the Platonic writings we find all the diverse meanings of *mimesis*. Ranging from the most significant appraisal of the arts in the Symposium to the sheer condemnation of them in book X of the Republic, we rather find in his work a sort of negative definition of art and *mimesis*. Through the discussion of particular attempts at definition, represented as opinions of the Sophists but no doubt Platonic dilemmas as well, *mimesis* acquired in Plato's dialectical approach a comprehensive theoretical framework. Plato's deep concern in condemning *mimesis* of reality in art as copying of copies, twice remote from the real world of 'ideas', reveals the strength of his belief in the value of *mimesis* in artistic creation. It is because he acknowledges something beyond mere copying in *mimesis* that makes

him to continue and advance the debate towards defining and describing it.

The Greek archaeologist Manolis Andronikos in his thesis on Platonic aesthetics attempts a re-reading of the Platonic works by adopting a dialectical framework where the notion of play is attributed a positive role in artistic creation (15). Andronikos' dialectical methodology claims a close relevance to our approach and for that reason we will draw on his work for a while. He clearly breaks with the German idealist tradition of Kant and Hegel and interprets Plato's "ideas" as fictional dialectical entities rather than in any spiritual sense. Plato's ideas, Andronikos argues, are only conceptual creations which nevertheless endow with meaning any inquiry towards them.

Platonic dialectics despite their indefiniteness are considered as ontologically significant. Plato, as interpreted in this thesis is neither the idealist that the German Romantics wanted to see in him, nor the logician that English analytic philosophy has suggested (16). Platonic dialectics are here considered as inquiries open to the world. What often appears as contradictory in Plato's discussion of art is nothing but part of the dialectician's way towards the "truth" in art, whatever that might be.

Apparently Plato found the resolution of his inquiry within a continuous dialectical process recalling thus the Heracleitean way of theorizing. Plato's discussion is not static and what is more important it does not aim at a final objective and positive definition. Employing a dialectical approach, Plato rejects several accounts of *mimesis*, but finally is presented again with the *aporia*, no end, no limit (17). This kind of *aporia* does not suggest the *ignoramus ignoramus* motto of the agnostics, but rather presents a dynamic mode of inquiring leading the debate to an ever creative level. The ambiguity and the openness of the Platonic *aporia* is what we are left with while the solution in Plato's eyes must lie on a meta-dialectical level of inquiry, however fictional that may be (18). It is in that sense that the 'ideas' for Plato present just a dialectical feature, a tool in his inquiry about things, a fictional end and not a definite, deontological *telos* (19).

Mimesis for Plato is like a mirror (20). It reflects images of images, yet it is attributed a creative role in the arts (21). Through *mimesis* art is able not only to follow and repeat nature but create as well what nature lacks. The expressional quality of traditional imitative arts such as dance shifted to the quality of being different from reality (22). In one of his classifications Plato distinguishes between productive and imitative arts (23). In *Cratylus* *mimesis* is a symbol which cannot help in scientific knowledge (24). Nevertheless, Andronikos argues:

It is its own being, aiming at its own *telos*. Platonic thought starts to be directed to the limit where aesthetic and cognitive phenomena are separated. (25)

The imitator cannot get scientific knowledge through imitating. *Mimesis* is not *spoudi*, serious endeavour for the discovery of things, but play (26).

Plato's thought captures the dialectical process which imitation and contrast imply. Similarity and difference, image and soul, reflection and thing, are but instances of the above dialectics. He starts condemning *mimesis* as mere copying of reality which does not offer anything. He then acknowledges positive values in it and again refutes it in the ideal city. *Mimesis* in the Platonic dialogues is not something definite but rather a powerful theoretical field which is constantly revealed and concealed in our attempt to interpret a work of art as *mimesis*. The original parallelism of *mimesis* with the mirror has vanished to give its place to a fresh representation of the world, to a new creation. This new creation is derived from what the imitator is imitating, but yet is something new (27).

The dialectics of the opposites in a never ending quest (28), is what constitutes the essence of the Platonic approach to the notion of *mimesis*. Art for Plato in its way to imitate and through that to create, is but play (29), and although play is considered the opposite of *spoudi*, i.e. serious scholarship, nevertheless 'only the play of art is the most technical and the most graceful play of man' (30). Play and 'spoudi' are thus different states and their diametrical opposition proves their affinity (31). Play is not 'spoudi' in the sense that it is aimless and does not follow any systematic and logically consistent methods but nevertheless it is *spoudi* in the sense that describes adequately the mimetic process.

Play is even claimed to acquire higher seriousness than *spoudi* (32). *Spoudi* represents the dogmatic Plato who aims at a logical explanation, while play represents the sceptic Plato who understands the indefinite nature of things. Play and 'spoudi' represent an antinomy and not a contradiction. Contradiction is one thing and antinomy another, i.e. contradiction is the logical opposition, while antinomy is struggle and rivalry of opposing ways to truth (33).

3. 2. 3. ARISTOTLE ON MIMESIS AND ART

Aristotle in his systematic discussion of *mimesis* and art adopts the same assumption as his master Plato: art is the *mimesis* of nature (34).

For Aristotle arts either complement nature with what she is unable to do or imitate her in what she has done (35). Arts in his thought achieve a indisputable creative status and *mimesis* has not at all the meaning of slavishly copying but rather is able to produce things uglier or more beautiful than they are in nature. So there are three ways of imitating nature:

1. Imitating to produce *mimemata* as they are found in nature.

2. Imitating to produce *mimemata* better than their natural model.
3. Imitating to produce *mimemata* worse than their natural model (36).

Aristotle goes so far as to accept even the introduction of the impossible in art arguing that plausible impossibilities are to be preferred in art to implausible possibilities (37).

In his famous definition of tragedy we find emphasized the original meaning of *mimesis* as free acting, which encompasses both a representational and a creative dimensions.

What is of great importance to our study is that *mimesis* for Aristotle is the means and the end of the artist. *Mimesis* alone distinguishes an artist from a non-artist. But the artist is not supposed to copy material reality as it appears in the everyday world. His task is to imitate in order to recreate the inner character of reality, what aestheticians as Groos called *innere Nachahmung*, inner imitation (38).

There is no doubt that Aristotle conceives the notion of imitation in the context of the tragedies where the actor imitates (assimilates and expresses) reality and the degree of similarity to it determines the evaluation of his performance.

Even if reality is conceived in a comprehensive sense, including the expression and the compassion of the human soul, nevertheless art is subjected to rational laws of evaluation. Art in its Aristotelian sense offers its mimetic character as the most objective criterion for its evaluation (39). *Mimesis* in creating art is considered as *spoudi*, i.e. serious scholarship and conformation to objective laws of logic.

Art is conceived as a science the object of which is the *katholou*, the catholic, universal, permanent and logically coherent laws of nature (40). Aristotle reacting to Plato's conceptualization of *mimesis* and art as play, attributed to artists the duty of introducing order and reason to the chaos of everyday human activities. The everyday world, for Aristotle is a haphazard, trivial, transitory and arbitrary one and the artist creates out of this a *cosmos*, an ordered whole. The Greek scholar Ioannis Sycoutris intelligently remarks that perhaps this is the reason why Aristotle thought of the drama as the best of the arts. It is in drama more than in any other art that an austere, logical coherence is needed to address simultaneously different people (41). From the hybrid everyday reality which is loaded with all sorts of rational and irrational activities, feelings and passions, the dramatist must create ordered human situations which must be recognised by all spectators even if the logical coherency presented is unreal. In that sense drama, addressing human life in the most direct way, has to achieve the most difficult task of all arts in being accepted by all human beings, the life of which is imitated on the stage.

Perceptual objects for Aristotle contain in themselves their essence, the *katholou* and their imitation is not considered as being copies of copies of the real. The artist is not away from truth.

3. 2. 4. THE MIMETIC APORIA

Artistic creation for Plato can only be conceived as representation of "ideas". As the German philosopher Hans-Georg Gadamer argues:

-...it is part of the nature of *mimema* that it represents something different from what it itself contains. Thus mere imitation, being like, always offers a starting point for reflecting on the ontological gap between the imitation and the original. (42)

Plato argues that art through *mimesis* represents the original but this is not to diminish the value of *mimesis*. Representation for Plato is recognition of the original and this implies that a *mimic* situation not only involves what is represented being there, but also that it has in this way come to exist more fully. *Mimesis* not only represents but also brings forth the original acquiring a revelatory character.

So *mimesis* is representation but this does not affect its cognitive and creative value since, after all, all knowledge for Plato is representation and recognition. By recognition we are able to grasp the essence of the original. Recognition in Gadamer's words is that kind of representation which leaves behind everything accidental and unessential (43).

What constitutes the ambiguous point in Plato's theory of imitation is the remaining gulf between the original and the *mimema* which calls for a metaphysical explanation, although an unavoidable one.

Aristotle, on the other hand, argues for the autonomy of art which is considered to be a conscious production based on knowledge and general rules (44). Art for Aristotle is a precise science, which by employing logical clarity, coherence and necessity, aims at imitating and presenting the ideal forms of nature and not the typical, everyday, pragmatic ones which are full of generalities, typicalities and logical inconsistencies. The notion of *katholou*, which guides *mimesis* as a logically based serious attempt (*spoudi*), is where Aristotle squeezes in his metaphysical assumptions. Gadamer, interpreting the Platonic *mimesis* along the same lines with our previous analysis, criticizes the Aristotelian approach as follows:

...(Aristotle) is based on the presupposition of a thing in itself with which the intellectual notion - be it mere reproduction or independent creation - can correspond. Only if the necessity of this correspondence is guaranteed by a principle in one way or another divine. In epistemology the presupposition of this thing in itself was profoundly shaken by Kant; in art theory a similar view was proposed by Alois Riegl... Thus the opposition, between idealism and naturalism..., must in final analysis appear as dialectical antinomy. (45)

The other important issue raised here is that for Plato an artist produces a work of art i.e. the artist is a maker, while it is the dialectician (i.e.the intellectual) who complements the work of art. The intellectual recognises, interprets and understands it as a representation of its original. It is important to stress at this point that nowhere the possibility is excluded of the artist being the interpreter (the dialectician or the intellectual) as well.

Beauty is not achieved in the work of art itself by its interpreter. Art for Plato needs participation in order to be rendered meaningful and it is in that sense that *mimesis* alone is useless (46). Plato condemns art as an end in itself and tries to find its evaluative criteria in the intellectual interpretative process.

For Aristotle art is important in itself, not as a means to beauty. For Aristotle *mimesis* is an all encompassing concept which establishes an objective framework for art (although he defines it nowhere) (47).

Mimesis for Plato is the means for the intellect to grasp the truth. Art is only justified in its interpretation, where *mimesis* finds its place. Aristotle thought of art as a systematic approach to truth, a science which follows the laws of logic. For Plato, art is a never ending inquiry, a ludic process.

3. 2. 5. THE CLASSICAL AFTERMATH

All subsequent accounts of *mimesis* attempt a compromise between the Platonic and the Aristotelian approaches. Philostratus in the context of the extreme subjectivism of the Stoics praised more than any other the imagination of the artist who by being free to choose and fuse together themes, becomes more effective in rendering the truth (48).

For the Stoics, subjective eurythmy became more important than symmetry and the part in a work of art is justified per se and not as an integral part of the whole. Generally speaking, during the Hellenistic era the representational dimension of imitation is less important, while the expression of the artist's soul, the artist's imagination is considered to

be of the greatest importance in *mimesis*.

For Cicero the exemplar, i.e. the model or the idea, exists in the artist's mind. What has been for Plato an abstract and transcendental mental form, for Cicero exists inside the artist's mind. *Imitatio* for Cicero is the active manifestation of concrete perceptible forms, i.e. images in the artist's mind (49).

The basic assumption of art as the imitation of nature survived all accounts on *mimesis* and only in Horace's discussion of *mimesis* the object of imitation shifted from nature to its own body. The Aristotelian imitation of nature, Horace's point of departure, turns to imitation of art itself (50). In the Renaissance artists imitate nature and the glorious ancients and this is considered the same. Pope in his essay on criticism expresses it eloquently:

"Those rules of old discover'd, not devis'd
Are nature still, but Nature methodiz'd
.....
Learn hence for ancient rules a just esteem;
To copy nature is to copy them".(51)

Dubos, Gottsched and mainly Johann Elias Schlegel represent the main thinkers of the Neoclassical stream who dealt with the notion of imitation based on the Aristotelian tradition which emphasized the creative nature of imitation. Schlegel postulated that imitation could even be dissimilar to the original and advocated the partial and intentional departure from the model. The original and the degree of similarity between the original and the product of imitation are left open to the free choice of the imitator. Imitation for Schlegel is just the means to an end, which recalls the main Platonic issue. For Schlegel, the aim of imitation is set outside the work of art in the sense of pleasure aroused to its interpreter.

As he expresses it:

Imitation necessarily brings about order by virtue of the fact that it produces agreement between the relations of parts of an imitation and those of the original. Order also arises even if the original does not have internal order...
...when I observe order, I have a sense of pleasure; and so, when I observe similarity of imitation to original, I react in the same way. (52)

Quatremere de Quincy in his *Encyclopedie Methodique* provided a comprehensive

discussion of imitation, linking the Classical tradition to the architectural debate. His view of imitation influenced all subsequent architectural theory to our day (53). Quatremere argued that imitation is the only way to create works of art and that each art has its own model in nature. In his *Encyclopedie* he writes:

The imitation which is really appropriate to architecture and the architect, which associates the one with the other for the glory of the beaux-arts, reposes on nature, but considered in the general laws of order and harmony, in the reasons which explain all the works, in the principles to which nature has subordinated its action... Additionally, architecture imitates nature, as far as, among the creations which depend on its art, ^{i.e.} follows and makes sensible the system which nature has developed in all its 'oeuvres'. (54)

Quatremere strongly advocates ^{that} artists ^{should} imitate the Classical Greeks, because the secrets of nature have been revealed only to them. He stresses that only the Greeks managed to avoid in their arts the fixation of symbols required for the representation of the divine. Unlike other peoples, Quatremere argues, the Greeks, by multiplying the occasions of making statues for persons who were not gods and had nothing to do with religion (winners of stadium games), emancipated imitation from its static copying character.

Imitation thus no longer subjected to mere representation of sacred forms sought through the amelioration of form to approach reality and truth. Truth and reason acquired major importance for imitation, which was no longer considered imitation of the routine but true imitation, involving change and adaptability. False imitation, a separate citation in Quatremere's *Encyclopedie*, was defined as any imitation lacking originality, creativity and value.

3. 3. CONTEXTUALLY ORIENTATED IMITATION

Plato was the first to relate *mimesis* to ideal models and divine canons. But nevertheless in his *Timaeus* he stresses:

The genre of imitators will imitate easier and more successfully those things in which it has been brought up and is used to. (55)

Andronikos provides a commentary on these lines and probes the implications further:



This sort of imitation means the spiritual contextual atmosphere rendered by all the works of art. Mimesis of this atmosphere is but a free interpretation since it has not any form capable of being imitated . It is the expression of the spatial and temporal spirit (genius loci, genius tempi), which each form of art achieves using different materials and each artist in his own way, so that their common (spiritual, intellectual) basis where they started from, is explicit and clear. (56)

So the product of mimesis is judged not only against general criteria but against contextual values as well. The outcome of imitation must be the proper one. Even if mimesis is expected to relate to an abstract or even metaphysical model i.e. the abstract notion of nature or the Platonic 'ideas', nevertheless there are different ways of achieving it and hence the artist must seek for the suitable one. Suitability (57), a notion derived from the Sophists and Socrates, characterizes an imitation which adapts to its purpose, nature, time, and condition, when it is *prepon*, what is needed. Any analytic description of the *prepon* should contradict its definition. What it is remains to be found by the particular artist to fit the particular conditions.

Plato and Aristotle as well as the classical aftermath moulded on their thought, were used in this study in no historical or philosophical sense per se, but rather as a means for establishing a conceptual framework for imitation, before proceeding to a critical discussion about imitation attitudes in architectonic creation.

The value of the discussed issues becomes evident if we consider that contemporary uses of imitation in the architectural domain range from stylistic copying to creative intervention in historic settings. Furthermore, we think that as long as not all values are shared by all peoples, any attempt to establish objective absolute models to be imitated by new architecture seems rather inadequate to address the problem as a whole.

In that sense the failure of the "international style" becomes conceptually evident, quite apart from the historical reality (58). We think instead that the only plausible way for achieving meaning in the built environment is by making the best of the already existing values. Taken that for granted, what is of great importance is the critical examination of attempts sharing the same assumptions.

With the notion of *mimesis* as defined in the previous pages, it now becomes evident that any consideration of historical settings in terms of traditional materials, geometric forms or any other eclectic interpretation based on partial knowledge are simply whimsical and arbitrary. Imitation of a context always presupposes a comprehensive understanding of

it.

So, when we speak of architectonic creation in old settings, it is as legitimate to accept the same architectonic response to different settings as it is to accept that two contexts are characterized by the same spatio-temporal dimensions.

3. 4. CONTEXTUAL DIMENSIONS

In dealing with contextually orientated imitation as a means of relating new architecture to old settings, it is necessary to dwell for a while on the dimensions of a context and try to define them. The first question we, in this thesis, have to answer is: What is it that makes space so idiosyncratic in every place? and then: How can we acknowledge its particular identity in relating new architecture to it?

When we speak of space in the present essay we mean first of all "actual" space, that is, the geometrical articulation and configuration of our surrounding physical environment. Actual space can be objectively described and measured in geometrical (volumetric and planimetric) terms and in that sense it is void of any symbolic dimension. All actual space is equally important and no evaluation is possible. Actual space differs from place to place but such differences in themselves have no meaning. What is important to assess in a place is the reason for its being different from any other.

But space, as we use it, also encompasses "virtual" space. Virtual space, like actual space, limits, frames, and differentiates the physical environment but it does not have material existence. Virtual space superimposes its image upon actual space and renders it a non-homogeneous field where not all parts of it have the same importance for the society inhabiting it. Virtual space is what gives significance and identity to space rendering it a place. It relates to the associations, links, memories and generally the meanings that can be ascribed to it by socio-cultural life.

Thus an open air field acquires the qualities of virtual space when it is experienced as the place of a local festival or the place of an historical event. Equally, a hole on a public square, as a virtual space, is the centre of a maypole dance. Any actual space can be virtual, when experienced by a particular person, but in this context we will deal and consider as virtual spaces, spaces that have socio-cultural significance.

The terminology used here to describe space should not cause any confusion as to reality of a particular place. Virtual space is most real since the man-made environment is always interpreted according to some value systems, and actual space seems to be the most

abstract since it is void of any socio-cultural characteristic. Yet it can also be said that actual space is most objective, describable and measurable, while virtual space encompasses the socio-cultural and existential space. Suzanne Langer also distinguishes between actual and virtual space in the visual arts but she does so in a different sense from the one used in this study. Following Hildenbrand, she draws the distinction between actual and virtual space on perceptual grounds (59).

Some examples will make clear the sense in which the terms "actual" and "virtual" space are used in this study and how virtual space can be acknowledged, as characteristic of a given setting, by a new building in that setting. The place where Franklin's house stood in Philadelphia, is characterized by its physical features as well as by its specific significance for the local people. The American architect Robert Venturi in his attempt to recreate the atmosphere of the place clearly imitates the virtual dimensions of the place by rendering the contour of Franklin's house in a metallic framework (Fig. 3. 1). This metallic frame gives material existence to what was there as a virtual quality.

In front of 'molino' Stucky in Venice what always existed as virtual space was not some historic building of cultural significance to the inhabitants, as in the previous example, but the reflected image of the facade of the building. The architectonic group SITE manifested the virtual space in front of the building in a material state by shaping the pavement in the form of the reflection of the facade (fig. 3. 2). That part of the Venetian lagoon has always been the 'carrier' of a particular image and SITE's intervention solidified a particular moment of Molino's mirror image. However trivial^{an} aspect of the place, SITE's intervention shows a gesture towards acknowledging a latent property of the place. In the following parts of the thesis we will discuss what aspects - actual and virtual - of a setting are appropriate to be imitated in designing new architecture in it and the need for a hierarchy within the characteristics that we acknowledge as significant to relate to.

Both actual and virtual space in a given setting change, as life goes on. Places change not only in physical configuration but in significance as well. Yet, at every time every setting presents a particular identity which relates to the appearance of its architecture as well as its meaning for the people in this setting. We can conceptualize the constantly developing actual and virtual space in a setting as a process of interaction between space and time. In Chapter Four we will examine in what sense the spatio-temporal dimensions of a setting can be acknowledged in relating new architecture to that setting. It will suffice for now to pinpoint the fact that a setting is a life process and not its visual appearance and its symbolic significance at a particular time. So, imitation of a setting implies imitation of the way that a particular setting came to be.

This relativistic notion of mimesis, i.e. contextually orientated, is against any absolutism and universalism in architecture and constitutes the main assumption in this thesis. New architecture in a old setting relates not only to local characteristics but to more general ones as well, only it does so through the standpoint of a contextual basis. Yet, some "absolute" model of beauty is also implied in assessing the relevance of new architecture to a given setting. Relativism and absolutism, *prepon* and beautiful, constituted for Plato's theory of art a dialectic play-pair. Interpreted this way Plato's theory of art becomes useful for the purposes of this thesis and justifies the extended discussion of *mimesis*.

As we will argue in Chapter Five, what is considered as a criterion for judging how successfully a new building relates to its context, is the ability of new architecture to stimulate and sustain several, interrelated and contextually relevant, interpretations for different interpreters (60). So, objective value for an architectural creation is possible to the extent that a comprehensive interpretative process is also possible. However fictional a wholistic relation between new and old architecture might be, it nevertheless implies that increased possibilities of acquiring diverse interpretations renders the architectonic intervention meaningful and appropriate with equally increased possibilities (61).

Expressing the above in Socratic terms:

"A house can justly be regarded as most pleasant and most beautiful if at all times its owner can find in it the most congenial shelter...". (62)

The transition from the subjective to the intersubjective will be made through the possibilities of a contextually orientated architectural creation to remain meaningful in several circumstances for several interpreters. Interpretation of new architecture *vis a vis* its context is adopted in this thesis as a useful springboard for new architecture to be meaningful. Contextual anchorage of all interpretations also guarantees the interrelation between several interpretations so that to avoid a meaningless multiplicity of interpretations, like those in a Rorschach test.

3. 5. IMITATING THE CONTEXT

3. 5. 1. THE CONTEXT AS A SPATIAL STRUCTURE

The context of a particular setting constitutes a complex spatio-temporal web. When its imitation is intended it must be decided (explicitly or not) what this context consists of, what are its particular values; and furthermore a certain hierarchy between them must be

established. As Nelson Goodman puts it describing the copying of an object:

... the object before me is a man , a swarm of atoms, a complex of cells, a fiddler, a friend, a fool and much more. If none of these constitute the object as it is what else might? If all are ways the object is, then none is the way the object is. I can not copy all these at once; ... (63)

Similarly the architectonic context in old settings is its material dimension i.e. the material fabric of the setting, its formal dimension i.e. the geometric articulation and configuration, its symbolic dimension i.e. the embodiment of several social values and meanings and much more (64).

In the Western cultures the use of durable materials for monuments as well as our contemporary attitude towards conserving them signify the importance of the material dimension of things for these cultures. On the other hand, what is of major importance to Chinese culture, is the abstract geometric form of things, and not the material existence which is temporary and subject to decay. For the Chinese only form resists, endures and finally outlasts time.

Similarly, in Japan " at stated intervals Shinto temples are entirely rebuilt and their furnishing and decoration renewed. The great shrines of Ise in particular, the very center of the religion, are built every 20 years " (65).

To imitate all at once is next to impossible since at least the temporal dimension can not be the same. Similarly, to imitate any partial aspect is a selective attitude which has to be somehow justified to avoid being arbitrary and whimsical, an architectural caprice.

If neither all the dimensions of a particular context nor any definite particular one can be the standard rule for imitation, then a certain selective attitude and a hierarchy has to be established to guide the imitation process. This attitude is necessary but not sufficient to produce creative, because appropriate, new architecture in old settings. In this thesis, we can go so far as to discuss some guidelines along which creative new architecture can be enhanced and superficial imitation discouraged. Otherwise new architecture can only be a good copy of what exists already.

3. 5. 2. THE CONTEXT AS A LIFE PROCESS

We have already introduced the conceptualization of space as actual and virtual. Materials, forms, and urban disposition are some of the dimensions of actual space, while the cultural significance is a property of virtual space. Even if a new architecture manages to address all the above dimensions of the setting it is grafted into, it would nevertheless relate superficially to it. If a comprehensive interpretation is intended, it is misleading to consider a specific context only as it appears at the particular time we happen to interpret it.

What is needed is a full participation not in a static image synchronically seen but participation in its life process. A context interpreted as a diachronic process, will reveal the process of its transformation through time, the rhythm of its change and the life force which results every time in a different spatial structure.

After WW2, the historic centers of Warsaw and Prague were rebuilt as facsimiles of the destroyed originals. Contemporary practice in historic centers at least in Europe and the United States confirms that pastiche (facsimile copying), is a well established policy. These attempts of superficially relating new architecture to old settings create a rather grotesque atmosphere in the sense that buildings of the past share with contemporary ones the same appearance. People cannot recognise if a building is authentic or not, while historic settings are treated in a scenographic sense.

Using the existing old settings as blueprints for contemporary architectonic expression cannot but be problematic as far as the problem of new architecture is concerned. In an age of museums, the city is becoming a museum itself. New architecture has nothing to offer or suggest and is exhausted in copying the past. If historic settings are meaningful it is because they represent a whole set of social and cultural values. They are manifestations of the life process of past eras. Is it legitimate for contemporary architecture to express another society, in another time in the same way, since we no longer share the same values?

In some cases the facade of old buildings is kept intact, or copied exactly and a new building is being built behind. Deceptions like the above, even if when they offer a satisfactory appearance, fail to establish lasting relationships with their context. When false imitation is realised and the "trompe d'oeil" is over, what we are left with is a meaningless environment. False imitation such as "contemporary" medieval villages in Yugoslavia, neo-vernacular settlements in the Greek islands, neo-Georgian houses in Bath and Edinburgh, are but instances of the predicament of contemporary architecture.

Building regulations in historic settings in an attempt to protect vernacular and historic settings from architectural indifference and land exploitation, deal with architectural heritage in terms of proportions, colours and materials used. The adoption of certain forms, metrically described is obligatory, inhibiting this way architectural creativity for the sake of a well defined tactics of copying (66).

Criticism like this is not at all to discourage preservation in historic settings. What is argued here is that as far as contemporary architectural creativity is concerned, copying (false imitation) does not offer a plausible creative response to the problem in general. And it seems that there is a problem since the values of the past are not the only values of today.

We do not even deny that copying is the only solution in particular cases e.g. the reconstruction of the Polish historic centers and mainly that of Warsaw, was a symbolic action towards uniting people and their history under exceptional circumstances. We do not deny either the fascination of copying in a Disneyland like mode. But certainly as far as the aim of this study remains to examine the problem in general, pastiche is not imitation or at least it is not imitation in the sense we are using the term in this study.

Imitation of a historic setting in a contemporary intervention does not mean copying its material or formal manifestation but rather imitating the past ways of responding to contextual needs. In that sense, imitation of the creativity or the ingenuity of the architecture of the past in a particular setting, seems to come closer to proper imitation.

Similarly, in trying to express the quality of a historic setting as a whole by adopting only a particular aspect of it as representative, cannot but result in architectural caprice. Students of the Architectural Association in their projects for the Cowgate area of medieval Edinburgh, imitated the drum of the castle or cranes hanging around (67) (Fig. 3. 3). Claes Oldenburg impressed by the continuous traffic circles in old Stockholm thought of them as the most characteristic symbol to depict in a gigantic monumental spire (68) (Fig. 3. 4).

Superficial selectivism like these cannot be considered as successful insertions of new architecture in old settings, because they do not relate to the essence of a setting; instead they just pick up a typicality or an abstract whimsical generality expressing a haphazard aspect of an old setting and a haphazard choice of the designer. Overstressing some characteristics of an old setting at the expense of others can only be justified if it results from an interpretation of the setting as a whole and an established hierarchy among what is to be imitated. Otherwise, imitation can only express lack of proper understanding.

Every context is the accumulation of several periods of its life, it is sort of stratified

historically and any synchronic analysis is unable to catch them. The genius loci of a particular setting has a diachronic existence every time manifested in different materials and forms.

Supposing we want to insert a new building in the historic setting of the island of Hydra. Its context is the coexistence of 4 distinctive eras expressed architecturally in equally distinctive forms. Which one should we imitate to match our new building? The problem becomes even more difficult if we consider that the modesty of the 16th century settlements contrasts to the sea captain villas of the 18th century (69). In such cases copying, as a strategy for intervention in historic settings, is caught in a paradox, while the imitation-contrast dialectics manifests its full value in relating new and old in a way which goes beyond architectural styles.

The Italian architectonic group SUPERSTUDIO exaggerating the problem of historic eclecticism in contemporary architectonic intervention in old settings proposed a scheme for Florence attempting to transform the city to a lake as it used to be in Pleistocene period with only Brunelleschi's dome and Giotto's campanile soaring above the water level (Fig. 3. 5). Again such a selective attitude cannot do justice to the Florentine context as a whole

The concept of analogy is of particular importance here to enable us to interpret the particular setting as a context for architectonic intervention, diachronically, and to decide the scale and the impact of our intervention.

Quatremere gave a hint towards this dimension of the context, when he said that we must imitate nature not in what she makes but as she makes things, in other words we should rather imitate the worker and not the work.

The particular historical importance of a context and its symbolic dimensions in general is thus seen not as additional properties of space but as an equivalent with space² product of a life process. Context interpreted in that sense is understood comprehensively and provides the best possible contextual background for an intervention to come.

Any architectonic creation which interprets, evaluates and addresses an old setting, relates to life process in it rediscovering the nature of this particular setting. This very nature is what we have been exploring as the Platonic "idea" or the Aristotelean *katholou* (70), or even what Norberg-Schulz calls *genius loci*.

All of these acknowledge and attribute a sort of spirituality to human settlements and it is in that sense that it is possible for the same contextual nature to be manifested in several geometrical forms and/or through the use of materials different from the original.

Otherwise we can only talk about different settings as different times. Imitation of this sort is a true one to its time acquiring the quality of an expressive, metaphoric or analogic imitation^{other} than mere copying and pastiche. Despite the fact that different responses are possible to the same context, they all differ from any selective attitude because they address the context as a whole and establish a communicative basis with it.

3. 6. CONTRAST AS A NOTION DIALECTICAL TO IMITATION

Since imitation cannot be the same in all dimensions as its model, it necessarily implies and calls for differentiation as well. Either as a consequence or as an intention, differentiation enters the imitation process and defines the identity of an architectonic creation in relation to its model of which it constitutes an imitation of and to which it relates.

It has become evident by now that pure imitation is impossible in reality. In order to imitate an aspect of the past it is often necessary to do so by contrasting to some other aspects of it. For instance, if we want to imitate the construction techniques of the "black and white" Elizabethian houses in a new building, we have to abandon the old morphology if we are to use new materials. Another instance of contrast occurs when false responses to contextual characteristics have resulted in inappropriate buildings. In this case, although it is necessary to relate to them as parts of the context, this relation can best be expressed in terms of contrast if a critical appraisal of the contextual qualities is intended. In any case, past forms, past contextual meanings and associations for a given setting and past ways of responding to these aspects of a setting are often historically determined. This fact alone necessitates the imitation of these aspects in an analogical sense, i.e. employing contrast as well as imitation in order to imitate more effectively.

The notions of originality, novelty, invention etc., acquire their importance in relation to the notion of contrast and this in turn by being an opposite notion of imitation associates with them.

Contrast is the manifestation of an opposition. New buildings intended to relate to historic settings by contrasting to them, often result in meaningless novelties, which are exhausted in a mere juxtaposition to their surroundings instead of relating to them in a wholistic way by engaging with them and critically assessing them. Architectonic contrasts which exhaust their values in visual shocks cannot be considered as plausible solutions to the problem. Glass clad buildings wishing to contrast or even reflect their historical context neutrally are nothing but an alibi for uncreative architecture. As far as our problem is concerned, glass architecture alone has nothing to offer beyond a visual

difference. Glass architecture as a strategy for contrasting to historical surroundings has always a borrowed existence. It is the absence of architecture. As with pastiche, the scenographic attitude appears not as copying for homogeneity this time, but as contrast for variety.

"High-Tech" architectonic interventions in old settings are limited to the implementation of modern technology alone and contrast in terms of materials and the resulting forms cannot establish a dialogue with the existing settings.

This is not to suggest that there is something uncreative about glass architecture or "high-tech" just because they employ new materials and revolutionary forms. In fact the opposite is rather true, but the use of new materials and "high-tech" forms alone do not guarantee an appropriate, relevant and successful contrast to an historic setting. In other words, they cannot substitute^{for} the need for creativity. New technological materials assembled in high tech constructions or glass architecture express internationalism and there is no objection to that. The objection raised here concerns the local characteristics of a particular setting which also claim their acknowledgement.

Philip Webb in his red house created a prominent modern building using local traditional materials and what is admirable in Mackintosh's Glasgow school of art is not the use of iron and glass but their creative manipulation in order to express the Scottish context in a modern way (Figs 3. 6-7).

Contrast in the present study does not mean any differentiation to a context but a kindred one. Contrast as a form of relation involves imitation in order to be considered akin to what it contrasts to. Imitation and contrast in that sense arise and constitute dialectical features each one presupposing the other (71).

To imitate is not just to copy something but create in analogy, which necessitates contrast. Even if we imitate nature we have to consider that:

Nature has a liking for opposites; perhaps it is from them that she created harmony and not from similar things. (72)

Contrast is not just any difference. It is the opposite of something and in that sense relates to it. Anything different does not necessarily relate to what is different to. Contrast by being opposite to something rejects it in a wholistic sense presenting a critical disposition to things and as such acquires significance and contextual value. It speaks, if we may say so, the same language as the context and holds a critical position towards it from the inside.

To create, through new architecture, contrast to an existing setting, presupposes a full understanding of it so as to enable us in creating its opposite, to imitate the complementary way in intervening in a context. Contrast is the only way of introducing novelty and change through complete and comprehensive understanding of a particular setting and its identity (Figs 3. 8-9).

It is in this sense that Bruno Zevi argues about the proper conceptualization of the problem. He argues that every architectonic intervention in existing historic contexts should be conceived as a "dissonant insertion", alluding to the musical analogy (73).

Zevi's plea for "dissonance" in historic contexts should be interpreted, following Schoenberg, not as just an irrelevant tonality in a harmonic series but rather as a disagreement in a wholistic sense. The context is opposed as a whole and the dissonance is considered as such in relation to this whole. Dissonance presupposes understanding and critical disposition.

Architectonic intervention and context are not to be considered as two separate things but rather as the opposite instances of the same thing. Heracleitus expressed that in one of his fragments:

(People) do not understand how that which differs with itself is in agreement; harmony consists of opposing tensions like that of the bow and the lyre. (74)

In contemporary architectonic creation it seems that we have come to understand the need for contrast (75). What we lack is a comprehensive understanding of the Heracleitean "itself". Difference and contrast in itself is his plea. In more concrete terms, any architectonic contrast to an existing setting should first of all understand the context so that to be considered as an instance of the context itself before presenting its contrast to the existing dimension. This sort of contrast is an aspect of the context, otherwise it does not relate in a dialectical sense to it, or at least it relates as much as anything else.

Contrast and imitation measure our indebtedness to tradition and our ability to transform it in order to survive. Their dialectics elucidates the interpretation, evaluation and finally incorporation of the past. It has to do with the task of changing the context in a contextual way.

3. 7. FROM CONTEXT TO INTERVENTION:

THE DIALECTICS BETWEEN IMITATION AND CONTRAST AS A CREATIVE PROCESS

It seems that we have come to the point where we can consider imitation and contrast in the following triadic schema: context/imitation-contrast dialectics/object, and particularly: old setting/imitation-contrast dialectics/new architecture.

So, the imitation-contrast dialectics now becomes the centre of the problem of relating new architectonic interventions to old settings. The problem nevertheless remains of how a harmonic balance between imitation and contrast could be achieved as far as the built environment is concerned. With this problem we will deal in Chapter Five and Chapter Seven.

New architecture, by establishing meaningful associations with the setting where ^{it} is being grafted into not only becomes meaningful itself, but justifies, reinforces and reveals the existence of its context as well. In that sense old and new architecture, conceived in this thesis as context and object, establish a dialectical relationship capable of producing and acquiring several interrelated and contextually significant values.

This interplay between the rival and complementary opposites is the real creative generator of meaning. Hippolyte Rigault comparing the ancient and the modern in literature writes:

Two spirits partake in the world, the ancient spirit and the modern spirit, both legitimate, because this corresponds to two real necessities of humanity; tradition and progress. (76)

Joel Weinsheimer discussing the same problem from a phenomenological standpoint, adopts a triadic conceptual schema through which he examines original and imitation as instances of the same thing connected through the imitation process. The original finds its justification in being imitated and imitation finds its *raison d'être* in revealing the original.

Although Rigault and Weinsheimer discuss the problem in the domain of literary criticism where the relation between original work of literature and its imitation can be traced more adequately, what is of relevance to this study is the creativity of the dialectical interplay between original and imitation, original as the context-the particular setting-and imitation as a new architectural creation intervening in that setting.

For Weinsheimer, imitation and contrast constitute a never ending dialectical process

of creation where "imitations father originals and originals father imitations" (77). Originality, even if it is considered as imitating nothing, denotes that it "wishes" to be imitated by all.

Although Weinsheimer adopts a dialectic conceptualization he nevertheless cannot finally avoid the dominance of imitation over and against originality. Originality, or novelty, is rather considered as a form of imitation, or as a chancy by-product in our attempt to imitate. Novelty is not intended. In that sense it cannot be considered as adequate for the purposes of this thesis, where contrast is considered as intentional and creative inferring novelty in the context it addresses. What remains important though in Weinsheimer's study is that imitation is conceived in its most creative sense, that is encompassing the criticism of its original.

In our discussion what constitutes the key concept of creation in contextually orientated architecture is the imitation-contrast dialectics, which has the same implications as imitation in Weinsheimer's theory, used in a creative sense, linking all creation in general, encompassing the criticism of its original. Imitation and contrast constitute an equipotent pair of dialectic opposites which is creative and not tautological (78).

In that sense imitation through contrast and contrast through imitation seems the only proper way of relating. Imitation stands for the adoption of acknowledged values, while contrast stands for the renovating agent of the context which introduces new values and meanings according to the changes of the socio-cultural context.

To imitate or contrast in that sense is to reveal the essence of an existing architectonic context by manifesting it in a contemporary way in order to be understood. Imitation and contrast coexist in a symbiotic way both striving to free the local spirit, the *genius loci*.

Italian architects seem to have been the first to conceive theoretically the problem as stated so far in the present study. In the 50's the basic principle of the modern movement which was neglect of the past, was critically opposed and finally abandoned in favour of an approach towards harmonic coexistence between the old and the new in historic settings. There had been a forerunner of this attitude when in the early decades of the 20th century the Italian archaeological school employed new materials in reconstruction to differentiate the authentic from the reconstructed parts.

Reconstructions in Pompei, in the forum Traianum in Rome or even the Greek temples in Lindos, Rhodes, are two examples illustrating this attitude. Echoing Camillo Boito's plea for authenticity the contrast employed in imitating structures and monuments of the

past had been an everyday practice (Fig. 3. 10).

Early in the 50's the architects Belgiojoso, Peressutti and Rogers created an admirable architectonic intervention in the historic urban tissue of Milan. Tore Velasca is a modern building but nevertheless it is a pure Italian offspring addressing the typical Italian townscape and especially that of Milan from medieval towers to contemporary office blocks. The power of the bureaucratic image of Tore Velasca takes the place of the equally powerful image of the mediaeval Dukes' towers (Fig. 3. 11).

Museum building has also been the starting point for harmonic contrast in architecture. Carlo Scarpa in Venice and Franco Albini at Genes present the first creative attitudes of successful architectonic integration between old and new (79).

At Urbino, Giancarlo De Carlo and at Verona, Carlo Scarpa epitomise all creative attitudes. The imitation - contrast dialectics achieves there its most powerful expression (Figs 3. 12-13). In Calver Strasse, in Stuttgart, the architects Kammerer and Belz managed to insert a new architectonic creation able to regenerate powerful images of the street by using steel frame and metallic cladding (Fig. 3. 14).

Dominikus Bohm's administration offices at Benberg, near Cologne, constitute a powerful manipulation of volumes recreating the whole setting, while addressing the context at multiple levels. It imitates the articulation of the urban volumes while it never fails in retaining a coherence as one building. The horizontality and the symmetry of the nearby Neoclassical buildings is imitated through a similar approach in the horizontal series of the openings while it is balanced with the soaring of a multi-sided spire associating with the Medieval belfries (Fig. 3. 15).

Without losing its autonomy as a whole it spreads diachronically into the urban tissue acquiring roots from the rock formation of the Germanic castles to the ordinary mediaeval house facades. The contours of the several sides and the height levels in combination with the flatness of the concrete slabs appear as the best contemporary successor to the framed half timbered facades of the medieval houses. Mortar and timber give their way easily to concrete, which in turn without betraying and contradicting with its potentialities as a new material, manages to acquire a local use. Its skyline undulating in the air compensates for an ever increasing urbanisation rhythm and renders the architectonic intervention as a whole a powerful generator of meanings able to remodel and re-express the context in a contemporary way (80).

In the following we will try to illustrate the dialectics between imitation and contrast in what we consider to be a creative intervention in an old setting. In Chapter Six we will

discuss the way the architect comprehensively and diachronically interprets a given setting in order to design a new building in it. We will also examine the possible levels of interpretation and the need for a hierarchy between them.

The Dutch architect Aldo Van Eyck in Hubertus house epitomises a whole life of dialectical architectonic theorizing and practicing. In Otterloo congress in 1959 he had already stressed the need for temporal perspectives in contemporary building. Since then his plea has been for the energetic coexistence of past, present and future in architectonic creation, and Hubertus house constitutes an attempt for the fusion of these times together.

An old Neo-Renaissance synagogue was demolished to give its place to a new architectonic creation in Plantage Middenlaan in Amsterdam.

Hubertus association for one parent families had already been using two of the existing buildings and owned the synagogue. Taken the need for a new building for granted it would be quite normal, as Herzberger writes, to have headed towards either a self-contained more or less autonomus building or else one subordinated to the existing ones. Van Eyck managed to create both. A new bright-coloured architectonic creation was built which gradually extends its presence into the other two existing ones. The streetscape is renewed in a familiar way. The new building is placed between a rather indifferent to its neighbours glass building and the two Neo-Baroque ones which generally speaking can be considered as typical of the street and the adjacent area.

Although the glass building does not relate to the character of the specific context but only differentiates itself to them in a haphazard and not a critical mode, it nevertheless is equally with the others considered as a legitimate presence. It is as if the passage of time has rendered it a contextual image. Van Eyck manages to relate it as far as new materials are concerned but what is of greater importance manages to relate to the old images of the context as well though the creative manipulation of familiar perceptual and symbolic dimensions of the context.

The use of bright coloured steel framework and concrete columns contrasts to the grey patina of age of the existing buildings as well as with the the glass cladde one. It is not the contrast of just one colour to another, but the contrast of all the colours to any specific one. The rainbow is contrasted to the clouded mood of the neighbourhood. The new material takes easily the place of timber opening frames and disseminates the change which has occurred inside. The renovation process ranges from imitating the old forms in new materials and colours to totally creative innovation in shapes and structures.

The new building emerges through a gradual transformation from the inside of the

existing buildings, the envelope of which is kept intact, to the main new building. The new building appears as if it sprang off the existing urban fabric giving to it a new life. In its light the old fabric receives a new interpretation and a new life, while the architectural intervention acquires anchorage in the specific context.

Hubertus house is not just a different image in its context, but embodies an understanding and a critical disposition towards it. Participating in the street where it belongs, it closes the gap and acquires its position as one of the series keeping the linear character of the existing street, but nevertheless it regenerates another one which starts from the entrance and extends to the rear vertically to the street (Fig. 3. 16). A new private street is contrasted to the existing public one. The new building is transparent and open towards the street as its expressional presence confirms, but nevertheless it does not show any intention for public intrusion and creates a shelter for the people inside.

The mirror frames facing the street, reinforce its open-closed character and remind us of their symbolic use in India, to keep the spirits out (Fig. 3. 17). The mirrors constitute the threshold and the limit between the public and the private realm and contrast the permanent colours of the building, framed inside the mirrors to the temporary changing of the street life.

Van Eyck's plea for a house as a small city can be seen clearly in Hubertus house. Paths, playgrounds, and ladders create a cityscape character which could be considered as a toy version of Amsterdam (figs 3. 18-20). Neighbourhoods one above the other, canals like corridors of children circulation and ladders foot bridge-like constitute a coherent whole.

The central spiral staircase acquires in that sense a symbolic dimension uniting the old to the new, the street to the side street, the inside of the main entrance to the outside. Generally speaking the spiral unites context and new intervention as two sets of opposites in time. Contextual setting and the new architectonic intervention succeed one another as the one blends with the other though the staircase glass, in the interpretation process as one reinforces the other and even at the symbolic level as the spiral unites the opposites in time (Figs 3. 21-22).

The narrow facade, the creation of the inside street, the omnipresent ladders, and the formal configuration of the whole building constitute but playful manipulations of spatial and temporal values already existing, the creative transformation of which evokes and re-evaluates them. As Francis Strauven argues in a sound interpretation:

Far from conforming to its neighbours, or accommodating itself to a supposed typological order, it is grafted on to its context in an equal but contrasting

relationship. It belongs not because of an outward similarity but because of a commitment. This commitment is expressed by interchanging transformed signs.
(81)

This interchange of signs is held in a variety of levels and penetrates the conception of the building from detail design in the interior spaces to the performance of the building as a whole in the given context. Hubertus house by not being conceived in a vacuum absorbs and radiates contextual values (Fig. 3. 23). It is selective in the gifts it accepts from its context, while it does not fail to interpret it in contrary terms, introducing to it novelty and change.

3. 8. CONCLUSIONS

Imitation and contrast are inextricably interrelated in their operation to link new and old architecture at several levels of reference. Pure imitation or pure contrast are impossible. What really matters is not which one prevails over the other but their balanced interaction in a continuous dialogue. This is the reason we have been discussing imitation far more than we have contrast.

As they are used in this thesis, a proper imitation is equally appropriate and creative, as far as new architecture in historic settings is concerned, with proper contrast. Both notions of imitation and contrast can be used as tools in our interpretation of new architecture in old settings, while their creative use is a matter of interpretation.

In the following chapters we will examine how imitation and contrast, assessed through some dialectical polarities we will introduce in Chapter Four, can interrelate new and old architecture in a comprehensive sense.

CHAPTER FOUR

TOWARDS A DIALECTIC CONCEPTUALIZATION OF TIME IN THE MAN-MADE ENVIRONMENT

4. 1. RELATING OLD AND NEW IN TEMPORAL PERSPECTIVE: TEMPORAL DEPTH AS AN ENVIRONMENTAL DIMENSION

It was argued in Chapter Three that the dialectics between imitation and contrast is a useful framework for exploring the relation of contemporary architecture to historic settings. Although imitation and contrast are antithetical notions, they both express modes of relating new to old architecture. This common property enables their consideration as equally important dimensions of an entity characterized by their dialectic interaction.

In order to assess relations between old and new architecture in various contexts in terms of imitation and contrast, it is important to notice that they are only polarizations out of a wide spectrum of relativities. Absolute imitation and absolute contrast are both fictional - conceptual abstractions - while the modes in between characterize the empirical reality of everyday architectural development.

Imitation and contrast, by relating features or aspects of new architecture to a given setting where new architecture is grafted into, link together things separated in time. Yet, despite the link across time that these modes of relation make between new and old, the distance in time remains present, embedded in this relation. In fact it is the act of relating a given setting and a newly introduced piece of architecture, which manifests their separation and their contiguousness at the same time.

For instance, a contemporary infill to the Mediaeval part of Edinburgh, intended to relate to Edinburgh castle, can only do so by imitation of certain aspects of it and in contrast to some others. The materials employed, the morphological articulation, the lay-out or even the scale could be some of the aspects of the castle to be addressed either by being imitated or by being contrasted, or else the new building will show no intention to relate to its context. Whatever these aspects might be, they would link contemporary times with the

times that Edinburgh castle represents albeit not concealing their actual distance from them. A temporal field is raised between new architecture and the castle and it is within this field their relations are assessed and their meanings ascribed. The emergence of such a temporal field accompanies every transformation, addition or modification in the man-made environment since anything new comes necessarily into visual and spatial relation with its adjacent context, whether new architecture intends to relate to it or not.

Reproduction of historical styles, pastiche or replication cannot be an adequate policy for contemporary architectonic intervention because they miss the temporal distance between any historical era and today. When relating past and current architecture, the temporal distance between them is also important not because time has passed *per se*, but because it has resulted in different socio-cultural characteristics such as manners, customs, beliefs, taste and so forth, which can no longer be expressed by copying the past. Approaches which acknowledge only the formal typology of the past disconnect forms from their meaning. The reproduction of Georgian houses in Edinburgh overemphasizes a relation of the present times to the Georgian period - whatever a neo-Georgian building is supposed to express today- at the expense of contemporary architectural expression. However faithful the reproduction of the external facades could be, the intention of imitating a past era is negated by modern needs as they are reflected, for instance, in modern appliances and the provision of parking places.

Conversely, new architecture attempting to relate to a historic setting by uncritical differentiation, fails to acknowledge the continuity between past and present in this setting, the remaining bonds connecting a society with its past. However each culture changes, it does so in reference to some sort of permanent or continuous characteristics which define its identity. Some architects and critics argue that glass buildings relate to their surroundings in terms of their contrast to them.

No doubt, glass buildings are everywhere and in most cases there is no intention of their designers to relate to their surroundings. But it is more relevant for the purposes of this thesis to examine the cases in which neutral glass buildings are postulated to be responsive to their environment by virtue of the characteristics of glass to reflect its surroundings.

The sheer juxtaposition of new materials and abstract geometric forms to the traditional texture and shape of historic settings, in addition to the reflection on their surface of their adjacent buildings, are often considered enough to define successful intervention in historic settings. For instance, the administration building of a bank in the city of Stuttgart (Fig. 4. 1), is described by its architects as a desirable contrast with the historic buildings in

its vicinity. Differentiation for its own sake, that is, as an end in itself, is not enough to anchor a relation; and the reflections of the contextual images do not bring old and new closer. The temporal gap between them remains unbridged and old and new architecture stand in isolation from each other. Certainly glass buildings can be successful interventions but not because of their reflecting historic surroundings and of juxtaposing new materials to old ones.

It is evident that a temporal perspective upon the problem of relating new to old architecture defines the limitations of each of the previous cases. Copying, i.e. uncritical imitation, overemphasizes the similarities between new and old at the expense of their differences, while juxtaposing, i.e. uncritical contrast, overemphasizes the differences. A relation between old and new architecture can only be considered in a wholistic sense if it is assessed in a temporal perspective where similarities and differences between the present and the past find their place and balance.

Relating new architecture to old in terms of visual appearance, formal organization, volumetric configuration or planimetric disposition have been the main themes at least in the European historic centres. Detailed Building Regulations define precisely the size of windows, the proportions of the facades, the number of openings, the form of the roof, the building materials, the texture and the colour of buildings, to mention only few of the requirements that any new construction in historic settings has to comply with. Typologies of historic buildings, based on the geometry of their form or even their materials, are used as blueprints for contemporary architecture.

Some interesting questions are raised here. Why should contemporary buildings relate to a specific typology which represents only a particular period of the past? How are we to define the importance of one style to be imitated at the expense of all the others which differ from it yet are part of a particular setting as well? Or, to put it more generally, what are the relations between the present and the various past historical periods in a specific setting? Spatial approaches to the problem of architectural renewal certainly do not answer such questions and for this reason the relation of new to old architecture they refer to is imperfect, arbitrary, sterile and sometimes politically suspect when one sided views of history are advocated.

In some particular cases, however, reproduction of the past or replication of a specific building or total negation of a specific period of the past can be justified. These cases however can only be accepted as exceptions that prove the rule. In Poland, for example, after the Second World War, the historic center of Warsaw which had been dynamited during the war to break the national spirit, was reconstructed according to existing detailed

drawings of the destroyed buildings. The same materials were employed and detail for detail, building for building an exact replication was achieved. The final product is, of course, a fake but we can nevertheless consider it exceptionally as legitimate. Poland had to redeem its national identity. Replication of the historic center in Warsaw was a means towards this end, a symbolic act of great national importance. Such a major catastrophe of a considerable area of the historic center of the nation's capital could only be compensated by a reconstruction almost as radical the catastrophe itself.

4. 2. CONTEXTUAL FACETS AND THEIR TEMPORAL DIMENSIONS

Arguing for the consideration of the temporal dimensions of historic settings *vis-a-vis* new architecture in them, raises an important issue. What exactly is the context of a specific historic setting which should be treated as sort of reference, a model for new architecture to relate to? A particular place in a given setting which is to be built or modified is an entity resisting complete analysis and measurement; it encompasses its geographic position, its topography, its history as the history of its elements and, to put it briefly, everyday life during all the stages in its history. Any analytical approach to measure its history cannot do justice to its existence as a whole. Every place defies fragmentation and statistical dissection. The best possible systematic approach to its identity is doomed to be as near to the reality of the place as ornithology is to a particular bird. Nonetheless some aspects can be discussed even if to show the complexity of the problem.

Every place is part of several comprehensive entities at several scales of reference, while being an entity itself. It is part of a local socio-cultural situation by following its development, while participating in several others at several levels. For instance, a particular place in the Greek island of Hydra while having a unique identity itself, it is also part of the street and the village it belongs to. At greater scales of reference it is part of Hydra island, Greece and the Mediterranean to mention some of the most distinctive.

One building is by no means the minimum scale of reference and a street certainly not the maximum. The contextual facets of a setting, against which new architecture will be interpreted and evaluated, is a varying framework, which cannot be analytically specified. The building materials, the configuration of the urban tissue, the texture of the urban fabric, the geometry of its lay-out along with the relations, associations and meanings that every part of the setting pertains to, are only some of the constituent elements, that new architecture can relate to.

The context for a new building, whatever the scale of reference in relation to the new

building, is more than its parts. A built wall is more than the number of bricks and the mortar used for its construction. In order for a wall to be built, skills, a will to build and a purpose for doing so are also needed. The man-made environment equally so, or perhaps more so, is a complex web in various networks having to do with the particularities in space and time for every culture.

Another basic issue concerning the contextual facets, or levels of reference, was discussed in Chapter Three, where the notions of actual and virtual space were introduced. Actual space relates to the form of a setting - to whatever scale we consider it - and virtual space to its content. Context, in short, is actual and virtual space, considered at a diversity of levels, in constant development.

Attempting to relate a new building to a historic setting is not simply relating to one clearly defined thing in space and in time. What should a new building in contemporary Athens relate to? The Classical context, the Byzantine context or the Neoclassical one, to mention only a few distinctive "styles" at the expense of architecture which cannot be classified in styles? The question pertains not only to the formal aspects of these "styles" but also to their temporal dimensions. For example, what does it mean to reappropriate the Neoclassical "style" today? Why adopt it? What does it express and what has it come to signify? For instance, the meaning of Neoclassicism cannot any more refer to the humanistic revival of the Classical world during the 19th century, since it has been abused to express political power and authoritarian institutions in such diverse societies as the United States of America, the Nazi regime in Germany and the Socialist Soviet Union.

Histories of "styles" cannot adequately account for the life of a setting. Its history resembles more a dynamic field, where the histories of its elements coincide, criss-cross, interweave or oppose each other. In this way, every setting as a unique entity develops in a particular way and presents particular to it characteristics. Its history relates more to the way it evolves rather than to a particular instant in its life.

The notion of history itself in a definite sense has been critically questioned by the French historiographers. The pioneers of the *Annales* school, Lucien Febvre and Mark Bloch, moved away from the conception of history as a narrative of political deeds towards a rather philosophical history (1). All aspects and dimensions of every day socio-cultural life are now seen integrated in a total history. History is not any more "objective" historiography but a comprehensive notion to encompass wholistic situations. Royal historiography gives its place to the pragmatics of everyday life. Manners, customs, beliefs, social activities and their manifestation in the realm of tools, objects, and buildings are seen as part and parcel of a total history.

The context of a particular setting similarly cannot be a dominant architectural style in one distinctive time in its history but its history as a whole, a field created and characterized by the interaction of its elements, whatever could be designated and interpreted as such. In this way history penetrates every element, while relating it to its context (2).

Treated in this way history becomes synonymous with time. Both notions express the fictionality of their abstract mode of existence and the reality of their particular manifestation in human experience. Time becomes an abstraction realizable as particular events; and history, or total history, as concrete particular histories of things. As Aldo Van Eyck expressed it:

Whatever space and time mean, place and occasion mean more. (3)

Individual buildings in a historic setting not only contribute to what can be called a contextual history but *are* histories as well. In this sense we cannot speak of a history of styles or even a history of institutional buildings or types of buildings, but rather of particular histories of all buildings, additions and changes in every specific setting. Florence, for instance, is not only Dante's Florence or the one depicted in touristic postcards, but every trivial place of everyday life throughout its history as well. The old market, a shrine on a crossroad or even the studio of the Alinari photographers are places of social significance and aspects of the Florentine context along the celebrated Roman and Renaissance monuments (Figs 4. 2-5).

Despite the existence of a multiplicity of contextual facets, finally - and unavoidably so - a certain hierarchy has to be established between them if an assessment, an understanding and an interpretation is to take place. In our interpretation some of its aspects will receive more attention than others. A new building grafted into a historic setting will be finally assessed to relate more to some particular aspects of it and less so to some others. Difficulties in deciding which aspects of a setting are more important in comparison to others relate directly to the ability for creativity on the part of the architect. For the moment it will suffice to discuss some negative approaches - because arbitrary, superficial or capricious - towards establishing hierarchy amid contextual facets.

In some cases this difficulty or indeterminacy in critically evaluating contextual facets results in the provision of a pretext for architectural follies. The group of architects "Superstudio" in one of their projects for Florence disseminated in exaggeration the predicament of deciding which part of the past should be referred to in a new urban project. In a Situationistic mode of anarchic liberty they proposed a lake to cover the historic center of Florence leaving above the surface of the water only Brunelleschi's cuppola of the Duomo.

This project was intended to relate to the Pleistocene period in Florence's history when it was, in fact, a lake (Fig. 3. 5). This project is, of course, a polemical exaggeration but the point is - although negatively stated - eloquent. What period of Florentine history can claim preponderance over the other periods in relating to contemporary architecture?

The way that the contextual facets of a historic setting can be fused together to germinate new architecture cannot be predetermined. What can be said is that whatever the final hierarchy of contextual characteristics - as they will be expressed by the new architecture - they nonetheless all have to be considered and critically interpreted first. This hierarchy is needed despite the fact that the dynamics of contextual history cannot be resolved in a systematic, unitary way. Hierarchy in interpreting a historical setting is needed if new architecture is to relate to an established unity and identity. After a hierarchy has been established new architecture can critically approach its context as a whole but from a particular standpoint. It can then derive unity and identity from it while shaping its own identity. Otherwise new architecture can only express - at its best - an uncritical selectivity. In other words, it can only serve an incomplete understanding of the past.

4. 3. TIME AS A QUALITY IN THE MAN-MADE ENVIRONMENT

Every place in a historic setting is characterized and identified by its own history. This particular history is not simply part of the history of the setting where it belongs. It is also qualitatively different from the history of any other place in the same or any other setting. Whatever part of a historical setting we consider as an entity i.e. a building, a street or a village, we can only interpret and understand in its own terms.

The passage of time not only changes every part of it from an earlier state to a later one but also qualifies differently for every particular one. This qualitative differentiation of time for different parts of a setting, resulting in an idiosyncratic development for every one of them, is caused by the particular characteristics of every entity that we can designate in that setting. Every part of a setting, that we come to designate, follows its own way of development, while being part of its context, at several levels. So, a setting is more than the statistical average or the mere accumulation of the histories of its parts. The history of a setting is composed by the histories of its parts, but it finally is beyond any particular one of them, or all of them together, leaving the problem of designating the parts of a setting in a comprehensive sense.

Space in the man-made environment is considered in this study as actual and virtual. Actual space refers to space as a measurable formal entity while virtual space refers to the

content of space, that is, the ways it qualifies time for its development, which relate to the particular to its meanings in association within its context. The former represents the quantitative aspects of space while the latter its qualitative ones. Actual and virtual space change in time and the shape of human settings changes along with their meanings.

The site where "La Tourette" was built was changed physically by the addition of Le Corbusier's building but also in meaning and importance. (Figs 4. 6-8). As an actual space the site changed considerably. What used to be a landscape of smooth hills and an open, extended horizon was transformed into a dense introvert concrete mass. As a virtual space its meaning changed as well. The frontality and the solidity of the north wall is not only a physical obstacle but also implies a visual intensity closely related to its nature as a religious building. Time besides being the time of its construction or the time of our experience of it, starts to acquire depth by generating meanings and evocations. Eveux-sur-Arbresle, the more comprehensive setting of "La Tourette" not only changed in shape but also in significance.

René Guénon in his book "The Reign of Quantity and the Signs of the Times" discusses the modes of time. He distinguishes between the quantitative passage of time and time as quality. Time as a quantity can be measured and represents the container of events while time as a quality is unmeasurable and represents the content of events in human life. Periods of time, according to Guénon, are "qualitatively differentiated by the events unfolded by them" (4).

Following Guénon's differentiation between time as passage (i.e. quantity) and time as qualified time (i.e. contextual event), we could add that conceptualization of time as such is qualitative since it acknowledges that the passage of time is differentiated and locally qualified for every place. Time as a quantity and time as a quality differ in the same way that actual and virtual space do. Differences between various actual spaces in different contexts on geometric, morphological or generally on visual grounds remain at the quantitative level; while meaning and identity in the man-made environment are not quantifiable; they reside only in qualitative differentiations.

The identity of a particular building in its setting is not based in its being different in appearance from other buildings in the same or another setting. What is also, or perhaps more so, appreciated in this building is rather the reason of its being different or, the sense in which it is so, even if the reasons for its differentiation remain to some extent a matter of interpretation or, perhaps, because of that. The appreciation of these deeper characteristics account for the evaluation of its meaning and its identity. Differences in the appearance of buildings such as different materials, different styles or different colours can

then be appreciated as manifestations of more essential characteristics of the unique identity of buildings and settings.

Sometimes formal diversification of contemporary architecture in several contexts is considered enough to avoid the uncritical uniformity of modernism and to relate to the local context. The Building Regulations for vernacular settings in Greece, for instance, prescribe different characteristics in every setting to be imitated by new architecture. Pitched roofs covered with red Byzantine tiles and balconies of specific proportions, to name but two of the required elements, are prescribed for some of the settings in Northern Greece. Vaulted roofs and balconies with *ballustra* are prescribed for some island settings. This kind of differentiation in the approach to diverse vernacular settings acknowledges only the superficial differences and neglects the reasons for their differences, which relate to their identity. Of course, the character of every setting is closely related to its spatial forms but only as a generator of them and not as the specific forms themselves. Some of the differences between different settings ensued because of the exclusive use of local materials. Today, not only are modern materials equally available everywhere but some of the "local" materials for a specific setting, prescribed by building regulations for historic settings, are scarce if not totally non-existent in the locality. The paradox arises then of materials imported from elsewhere to meet the requirements for local materials.

Some other differences between various settings are more essential. Pitched roofs are still a genuine expression in respect to the climatic conditions of N. Greece while the idea of the balcony is still a basic characteristic in island settings in respect to the mild weather and its social significance.

What is more important, spatial differentiation is the result of the characteristic development for every setting and as such ~~it~~ cannot constitute the means to define its identity, let alone to create it. The reasons for its being different from any other account are better than the fact of being different. Differences in appearance should be approached through differences in identity and not vice-versa since identity for a place is much more than its spatial appearance.

Time changes as a whole, from the quantitative status of a temporal flux into a quality printed on some building or some street. The passage of time changes into events. This transformation of time from quantity to a quality relates only to the particular properties of a place. It has nothing to do with different contextual qualifications of time for different places or the differentiation in the appreciation of the passage of time in different socio-cultural contexts (5).

Consideration of the diverse qualifications of time during the development of a given setting will help us to discover the role of its particular characteristics in shaping its development and growth while retaining its identity, or rather shaping its identity in the process of its continuous development. The identity of a given setting will then emerge in our interpretation as the particular path that history took in this particular setting at different times, how and why it came to be what it is.

4. 4. THE TIMES OF SIENA AND THE TIMES OF FLORENCE

4. 4. 1. THE COMMON BACKGROUND

The diverse qualifications of time in equally diverse contexts as a matter of different identities evolving in time, will be better clarified by examining in detail a particular period in the "lives" of Siena and Florence. This example will also give an idea of the dimensions - geographical, political, economical, social and so forth - that are involved in what we define in this study as context at different scales. What is more important, the antithetical qualities of time, as for instance rendering something new or old, uniting or diversifying, constructing or destroying, rendering something ephemeral or permanent will start to emerge alluding to its dialectical nature.

There can hardly be found any absolute values in Renaissance architecture. Despite the fact that architecture of the 15th century in Florence has been greatly appreciated ever since it was built, this was due rather to its being a genuine expression of a specific society at a specific time in history than to characteristics of some absolute and perennial value. Our appreciation of Mediaeval architecture for instance, is compatible with that of the Renaissance despite the fact that each negates the other in terms of spatial form, social structure, materials, design theory and philosophy of life. "

What are the contemporary criteria that allow for equal appreciation of antithetical paths in architectural development? How can we admire both the Renaissance artefacts of Florence and the Mediaeval texture of Siena, especially when we know that they were developing in parallel? Despite the fact that our contemporary distance facilitates to some degree equal appreciation of them, the point remains about the value of antithetical qualities and their relation to human life. Siena and Florence have surprisingly^a lot in common, yet they followed quite diverse ways of development. This fact renders their idiosyncratic architectural development a convincing example that every place is developing in its own way which only is true to it.

During the late Mediaeval ages overpopulation caused the creation of independent city-states inhabited by traders and artisans - later called burgesses or bourgeois - which were unable to find work in the country. The newly created cities favoured the development and dominance of economic activities and freed themselves from the feudal system. Freedom of the individual, judicial autonomy and independent administration came to dominate the life in cities in contrast to life in the countryside dominated by feudal princes and bishops. Economic euphoria due mainly to the extensive trading in east and west prevailed, and cities were engaged in continuous architectural development to accommodate the increasing civic population and civic activities. Leonardo Benevolo writes characteristically:

When at the height of their development, the cities must have been more disorganised. The most important churches and palaces were still unfinished and covered with scaffolding, and each new addition to the city's architecture added a further dimension to it. Architectural unity was ensured by stylistic coherence, by confidence in the future rather than by memories of the past. The Gothic style of architecture was an international one, and it provided a common link between the construction and embellishment of all the buildings in Europe ... (6)

Mediaeval cities developed by adapting to geographical and economic circumstances. Streets were used extensively as meeting places along with their use as thoroughfares and developed in an organic, irregular way. Open spaces called *campi* adjacent to churches, civil institutions and commercial places and guild halles accommodated social gathering and interaction. In particular the *campi* of the Cathedrals, the townhall, the main market place and the major guilds were of primary importance and the urban tissue and social life developed in relation to these. Minor *campi* functioned as the public spaces of particular quarters of the city which represented administration quarters or areas inhabited by the members of a particular guild.

Siena and Florence were among the principal city-states following more or less similar paths of architectural development until the mid 14th century. The agricultural disasters of 1346 and 1347 brought famine to both cities. Weakened and demoralized the people of Siena and Florence could not but face a total disaster when they were struck by the "black death", the bubonic plague of 1348. Disasters like these had a devastating effect on the development and progress that both cities had been engaged upon. People were harassed, seeking less adventure and more secure and conservative ways to the future. In fact there happened a major turn-back for stability. The Roman past was still an available resource surviving the rapid development and growth of both cities. As Benevolo puts it:

The three prime characteristics - continuity, complexity, concentration - have survived the passing of time and they still define the basic nature of the European city; the fourth, however, which could be called the capacity for self renewal, did not survive the crisis in the second half of the fourteenth century. The most important creative moment had passed; from then on the cities looked back before taking any decision. (7)

Siena and Florence quite typically fitted the description of Benevolo for that particular time. From that time architectural development in Siena and Florence makes more sense in terms of their differences rather than in terms of their similarities.

4. 4. 2. THE TIMES OF SIENA

Siena always supported the Emperor more than Florence. Faithful to the Roman tradition, it was visited by the emperors Sigismund and Frederick III while belonging to the state of Milan. At the end of the *Quattrocento* (15th century) Siena was under the dictatorship of Pandolfo Petrucci. According to the historian Frederick Hartt:

It is no wonder that Siena could show no Masaccio, no Brunelleschi; that for its artists perspective was a plaything rather than an instrument; that antiquity made a tardy and fragmentary appearance in their work; that they were little interested in the Early Renaissance and less in the High Renaissance; and that they slipped into Mannerism without a qualm. (8)

During the *Quattrocento* Siena kept faithfully copying the *trecento* (14th century) in architecture. The Gothic way prolonged its existence and maintained its authority. The mild and broad horizontal landscape of the Sienese hills never encouraged dominant architectural forms. The rather organic Gothic style, seen all over Europe by the Sienese merchants seemed to be an adequate and secure way of life to abide by. What is more important - in contrast to the neighbouring Florence - is that architecture for Siena was nothing more than what it used to be; a spontaneous, roughly organized building development.

4. 4. 3. THE TIMES OF FLORENCE

The situation was different in Florence. Architectural development and the fate of old buildings was responsive to various internal and external conflicts. Conflict between rival states but mainly fierce conflict between the Florentine aristocracy and the new merchant class or even conflict between various guilds was the main theme in Florentine life

resulting several times in major destructions of buildings. Architecture acquired a special character in expressing the face of the city. Buildings more than anywhere else were the main target in times of conflict and the main points of reference in everyday life. Architecture thus increased its prestige and became the focus of social concern. After a period of major conflicts, some radical and quite unique for the Mediaeval world, changes happened. The minor guilds of painters and metal sculptors had increased their prestige by being absorbed into major guilds and this resulted to an exceptional social dignity for painters, sculptors and architects.

The feudal nobility of Florence, represented by the Ghibellines in the 15th century, had lost their power. In contrast to Siena, Florence favoured the Pope and the Guelphs - the newly formed class of artisans and merchants - and abandoned the feudal status of depending on the emperor. For Florence it meant that the energetic new class could introduce and pursue its "ideal" and "order" in architecture. Clarity, stability, balance, harmony belonged to the new repertory. Architecture was simplified and inspired by the Classical Greek orders as seen and studied in the Roman ruins. Man was established at the center of the world and the idea of distinctive personalities characterized as geniuses replaced in importance communal knowledge and anonymous Mediaeval craftsmanship. Enclosed by hills, Florence developed as an isolated state geographically, politically and socially. It was more than simple coincidence that it came during the 15th century to favour the development of the individual. In architecture the independence of the single artefact as an isolated work of art was in total contrast with the earlier anonymity of builders and the merging of new architecture in the existing Mediaeval texture. Architecture in Florence was meant to convey a symbolic content. It presented a consistency and abided by specific models in close relation to the new philosophy of life. It was for the man on the street to recognize that a new era had been inaugurated which promised to free the individual at the same time when at Siena and most of the other city-states in Tuscany the individual was subservient to nobility and papacy.

4. 4. 4. TWO TIMES RECONSIDERED

In more concrete terms the sign of the times for Florence was most probably the new Cathedral, the *Duomo* (Fig. 4. 9). At the same time what was more important in Siena was *piazza del campo*, the space in front of the Palazzo Pubblico. History for each place - the place of the *Duomo* and the place of *piazza del campo* - resulted in a symbolic place of the socio-cultural situation in each city. The *Duomo* for Florence became a sort of trademark of the whole city, expressing the distinct spatial and temporal qualities of the city as a whole, differentiating her from any other. In Siena after the project for the enlargement of the Cathedral was abandoned, the antique place of *piazza del campo*, served as her

trademark, symbol of continuity and tradition (Fig. 4. 10). It is interesting to note that the Duomo was intended as a monument; it was intentionally projected as the city's image in a series of urban embellishments. In Siena, it is our choice of *piazza del campo* to represent its idiosyncratic way of architectural development; it could not have been differently since Siena due to the nature of her culture did not seek to create emblematic artefacts. What is more important here is that there is no question of good and bad process of architectural renewal when considering the two cities. Novelty, renewal and development had different meanings in the contexts of Siena and Florence and found different expressions. An architect - and indeed it was a time of architects as eponymous professionals and of architectural competitions - should introduce different kinds of novelty and in a different way to the two cities, if renewal was in both cases the objective. This point becomes more interesting if we consider that more than a few Sienese artists were commissioned to build in Florence and more Florentine artists to build in Siena.

Needless to say, there were exceptions in what could be seen as clear-cut differentiation in architectural renewal. There were quite a few Renaissance buildings in Siena while the Palazzo Medici was built in a rather traditional Mediaeval fortress style (9) (Fig. 4. 11).

The contrast in the architectural development between Siena and Florence shows that the passage of time was qualified in an idiosyncratic way for every city. Being contemporary, or in keeping with the times meant different things to these cities.

Generally speaking, space - actual and virtual - , interacts with time and enhances its passage for its renewal and development. Time brings about change by interacting with what is there, in every place. In turn, through this interaction temporal qualities are embedded in the spatial structure of a setting. Consideration of time as a quality suggests that a setting is not a passive recipient of events to come, but also guides to some degree its renewal. So it will be useful to examine the interaction of space and time not as a cause-effect relation but rather as a dialectical interaction.

Time is differentiated in every place due to the uniqueness of its interaction with each particular place. The passage of time does not "push" artefacts, settings and cities into the future but is absorbed by them while changing them. In other words, time after its interaction with a particular context, comes to be interpreted as a change in that context.

Interaction of space with time happens everywhere, any time but it does not always follow a life-enhancing way of development for every place. Consideration *a posteriori* of change in a building certainly describes the history of that building and sometimes explains it. However, the problem of this study is to interpret change and evaluate it to help in

conducting architectural renewal in an integrative way with the existing architecture. Despite the uniqueness of every building or setting as contexts of new architecture, some notions towards a philosophic framework could help to reveal the identity of every place so that to be renewed accordingly. What we need to consider is precisely the *modes of interaction between a particular place and the passage of time that characterises this place.*

4. 5. TIME AS DEFINED BY ARCHITECTURAL CHANGE SOME CONCEPTUAL NOTATIONS

A change in the physical form or in the significance of something is the most obvious manifestation of the passage of time, if not another name for it. Change defines the passage of time while it expresses best the diverse forms of interaction between space and time.

Changes occur in every human setting on an everyday basis. Historic buildings get time-worn, derelict or ruined. New buildings are sometimes inserted in their place or the site remains unbuilt. Public and private spaces change in character and significance. It has always been the case that some changes are for the better of a human setting, some others less so and some for the worse. It is the aim of this study to contribute some criteria for better enhanced changes in historic settings and their significant interpretation.

Our need to assess changes in our environment comes from the need to find and maintain our place in the world and as such evaluation of change is inevitable. Evaluations such as "for the better" or "for the worse" are, of course, subjective. Yet every setting as a whole is sensitive to any change inferred upon it and if interpretation can achieve resonance with its life rhythm, then some hierarchy and evaluation of changes is possible. The main point, beyond any scepticism about the subjectivity involved in evaluation, is that not all changes can be equally important and furthermore that some changes are proven to be negative for human settings. This fact necessitates a qualitative differentiation between various sorts of changes.

The German philosopher Hans-Georg Gadamer in his seminal work "Truth and Method", on philosophical hermeneutics, distinguishes transformation from change. Transformation, according to Gadamer, is change of something as a whole and as such it is the only real change. Otherwise change remains partial and cannot change an entity as a whole. In Gadamer's terms:

-...transformation means that something is suddenly and as a whole something else, that this other transformed thing that it has become is its true being, in comparison with which its earlier being is nothing...There cannot here be any transition of gradual change leading from one to the other, since the one is the denial of the other. (10)

In this study the notion of change is used as a synonym for the passage of time. It has the properties of a generic term while for Gadamer "transformation is not change, even a change that is especially far reaching" (11). Change in this study can either be a partial one or a transformation. Yet, Gadamer's distinction is of particular importance to our debate. First of all it relates change, of whatever scale, to a whole. Be that whole a building, a street, a setting or whatever comprehensive context, it nevertheless constitutes an entity to which change is referred and against which it is evaluated. Secondly, it acknowledges qualitative differences between changes. Although transformation and partial change may in fact be relative distinctions depending on what we consider to be an entity and what part of an entity. Transformation for one entity might be a partial change for another more comprehensive one. Transformation of a specific building usually only changes partially the street it belongs to.

Different entities follow different rhythms of development and any change affects differently various interrelated entities. The notion of transformation also suggests that for a specific entity, change can either be a partial modification or a total transformation. Gradual change primarily holds on to the perpetuation of an entity while when the process of development for an entity cannot go further, a transformation of this entity into another has to take place (12). Sometimes an old building can be modified to accommodate functions different from those it was originally designed for. In some other cases a transformation of an existing building or its substitution by a new one has to take place.

The problem of deciding what is an entity and what is a part of it seems to be of primary importance in our interpretation of change in the man-made environment. So far we have been discussing how changes affect a setting as a whole. A basic qualitative distinction has also been drawn between partial change and transformation as kinds of change. Change of a setting as a whole is an abstraction. In reality it is always some part or some aspect of it that changes in relation to others which remain unchanged. The fact that something changes always implies that in some sense it also remains the same. If it is a partial change of an entity, it is assessed in relation to the parts or aspects of the entity which does not change; if it is a transformation, it is assessed on the basis of the more comprehensive unity between the stages before and after the transformation of the entity

that was transformed. What is more important, change is not only assessed at the level of a whole setting. A new opening on a previously solid facade of a building changes the facade, the building, the streetscape and the whole setting where this change takes place. But what can be considered an entity, within the limits of which we can assess change? Is the facade an entity? Or, perhaps, is the part of the facade which gave its place to the opening an entity, in reference to which to assess transformation? Questions like these relate directly to the problem of how we designate individuals in general and in the built environment in particular. They provide a better understanding of the impact of any change inferred upon the man-made environment. They contribute towards a better understanding of changes in a setting and better interventions upon it. They are of great practical importance because they endow a new building with its contextual perspectives, at different scales, in relation to the setting where it is being grafted into.

In the case of organisms, individuals are assessed on the basis of their ability to maintain life, although not in isolation from their environment. In the case of the man-made environment the problem becomes even more difficult since entities, life and growth can only be assessed through our interpretation of them. Most times the functional integrity of an artefact accounts for its consideration as an entity while anything less than that is considered as a part of it. For instance, a kitchen or a corridor are often considered as parts of an entity like a house or a school. The building as an entity *par excellence* has dominated the architectural debate. Yet, sometimes we assess change at the level of a facade, a street, an open space or even a compound of buildings (Figs 4. 12-15). Sometimes the physical articulation of artefacts suggests their interpretation as a whole. Other times the functional unity of an architectural complex, even if it is styled diversely, prevails. The levels on which we usually distinguish entities and assess changes in the man-made environment also varies according to our knowledge of a place or according to the way we happen to experience it. Sometimes we consider a setting as a whole, sometimes we focus on parts of it as entities. If we know the functional unity of a building complex, we can relate some change in it to the complex as a whole, or to a distinctly styled part of it. The whole issue of designating and interpreting changes of entities in the built environment, relates to the intentions for doing so. Distinctions like these are always purposive, intentional and those discussed in this study intend to relate as comprehensively as possible new architecture and existing settings.

No clear cut definition of what is an entity and what is a part of it can be designated or suggested, as far as it remains a matter of interpretation and interpretation as part of the experience of the man-made environment cannot be predetermined. Nevertheless these questions are important in our predication of identity and character experienced in the built environment.

Designation and identification of entities and the reverse activity of classification are our means to conceptualize entities in the spatio-temporal realm and their interrelations in order to assess change in context, or else, in order to understand, evaluate, and guide new architecture in old settings. Change thus is always intrinsically related to an entity, even if we are to identify entities at other levels as well. An entity is characterized by an identity if it retains a kind of permanence and sameness while developing. Sometimes it is also said that an entity presents a specific character. To clarify the concepts of identity and character it will suffice for the time to note that an entity is designated as having an identity in relation to itself, while an entity is designated as presenting a character in terms of its differences from other entities. Identity relates to continuity in time and unity while character relates to individuality.

In the man-made environment nothing is additive. Even the smallest scale addition to a building affects not only the particular building but the surrounding setting as well. Interpretation has to understand the context of any intended change - at whatever scale - as a whole in order to change it by introducing novelty or evaluate an inferred change. Whatever degree of subjectivity that implies it is one thing to relate a new building to its setting, and another to avoid this consideration or assume that any change - to be inferred or to be interpreted - is an incident isolated from its context.

Changes out of context i.e. those unrelated to their setting, or relating only superficially to it finally do affect the setting as a whole only they do so in a haphazard, uncritical way often affecting negatively its development. In chapter six, the criteria for such an evaluation will be discussed.

Every particular setting has limits in its potentiality for accommodating change. For instance a small village cannot cope with disproportionate growth needed to accommodate large development schemes due to its tourist attraction. In this sense contextual consideration of the particular local characteristics of a setting might exclude intervention at a particular scale. No clear-cut line between what is a possible intervention and what is not can be drawn here since every case is a unique one. However the main point here is that not any scale of intervention is good regardless^{of} its other characteristics. Scale alone or function alone in some cases is enough to disqualify a particular scheme.

Although the exact limits of every setting for change cannot be prescribed - it would be equivalent to predicting its future and is always the architect's, as an agent of the society, responsibility - it can nevertheless be said that there are certain limits which render an intended change appropriate or not. Problems of appropriate functions and appropriate scale are thus raised which must always be considered against the contextual setting. We

could begin our contextual consideration with what is needed in a particular setting rather than concerning a development program and start looking particular contexts for suitability. In any case whether starting from the architectonic intervention or the context, consideration of this problem in both ways could ensure their potentiality for dialectical interaction.

When a new building manages to renew a place as a whole, we then can speak of the inferred change as transformation and, as far as the setting is concerned, a metamorphosis. Whereas transformation assumes an interpreter assessing some cause-effect relationship between external change and the particular setting, metamorphosis assumes an internal life process absorbing change and every time manifesting what is true to itself. Metamorphosis is internalised transformation or else transformation as seen from the inside of a setting. Transformation is a stage in the setting's evolution while metamorphosis a stage in its involution. This point is important because it indicates that change, a total transformation or partial change, in relation to a given context can be conceived in two ways: as externally imposed and as internally needed.

Architectonic intervention has to acknowledge the contextual rhythm of change, to understand how a given setting "breaths", the "life force" behind its physical presence - by virtue of socio-cultural interaction - and the particularity of its *genius loci* in order to accommodate accordingly architectural development in contextual terms i.e. rendering them internal.

Interpretation and evaluation thus have to treat a place as a series of changes and interpret and evaluate it before introducing any novelty. Contextual consideration is the best guarantee for the appropriateness and the opportuneness of any intended change, to renew this place from the inside and redirect the contextual process in a contextual way.

Interpreting the context of a particular setting as a process and as a series of particular buildings changing in time, will enable us to understand the power of a new building to modify the contextual process, and the power of a setting to unite all the buildings it consists of under its particular identity. A setting considered as a process subdues all novelties to its development, while a setting as a series of buildings can always be verified with every new building. Only in this sense will the context be able to *change* while *being itself* in the sense that the life force, so to speak, behind the process remains there (Fig. 4. 16).

4. 6. CONCEPTUALIZING ARCHITECTURAL CHANGE DIALECTICALLY

The relation between space and time, or else the diverse manifestations of time (13) as experienced in the spatial environment of human settlements, will be examined here by following a dialectic discourse rather than any analytic method.

Instead of classifying time in distinctive categories in a deterministic way, as for instance in historical periods, a dialectic discourse is adopted, i.e. consideration of time as opposite temporal qualities. We can thus describe adequately not only the diverse and even oppositional modes of temporal manifestation but their interrelationship as well. We believe that a dialectic discourse expresses better than any deterministic mode the relations between man and his environment as manifested through his participation in it, interpretation and evaluation of it, and finally intervention in it. This dialogue between the experiencer of a particular setting and the setting itself is engaged at an indefinite diversity of levels every time for every individual.

Some questions about the importance of knowledge about the past of a setting in our experience of it are raised here. Comprehensiveness in the consideration of a setting presupposes, or in any case suggest, an ideal experiencer who holds full knowledge and memory of the setting's past. Socially typical experience, involving how the past is generally supposed to have been for this setting, however partial, can find its place as part of an ideal experience. On the other hand ideal experience can account for every potent, plausible real experience of it. Our aim is not to attempt a comprehensive dialectic temporal conceptualization for the study of time in the environment *per se*. It is rather to address and adequately describe the multiplicity of temporal manifestations as experienced in the man-made environment, as well as the diverse levels at which people in several circumstances may experience it.

Dialectics of the opposites as a form of inquiry penetrates the whole of this study. This is because it is here considered to be an adequate logical system to deal with antithetical environmental qualities, which are nonetheless equally real in an empirical sense and equally important in human settings.

What any inquiry based on formal logic would consider contradictory qualities, dialectics acknowledges as antithetical values in terms of complementarity and reciprocal co-operation (appendix I). Thus contemporary and historic qualities or qualities of long and short duration do not have necessarily to be considered as an "either-or" question. Both are considered to be equally real and of equal importance in human settings. Qualities of the past for instance do not derive negatively (i.e. as opposites to current qualities) in order to justify our dialectical consideration of them, but co-exist with them as equally real. In other

words, antithetical qualities of time are inevitable.

The dialectic conceptualization of time as *synchronicity vs diachronicity*, *unity vs diversity*, *time constructive vs time destructive* and *temporariness vs permanence*, attempted in the following pages does not aim at quantitative exhaustiveness or at an objective representation of all temporal qualities. One could also go so far as to argue that all four dialectically opposite temporalities examined here are nothing but aspects of a more general dialectic opposition characterizing time.

This comprehensive temporal opposition as an abstraction of the diverse temporal manifestations, although it does not define time in any positivistic sense, nevertheless manifests itself through the spatial environment in contextually meaningful opposite temporalities. For instance, long and short duration qualities as well as constructive and destructive qualities of time are with us in everyday life.

Dialectic conceptualization through the four pairs of opposites, is only a frame to provide an adequate understanding of how each context shapes, accommodates and finally "traps" time. In other words, how time is "contextualized" in every setting. It will describe the contextual way of responding to temporal passage and it will reveal how a particular context shapes its life, its identity and its history out of the quantitative temporal flux. In other words it will interpret the way time as an abstraction is "real-ised" in a place.

4. 7. INTRODUCING SOME OPPOSED QUALITIES OF ARCHITECTURAL CHANGE

Change as a definition for the passage of time, or time as a carrier of change is dialectical. As far as something changes, it ceases to be what it used to be in order to be something else. In a reality of changing circumstances, an entity has to change if it is to remain itself. Any novelty inferred by change is created at the expense of something existing before novelty was introduced. Change encompasses both the transition from one stage to another and also the two stages themselves as before and after. So, change cannot be conceived but in terms of antithetical yet equivalent qualities which highlight some of its particular aspects and characteristics. Some polarities are here introduced to meet this purpose.

Permanent and *ephemeral* qualities account for the relativity of our conceptualization of change in the man-made environment. Every change in it, is in dialectical relation with what remains unchanged. In other words, we assess change according to certain criteria. Yet, even these criteria change in time. For instance, changes within an accepted style of

architectural expression at a given period are considered as such against some basic principles characterizing a style. Yet, the style as a whole is questioned at another time. We interpret dialectical aspects of change according to our current perspective at each time; that is, we are aware that our interpretation is historically bound. Yet, we consider some changes possible for a given setting and others impossible. Properties in the man-made environment which we consider impossible to change, or we do not think of, are experienced as permanent; properties that might be plausibly change are experienced as temporary.

Relativity of distinctions such as permanent and ephemeral is inevitable in our attempt to conceptualize change. As such, the polarity permanent and ephemeral, or long-lasting and short-lasting penetrates all the other polarities introduced in the following. *Constructive* and *destructive* aspects of change account for the positive and negative impact of change for several parts or aspects of an entity during its life process. Again both construction and destruction are inevitable as dialectical dimensions of the phenomenon of change. Time destroys in its way to construct and is able to recreate due to its continuous destructive process. The construction of a wall in the middle of a space destroys the unity of that space while creating two spaces. Within the limits of the relativity of our designation of what changes and what does not for a given entity, we interrelate construction and destruction within the process of its development. *Unity* and *diversity* as aspects of change in relation to an entity account for the possibility of interrelating consecutive changes in it. Changes can be considered either as maintaining some of its aspects or as transforming others in order to renovate the entity and keep up with the need for its development. The changes leading from childhood to adulthood in the life of a person can either be considered as maintaining the life process of a person or as continuously transforming it. With respect to every phase in itself, there is a discontinuity, a diversity of the process. But with respect to the life of a person it is perfectly continuous. A living organism like a cell depends on its environment for its life. A change in a cell can either be seen as caused by its environment or as internally determined and needed for its growth. In other words, change and novelty can either be characterized as an external or an internal process.

Some of the dialectical aspects of change introduced here as polarities, like the ones mentioned so far, are in the nature of things. However, other polarities arise more directly out of experience and conceptualization of the built environment.

Synchronicity and *diachronicity* are aspects of change that account for the experience of a setting as what it is in the present and as what it used to be in the past. The polarity past/present for the life of an entity seems to be the most obvious way to relate change to it since the past of an entity is what enables our interpretation of change in contextual terms. Change can be seen as temporally flat -as relating only to the present mode of being

of the entity it refers to- or as penetrating its past, since any setting while being what it is, never ceases to be what it has been as well.

These polarities by no means exhaust the possibilities of understanding change as experienced in the man-made environment. *Imitation* and *contrast*, as developed in Chapter Three, will be employed to investigate the dialectical nature of change through the proposed polarities. They relate a change to a setting and as such are different in nature from the polarities characterizing change itself. For instance, an assessment of the diachronic and the synchronic aspects of a Neo-Georgian house in Edinburgh will be made by using the notions of imitation and contrast to relate this new building to what is already there. The polarities are in the nature of change while the notions of imitation and contrast are tools to help us place a change in its context. The four pairs [synchronic/diachronic, continuity/discontinuity, constructive/destructive, permanent/ephemeral] are different guises of change, while imitation and contrast relate all these - change in general - to its context.

4. 8. EPHEMERALITY VERSUS PERMANENCE: QUALITIES OF LONG AND SHORT DURATION IN THE MAN-MADE ENVIRONMENT

Every human setting undergoes several changes due to changing socio-cultural activities taking place in it. New buildings are being built, new functions substitute old ones, new social activities find expression in new spatial formations, old buildings are invested with ever changing meanings. Yet, a particular setting is the common denominator of all changes in it. A sort of permanence is necessary in order to assess the changes it is undergoing. If everything changes, how could we possibly ascribe identity? Or, once identity has been assessed, how far can something change without losing its identity? The relativity of our conceptualization calls for some features, parts or aspects of an entity to be considered as lasting longer than others. These longer lasting properties are responsible for pulling together the identity of an entity and maintaining its integrity, while other characteristics of it change. Long lasting properties also change; only they do so after having played the role of "stabilizers" for relatively short lasting properties and after having been substituted by other long lasting ones.

What we refer to as permanence in this section is the experience of long-lasting properties as permanent despite the fact that *a posteriori* considered they also change. A human setting, as context for architectural novelty, could equally be conceived as the accumulation and superimposition of ephemeral characteristics which make it what it is - or as an entity characterised by permanent qualities and undergoing continuous change.

We have introduced the distinction permanence and ephemerality in a relative sense. No quality can exist for ever and no quality can exist only for an instant. Relativity and permanence might appear as contradicting notions if we fail to stress that permanent qualities, as we examine them here, are considered as such in relation to ephemeral ones and vice versa. Even if the *interregnum* between permanence and change cannot be clear, it is important nevertheless to assess rhythms of change in the man-made environment. Permanent characteristics appear then to change as well, only they do so in much slower rhythm so as to be legitimately considered as relatively permanent in relation to others changing more often.

The French historiographer Fernand Braudel deals with this problem by distinguishing three kinds of history; history of short duration, history of middle duration and history of long duration. He encompasses thus changes ranging from those manifested every 150-200 years and those characterizing everyday life. Braudel renders history comprehensible through an understanding of rhythms which characterize human life at several levels (15).

Relativity of permanence is particularly characteristic of peoples having a strong sense of linear, evolutionary history. In the so called Western mind everything happens in history and a permanent characteristic is one which has been initiated at some time and still persists. Relatively permanent qualities originate at some particular time in history and it is equally plausible that some time they will cease to exist. In the Western context qualities *become* permanent.

This is not the case with traditional societies. For those peoples the permanence that their buildings manifest are an absolute, always being timeless and remaining so for ever. Rebuilding as before has some purpose to recreation, renewal and to the eternal (16). The Japanese for instance rebuild their Shinto shrines every 20 years in the same form. Repetition in this case is not copying as it has been shown earlier for the pastiche policy in the historic centres of Western Europe. Repetition of the temple construction is a repeated manifestation and materialization of the archetype.

In a relative sense or not, time in the built environment presents two aspects dialectically interrelated: time as its everyday passage, the state of being susceptible to change, the situationistic event; and time as a permanent entity. What is important for our study is that both aspects are equally real in our empirical experience of them and equally important. Ephemeral properties do not derive in a negative sense from the permanent ones but they are properties *in themselves*. Ephemerality, as a property of architecture, emits an aura of change to the man-made environment and infers to it a sense of freedom and openness towards the future. Permanent characteristics, on the other hand, are not just the

background for ephemerality to be measured against. They are properties in themselves inferring stability and a sense of belonging to the human environment. There has scarcely been any building intended by its designer to convey a transient value. In most cases throughout history buildings were built to last. Even buildings designed to function only for a while, like for instance buildings for exhibitions, make a claim to posterity. Yet, *a posteriori*, as well as in every day experience, some buildings are considered to possess characteristics lasting longer than others.

Both aspects of time are inevitable because they are in the nature of things and their dialectical interaction can maintain this equivalence and equipotency at different scales of context. We experience the same kind of difference between permanent and temporal characteristics either in an absolute sense, as it is the case in traditional societies, or in a relative one, as it is the case with "Western" societies. We experience and interpret permanent characteristics in a setting, in a building, or in a street directly, i.e. as if it has always been there. It is as if we apply the permanent dimension of time to measure, to recognise and to interpret such characteristics. Conversely, we experience ephemeral properties as such i.e. as having a particular life time. In this case we apply the transitory nature of time as constant change, to measure them directly in our interpretation.

The neo-Platonic philosopher Proclus in his "Elements of Theology" speculates on this point eloquently and helps to elucidate the point that both ephemerality and permanence have an equally independent status as dimensions of time.

Every eternity is a measure of things eternal, and every time of things in time; and these two are the only measures of life and movement in things. For any measure must measure piece-meal or by simultaneous application of the whole measure to the things measured. That which measures by the whole is eternity; that which measures in parts, time. There are thus two measures only, one of eternal things, the other of things in time. (17)

Proclus' idealistic viewpoint is evident. He conceives eternity as the "idea" of time. Nevertheless he contributes to our discussion by stressing the qualitative difference between ephemeral and permanent qualities and the dialectical nature of time regardless if they are experienced in a relative or in an absolute sense. In this thesis, we do not share Proclus' idealistic assumptions. Yet, it is nevertheless interesting to notice that difference between permanence and change is not only a difference of degree, but also, a difference of kind. Permanence is experienced not as just a slower rhythm of change, in a different sense altogether, despite the fact that the intellect can falsify experience and proves the historicity and changeability of everything. This is particularly true in Western societies.

Often the physical presence of a building is enough to confer a sort of permanence amid the various changes it is going under. However its appearance, its function or its cultural significance change it is the particular physical body of the artifacts which unites all changes upon it. An old tree in an African village (Fig. 4. 17) ascribes a sort of permanence to the place despite the various changes in the nearby buildings. In towns and cities old buildings act as "stabilizers" for their environment and counterbalance the changing world around them. Monuments, intentional or not, represent permanence amid change and buildings expressing monumentality attempt to acquire such a significance amid their continuously developing surroundings.

Permanence is not necessarily bound to material existence. Giancarlo De Carlo argues that architecture has a permanent value in the memory of the people who experience it, which outlasts its physical presence (18). This memory relates either to individuals depending on their lifetime, or to socio-cultural life where memory is perpetuated through generations. The place of Les Halles market in Paris is still important in Parisian life two decades after its demolition. The recent international architectural competition, signifying its importance, aimed at finding the best way to redeem the qualities of the place in contemporary terms (19). Ritual procession during the holy week in Seville qualifies in socio-cultural terms the particular streets it follows throughout the year. Moreover we often speak of the permanent ambiance of a place, an atmosphere it yields and a sense of place which is beyond the particular buildings defining it.

Permanence as a quality, however independent of any physical presence of artifacts, is nevertheless physically anchored. Les Halles, the particular piece of land, constitutes the material anchor for the qualities of the lost market place. Permanence in the man-made environment is always defined in this study in relation to a specific context. They are relatively permanent but place bound. They are not bound to a specific historical period, but they do belong to a particular place.

One could argue that permanence in the man-made environment is beyond a particular place as well. But these postulated transpatial, universal permanence cannot but constitute only the result of contextual development and qualification and not the means to achieve it. It always relates primarily to some contextual basis.

Barcelona pavilion by Mies Van Der Rohe represented for generations of architects an example for long-lasting architectural properties, an international ideal of architectonic space. Few can deny the existence of such qualities of space, which can be experienced anywhere without belonging somewhere in particular (20). Although these qualities fall outside the scope of this thesis it is important to postulate that permanent, transpatial

qualities usually *presuppose contextual qualification first*. In Chapter Eight we will examine how these qualities relate to the contextual ones. It will suffice for the moment to note that contextual consideration does not exclude transpatial qualities; instead it ensures their significance only if it does so through contextual interpretation.

The ephemeral character of the man-made environment comes as a result of its responsiveness to the ever changing human life in it. It is this responsiveness of artefacts to human life^{that} legitimizes their metaphoric conception as alive entities.

To define what is life for a specific setting, or else to interpret the dialectical relationship between its ephemeral and its permanent aspects, are aspects of the same hermeneutical problem. The test of time might reveal the permanence of some characteristics and the ephemerality of others, but it does not help architectural development in its becoming. Hermeneutics - as a means for projecting a setting's life into the future by understanding the life force behind its past and current manifestations - will attempt to do so.

Again we take for granted that our times differ from the past as well as that they have some aspects in common. Imitation emphasizes the similarities between the present and the past and attempts to render characteristics of the past as permanent while rejecting all the differences between present and past as being ephemeral. Its main goal is to perpetuate the "life" of the characteristics of that part of the past that it imitates. But it fails to do so if it is exhausted in superficial aspects of the past as, for instance, in the material or visual aspects of historic styles. What it achieves finally then is to perpetuate insignificant for the present, and for that reason ephemeral, aspects of the past at the expense of more essential for today qualities of the past, which by not being imitated are treated as ephemeral. Copies aiming at permanent properties - and that is why they try to imitate them - degenerate into ephemeral constructions. Imitation of what is considered to be a permanent quality should also aim at - not by copying but in an analogical sense i.e. *mutatis mutandis* - the way its model retains a permanent value. In other words, as an act of relating new to old, imitation should aim at showing not how a historical building looked like but rather why^{it} is still considered of value in the present, what is it that makes it endure socio-cultural changes and changes of taste. This analogical consideration i.e. to catch in contemporary terms the essence of a characteristic of the past for a particular place, must sometimes overcome some other differences between the present and the past, such as differences in use. It is in this sense that contrast is also needed if we want to imitate the essence behind the appearance.

Contrast emphasizes the differences between the present and the past and attempts to render the characteristics of the past it contrasts to of ephemeral value i.e. belonging only

to the past. But if it rejects uncritically the past *in toto*, alongside the ephemeral. Characteristics of the past still of value in the present fail to reach it as well. Indirectly, even present qualities proposed by a new building expressing contrast are treated as being of ephemeral value only. Contrast negates any sort of permanence but it aims at it in another sense i.e. by acknowledging change and ephemerality as the only permanence feasible. It intends to attack established properties by rendering them obsolete but fails to provide an acceptable alternative i.e. failure to renew the context entails its assimilation and absorption into what originally attempted to contrast to. Contrast remains ephemeral in juxtaposition to properties which remain unchanged.

Both imitation and contrast can be creative responses to the permanent and ephemeral qualities of a particular setting. But again imitation in order to imitate at more than one levels i.e. the essence of a setting, entails contrast as well; and the same applies to contrast.

4. 9. TIME CONSTRUCTIVE AND TIME DESTRUCTIVE

Any architectural novelty in a given setting necessarily destroys an existing situation in terms of uses and significance, to construct another. This constructive/destructive process affects a single building, a street and the whole setting since any novelty is not only additive to that setting but transformative of it as well. In this study we consider the interaction of time with a given setting as constructive whenever time in the guise of aging of buildings or changing socio-cultural circumstances "generates" buildings and meanings, in the people's interpretation of this setting. Conversely, we consider this interaction of time and a given context destructive whenever time "deconstructs" or "obliterates" buildings and meanings.

If we consider that unbuilt space is equally important to the built one, and that any building operation affects the setting as a whole, an interpretation and evaluation of the existing contextual situation in it is called for before attempting any intervention to it. In fact interpretation and evaluation unavoidably take place in our attempt to give meaning to our environment, even if we ignore the problem, with every new building or any urban transformation we attempt. The problem that this study deals with is how to increase the possibility for any novelty to be contextually relevant.

A wall unites and separates the spaces on either side of it. What matters is if the creation of the two spaces is better equipped to fulfil some purpose. The destruction of the unity of the space can then be justified. Etymologically, both terms i.e. *to construct* and *to destroy* share the Latin root *-struere* (to build). Construct means to build up and destroy

means to build down. In this sense both are ways of building, showing their inevitable relation as dialectical aspects of change as well as etymologically.

Changes are desired by people, caused by people and experienced by them. Yet, every change derives its significance in relation to what it changes and why. What is important for our purposes in this study, is to assess and evaluate what is destroyed and what is constructed in its place, in reference to the entity undergoing change. What is needed most and why? Taking for granted the inevitability of both the destructive and the constructive aspects of change, one has to evaluate ^{whether} a particular change is to enhance or to impede life for a site at a particular time.

Demolishing parts of a setting, parts of particular buildings or whole buildings, is only justified provided that a better situation will ensue. Substituting the demolished part with a new building or leaving it unbuilt, as the case may be, should change the setting in a meaningful and constructive way; otherwise there is no point of attempting the whole operation. All parts of an existing setting, e.g. such as an old building or an open space, constitute part and parcel of this setting and are of socio-cultural significance. All these values and meanings have to be considered before replacing them; failure to do so entails loss for the particular setting. It should be made clear again at this point that by relevance or appropriateness ^{we} do not refer to similarity only; they refer to difference as well as a mode of being relevant. In this sense a new building in a setting may be positively antagonistic to the setting it is grafted into. Then destruction is justified as a necessary step towards inevitable renewal. In other words, novelty can only be introduced at the expense of something existing.

A plea for the consideration of what exists in a setting before the introduction of novelty, should not be taken to imply that all the buildings in a setting are necessarily contextually relevant by simply being physically part of it. Sometimes it does happen ^{that} the physical presence of a building is enough for its absorption into its surroundings. It is not also rare that buildings originally met with local opposition, later to become sympathetic, as time passed by. The Eiffel tower in Paris, for instance, at the time of its construction was considered by some a monstrosity. However there is less doubt about its significance to Parisian life today. In such cases the physical presence of a building plays a role for its persistence in later times which appreciate it differently due to changes in the political, and social conditions, change of taste or simply due to the acquired familiarity with it. But these are marginal instances and in any case they do not suggest anything that could be done towards better relations between old and new.

More often infills of comparatively small scale are "absorbed" in settings with strong

historical character. An overwhelming context like that of Venice, for instance, literally "hides" minor additions or modifications and minimises their impact on the context. This is true even if these minor changes are inappropriate to it, because based upon and/or express irrelevant ideas for the specific context. Many changes in the urban tissue of Mediaeval Edinburgh do not ever catch the eye of the passer by. Moreover, it is surprising that one of the most famous streets in Europe, Princes Street in Edinburgh, consists of so many inappropriate new constructions, whole buildings and additions to already existing ones. The overall atmosphere of the street literally overshadows the bad quality of some of the new buildings. But, of course, the question is evident. For how long can Princes Street keep its familiar character, if architectural renewal is unresponsive? Furthermore it can be argued that even in its current situation, Princes Street is rather "enduring" inappropriate interventions than "ignoring" them.

In the majority of historic settings, irrelevant infills remain alien and disruptive elements. In these cases removal of a disruptive new addition to an old building, an irrelevant new building or an unresponsively planned new urban sector, is a gain for the setting.

Time as an external agent to a given setting is manifested in two ways: firstly as a "regular" aging process and secondly as "irregular" historical circumstances due to the vicissitudes of socio-cultural life.

Time as aging process continuously constructs and destroys in various ways a setting. The ancient Greek myth of God Kronos, an allegory for time if not literally time, who devoured his offsprings seems to hold still its metaphoric value. The oppositional qualities of time i.e. to generate and devour, are both inevitable. Buildings, streets, villages, people, cultures appear in time and are subsequently all susceptible to its destructive dimension.

Most radical changes in the man-made environment come as a result of equally radical socio-cultural changes. These changes occur in irregular rhythms of change as opposed to the rather regular aging process. Sometimes natural forces such as earthquakes or floods cause irregular destruction of buildings too or even accidental catastrophes such as the great fire of 1666 in London. But even in these cases what really matters is the way that the socio-cultural entity accommodates such changes as part of a process by interpreting and evaluating them (21). The great boulevards of Paris were "opened" at the expense of thousands of existing buildings, even renowned ones, as for instance the one by the French architect N. Ledoux (Fig. 4. 18). During the French revolution of 1789 most Royal monuments were destroyed by the Republique. More recently Place des Vosges in Paris was cleared from additions of the last two centuries and for the sake of purity of style a

restoration project attempted to create the atmosphere of the *hotel de villes*, four storey mansions, of the 18th century (Fig. 4. 19).

The politics and the sociology of urbanism could account in depth for these changes. Marais, for instance, the area around Place des Vosges, after the renovation project was over, was not given back to the people which used to live there. The prices of the new apartments and shops went out of reach for the lower and middle classes which lived there. A high-class residential and shopping area is today created in what used to be a prestigious quarter of the Royal Paris two centuries before. But the sociology and politics of urban renewal are beyond the scope of this study. Although their importance is acknowledged as decisive, these dimensions are abstracted out of the phenomenon of change as it is examined here.

Socio-cultural changes equally with their destructive dimension, or because of that, construct as well. Every period in human history leaves behind its own monuments and its buildings as witnesses to their ideas, their beliefs and their economic and social situation.

Both aspects of time, as regular aging process and as irregular historical circumstances converge and change the man made environment not only physically but in significance as well. The senescence of buildings alone compensates for their physical deterioration. When a building gets time-worn, it gains in prestige *qua* old, as enduring the passage of time. It acquires what Alois Riegl in the beginning of the 20th century coined as "age value" (22). Time as socio-cultural change, changes the role and the significance of buildings. Reappropriation or renovation of the existing built environment in terms of uses and meanings constantly infers new meanings while earlier ones move to the background or to oblivion.

Whether this dialectical process between construction and destruction occurs in a constant rhythm as an aging process or following irregular historical circumstances is not of particular importance here. What is important, is the dialectic relation between construction and destruction, which renders them equally important in our interpretation of the man-made environment. This dialectics is in fact the path of life and in this sense human settings follow nature's way. Unlike her, however, they have no autonomous power of regeneration and it is only through human beings and societies that settings are subjected to renewal. Changes in settings are inferred by human activities and get significance in human minds. Otherwise the man-made environment turns into ^{the} natural. It is in the responsibility of every society to follow creatively this unavoidable dialectics between time as a constructive agent and time as destructive one, in order to develop in a life-enhancing way.

We take for granted that the present for a specific setting is different from its past although it came out of it. Imitation emphasizes the similarities of the present with the past and attempts to reconstruct it. But if it does so at a superficial level as, for instance, in reproductions of historical styles or pastiche, it also reconstructs and brings forth obsolete, for the present times, aspects of the past. Fakeness, generated by the irrelevant aspects of the past is enough to destruct the same qualities of the past that imitation was originally aiming at. Contrast emphasizes the differences between present and past and attempts to destruct what is obsolete from the past by constructing what is new. But if it does so at a superficial level as, for instance, when uncritical differentiation, i.e. juxtaposition, is adopted, it also negates and destructs the qualities of the past which people still hold dear, or else, which still are new.

Imitation alone and contrast alone are equally exhausted when they attempt to be creative by inferring to an existing setting preservation or modernisation only. What is needed from proper imitation, proper contrast or else the balanced dialectics between imitation/contrast is the replacment of historic qualities with modern ones. The constructive and destructive aspects of time are thus directed towards a critical reinterpretation of established qualities and creation of meaningful new ones. In this way the context adapts to and absorbs the supracontextual circumstances and the process of aging developing in a particular idiosyncratic way by holding a critical position against anonymous progress and modernity. It is only through a creative fusion of contemporary values and the existing contextual situation that a legitimate renovation can ensue.

4. 10. THE QUESTION OF CONTINUITY:

UNITY AND DIVERSITY IN THE PROCESS OF ARCHITECTURAL DEVELOPMENT

New architecture in historic settings is often justified in terms of the degree of integration with the existing it has achieved. International competitions for contemporary architecture in historic contexts value more than anything else the continuity between the new and the old. For instance the international architectural competition for Les Halles market in Paris and the one for the extension of the National Gallery in London, are two distinctive examples which received wide publicity and concern from the architectural profession and the general public alike. In both cases the continuity of the new architecture with that existing in each place was the prime criterion for the evaluation of the proposed schemes.

Yet in most cases the issue of continuity is abused. Some architects in their attempt

to relate old and new, show a concern only for visual continuity as a means of responding to historic settings, which is to be realised through the repetition of forms or materials similar in appearance to those already present (23). Some architects, like for instance the architect Maurice Culot and his followers, being in favour of the historical continuity in a formal and a material sense, negate modern architecture in toto (24). In the following pages we shall try to provide a comprehensive view of continuity encompassing its more profound aspects. Continuity in a broad sense relates to the way a building or a setting changes while remaining itself.

One way to interpret the identity of a given setting is to discover a coherence amid the various stages in its development. The identity of Chester, for instance, relates to whatever underlies both its Roman and its Mediaeval times. Every spatial manifestation of a given setting is only a facet of its identity, the fact of which should be rather sought in the shaping force behind its different guises in time than in any particular one of them.

The Italian architect Giancarlo De Carlo has shown through his work that a more comprehensive and adequate conceptualization of continuity is possible. In the following excerpt from a conversation with Judi Loach he defines the problem properly:

JDL: So the issue of continuity is not really a matter of whether or not there is a break in time, whether or not the process has been disrupted at a given point (such as by the Modern Movement) but rather a matter of how the past is being handled at this moment. It has less to do with the physical conservation of the past than with reinterpreting ideas from the past in the present.

GDC: Continuity is ambiguous but it is certainly not a matter of time alone. Continuity can be a very dangerous concept; for instance, Italian historians used the argument of historicism and continuity to fight against Modern architecture. But true continuity is not the repetition of the same thing-the copying of style or trivial details. It is finding a continuous link in the process of development called architecture. (25)

A continuous link within a developing architecture are the key concepts in De Carlo's interpretation of continuity. In our terms the process of architectural development can be continuous only if unity between successive critical interpretations and reappropriations can be assessed. Continuity necessarily involves diversity - otherwise it results in repetition - and unity - otherwise it results in fragmentation. In other words, unity and diversity are needed equally for the sake of continuity.

It is in this sense that continuity is desirable in historic setting and De Carlo

envisages as the "true continuity", but too often it is considered in a very narrow sense excluding the need for diversity. Continuity in the proportions of openings, continuity in the roofscape in a village, continuity in the height of buildings, stylistic continuity is often taken as a synonym of visual similarity. What this study attempts to emphasize is that there is no question of positive unity and negative diversity. Both notions can be sterile or creative strategies for architectural intervention. In their negative sense, unity can be repetition and diversity mere juxtaposition. Their dialectic consideration, as equally important, yet opposed, aspects of continuity, enable a critical approach towards existing settings in our interpretation of them and in our intervention for their renewal.

In this study, we call unity the quality of oneness in a given setting beyond the differences in its spatial and formal configurations as they change with time. Conversely, we call diversity the quality of responsiveness to novelties and its ability to diversify its spatial and formal manifestation in its way to accommodate change. In this sense, appropriate unity or appropriate diversity can equally account for continuity in the process of development for a given setting.

Unity binds together the various stages in the life of a setting while diversity changes it from one stage to another in its development. Diversity without unity degenerates into fragmentation while unity without diversity degenerates into repetition. The contemporary horizon, the current every time situation, is the common denominator and the basis for the dialectical interaction between unity and diversity. Both properties are assessed in the present times and they in turn represent the opposing aspects of continuity, as it is interpreted to be today. Maintaining an identity while being responsive to novelty are inevitably of equal importance to human life in general and to the man-made environment in particular.

Every change can either be considered as a static alteration or modification of an entity or as a dynamic and continuous evolvement of it. For instance, architectural development has often been understood as a series of diverse spatial expressions. Histories of architecture dealing with the history of several styles bear witness to this. Even if the reasons for a change from one style to another are provided, architectural development is seen as a series of discontinuous phases. Alternatively, architectural development for a setting can be considered as a continuous process of absorbing changes and being renovated, while essentially remaining itself. Again, as with the other polarities, it is a matter of interpretation what can be considered as an entity, what changes in this entity, how change is being assessed and whether renovation is to be part of an ongoing process or just a phase added to what existed before. Static conceptualizations of architectural development emphasize the importance of historical circumstances over the identity of a setting, while

dynamic conceptualizations of architectural development emphasizes the ability of a setting to guide its growth through time. In the former case changes are only the new situation while in the latter the forces causing a particular change remain with the change they cause and determine, even partially, its future development. Unity aspects of change account for the maintenance of identity in time, while diversity aspects challenge this identity every time by introducing novelty.

One aspect of unity is the physical one. Often new architecture borrows the materials of its surrounding in its attempt to relate to it. But is it enough? Even if unity at the material level is achieved, can it operate on any other level as well? Imitating the half timbered Mediaeval buildings of Chester associates with the traditional materials of the adjacent buildings but how can contemporary shops function without a glass front? In other words what about the unity at the functional level? The half timbered buildings in their time were primarily functional constructions, using the best available materials and the best possible building techniques. Are we doing the same today i.e. are we in unity with this aspect of the past, if we simply copy them? In terms of our definition, how can a setting like Chester, which was so rigorous in its development during Mediaeval times, be the same with its contemporary phase of timid and restricted development?

Adoption of past typologies or existing formal aspects of a setting are often considered as another approach towards establishing unity. Even if we disregard the relation between materials and forms examined before, how can a copy of a past form be of the same importance to contemporary life as the past form was to its own times? The paradox is evident, if we take for granted that contemporary life does not entirely depend on the past.

We have discussed in Chapter Three how Aldo Van Eyck in his Hubertus house in Amsterdam had to break from the Baroque morphology of the adjacent buildings in order to achieve a coherent innovation. He had to abandon the grey colours of the nearby buildings in order to express a lively world of vivid colours and he had to break from the old austere shell in order to create a playful environment.

Van Eyck breaks from the stylistic Baroque ornament to maintain what is more important in that, viz., a close interest to detail. He breaks from the beauty of the Classical orders to maintain the beauty of a lively contemporary environment. He breaks from the scale of the context to maintain its character in a scale more appropriate for children. The unity of the context is kept by a critical reappropriation of the what the context is in the light of new needs, uses and significance.

Unity can be conceived as the internal process of a particular setting which relates "genetically" the setting to any intervention. This internal process can be compared to narrative time in plots as for instance in the Greek tragedy, where disparate events are brought together in one temporal unity, that of the plot. In the following pages we will dwell for a while on this important issue.

The French philosopher Paul Ricoeur in his study "Time and Narrative" and in the Gifford lectures he delivered at the University of Edinburgh in 1986, has elaborated the issue of narrative to elucidate the temporal character of human experience. In "Time and Narrative" he examines the interplay of concordance and discordance in the analyses of time by Augustine and of plot by Aristotle. Using these opposite analyses of time as conceptual tools, Ricoeur examines the nomological interpretation of history, represented *par excellence*, by the French historiographers of the *Annales* school and the narrativist interpretation of history represented by the royal historiographers of Britain. Ricoeur argues that history relies on narrative understanding and narrativist interpretation of history despite its failing in "integrating explanation in terms of laws into the narrative fabric of history" yet;

...the narrativist interpretation is correct in its clear perception that the specifically historical property of history is preserved only by the ties, however tenuous and well-hidden they may be, which continue to connect historical explanation to our narrative understanding, despite the epistemological break separating the first from the second. (26)

Although the epistemological problem of nomological vs narrativist understanding cannot be resolved except in favour of one of them, in historical understanding (as later with the notion of selfhood in his Gifford lectures), Ricoeur favours the narrative mode. As far as the human self is concerned Ricoeur proposes the concept of narrative identity to address the unity of self (27).

This background is important for our study because it provides the necessary conceptual tools to interpret a given setting. A setting is similar to a plot "as an operation that unifies into one whole and complete action the miscellany constituted by the circumstances, ends and means, initiatives and interactions, the reversals of fortune, and all the unintended consequences issuing from human action" (28).

Derived from the definition of tragedy in Aristotle's "poetics", the dialectic interaction of unity and diversity finds an end in the final unity of the plot. Similarly the identity of a setting emerges as *the way it puts together its ingredients, or elements* and not as any

particular one of them. Unity is employed not to abolish, but to accommodate diversity within a process. So, the connective links in the "life" of a setting emerge as the way in which transition from one state to another takes place. Nothing remains totally unchanged, yet unity is secured.

The rhythm of change in the history of a given setting is important in our interpretation of its unity. Its recognition is easier when we follow closely the successive stages of development in a setting than when we witness two remote between themselves phases in development. In any case consideration of the identity of a context - at whatever level - is a prerequisite for its understanding.

Diversity relates to the experience of a change as an unexpected innovation in some aspect in a setting. It can be paralleled with a Surrealist attitude towards a disobedience to the *consecutio temporum*, an indication of a new temporality which can be run even backwards (29). It expresses a novelty, a diversification in the process of development and a divergence from an earlier state of being.

Unity involves diversity to pass from one stage to another, and diversity involves unity upon which to be projected to be considered appropriate. In this way the context can develop while maintaining its identity.

Finally, unity ensures the coherence of a setting, or else the coherence of successive contextual interpretations, while diversity redirects every time the contextual process in regard to necessary development. Through their dialectics a particular setting loses only temporarily its identity in order to find it back in another (higher, deeper?) level of existence, more appropriate to the contemporary times, at every time. In other words, always being itself while developing.

Unity and diversity can only be assessed in reference to some context. We cannot simply justify a new building in terms of utilitarian unity and neglect the *raison d'être* of its diversification in architectural form; nor can we accept as successful, a novelty in architectural expression, in relation to its context, done for its own sake i.e. self referential difference and juxtaposition. Diversification can be justified only when it manages through dissonance to bring forth the contemporary reality of a place.

In the case of engineering continuity through diversity in the materials, and the techniques employed and unity in function is enough and it can be found in the majority of all constructions where the utilitarian need prevails. This is not to imply that engineering lacks aesthetic values. On the contrary; only that aesthetic values *follow* the need for adequate function. The Dutch windmills have been considered, at least in the Western tradition of

landscape painting, as aesthetic objects of great artistic value. Yet, their *raison d'être* is an exclusively utilitarian one, to pump water out of the channels in the most effective way.

The rail bridge spanning the Firth of Forth outside Edinburgh has been since 1890, when it was built, one of the most appreciated pieces of Victorian engineering. The road bridge though, built in the 60's and being totally different from the nearby rail bridge, can claim equal appreciation to the rail bridge today. The two bridges are different in terms of materials and construction only to be similar in the sense that both employ the highest technology available at the time to achieve adequate functionality and performance. However distant in time the two bridges are and however different in terms of form and materials, they nevertheless both manifest a close interrelation.

Can we say the same for the rest of the built environment? The purely utilitarian human needs have changed little for ages. In fact, architecture has almost never served basic utilitarian human needs. The massiveness of the Egyptian pyramids, the clarity of the Classical Greek temples, the spaciousness of the Byzantine churches and the soaring of the Mediaeval cathedrals have served as the conceptual images for most of the European architecture, in most historical periods despite the fact that they cannot be justified in purely functional terms. Yet, matters of taste and socio-cultural conditioning dictate an ever changing state of the art for architecture. In these cases the dialectics between unity and diversity operate at levels concerning meanings, associations, allusions relating to the memory aspects of the man-made environment. In all periods of history we can find many parts of the built environment which have little or no functional use. Garlands, cornices, and festons in the facade and the interior of buildings are a good example of this.

Architects cannot claim continuity for high-tech buildings in historic settings on the basis of advanced technology and new materials only. High-tech buildings sometimes might be successful interventions - at whatever scale they are employed from an external staircase in an old building to a single building or even a compound - but not for these reasons. It is true that as with engineering so with the rest of the built environment aesthetic values sometimes are attributed *a posteriori*. It is also true that even engineering is not purely a matter of technology alone. The complex web of socio-cultural conditions in its totality is also involved. Yet, in edifices where the utilitarian need is the primary one we can afford the subsidiary role of other qualities such as meaningful expression and responsiveness to the socio-cultural reality. But for the rest of the built environment where the symbolic realm prevails and dwarfs what can be considered as utilitarian needs, the need for meaning is also at stake.

So far we have been focusing on the particularity of a setting in order to examine the

conditions under which it can follow a coherent development. But every innovation inferred upon it must be in unity with some development elsewhere since changes do not just happen in isolation. It would be a mistake to consider that human experience is limited to some particular setting. In the contemporary situation it is rather pointless to argue for cultural isolation. Quite the opposite is the case here since internationalism has been accepted as a fact for every setting.

For instance we can speak of consistency with its times when we encounter a car in a rural village in Africa or when building materials developed in Europe, such as concrete, are being used along with traditional materials. This connection is possible since we know of development elsewhere but it is a transpatial one for the African village. In fact when we refer to external historical circumstances in reference to a given setting, it is these transpatial connections we refer to. External changes do not appear "out of the blue"; they are consistent; only this sort of consistency is a transpatial one for the setting and not everyone is relevant to its development. In this study we seek to identify a framework able to qualify which of those transpatial consistencies are concordant with the contextual process.

A brief mention of some instances of transpatial connections will clarify the point. 1) All the post-modern buildings in the world: however irrelevant in its context a post-modern styled building is, it is nevertheless consistent with other post-modern styled buildings in the world, even if every one of them is unsuccessful in its context. 2) All the works of an architect. For example, I.M. Pei's extension to the National Gallery in Washington, his intervention to the museum of Louvre in Paris, and his hotel in Beijing are consistent between themselves as creations of the same architect. This consistency again is irrelevant to the appreciation of each one of them in their respective contexts. 3) Artefacts consistent with capitalism and commercialism. Norman Foster's Shanghai bank in Hong Kong and Richard Rogers' Lloyd's Bank in London are both images consistent with the dominant and ever expanding role of the market in Western societies. Built almost at the same time they both present a modern image of the Bank. Both buildings are more responsive to the fast changing currency rates than to the environment they are grafted into.

What is important for our purposes in this study is not ^{whether} some transpatial consistency can be ascribed to what can otherwise be considered as an irrelevant novelty, but to what extent it really matters for the context of the specific setting. Theoretically, anything can be connected to something else in some way but critical interpretation alone will justify desirable changes to be enhanced by a given setting and inappropriate ones to be avoided. Contextual unity at every place is what this study is after even if finally some transpatial qualities are to be addressed as well.

Imitation aims originally at unity with the contextual process as a means to enhance its continuity, but it fails if it is exhausted in the face value of visual similarity or the materials used or the geometrical forms employed. Continuity refers to the oneness of the contextual process in time and in this sense it is coherent development and not copying.

A neo-Georgian building - as is the case with part of the contemporary architectural practice in Edinburgh - can never be the same as a building surviving from that era. Even if the layman's eye is temporarily deluded, finally the copy can claim only a borrowed existence as it cannot fully justify its existence as an expression of the contemporary socio-cultural situation.

The geographer David Lowenthal argues that even signposting a historic area in a city is enough to:

...dissociate it from its surroundings, diminishing its continuity with the milieu. Trying to revive the past does more to dehistoricize the remote past than to make it vivid, let alone authentic. (30)

Copying, in failing to keep the contextual process going, by attempting only visual similarity for instance, turns out to be a repetition unable to maintain contextual continuity.

Contrast, on the other hand initially aims to bring novelty in the process of development for a given setting as a means to enhance its continuity. But may well turn into irrelevant juxtaposition if it fails to communicate with and critically oppose the existing situation.

If imitation attempts unity on a particular level, it also needs contrast if it is to establish unity at more than one levels in our interpretation of it. Equally so, contrast needs imitation in order to renovate the contextual process of development at more than one levels of consideration.

The most important issue here is the complete co-operation between imitation and contrast on an equal basis so that both are rendered meaningful at a multiplicity of levels establishing a balanced dialectics between unity and diversity, in order to enhance thus continuity for a given setting.

4. 11. SYNCHRONICITY VERSUS DIACHRONICITY: CONTEMPORARY AND HISTORIC DIMENSIONS IN THE MAN-MADE ENVIRONMENT

Any change, as it is conceptualized in this study, divides time in past and present and directs our experience in dialectical paths; experiencing a setting as what it is now, at the time and in the light of the particular change, or as what it used to be before at a different time in the past. So, change is assessed in relation to the history of a setting as a whole, altering not only the present face of a setting but also affecting its past from a particular perspective.

These two ways are closely interrelated and interdependent and deserve a parallel consideration. In this consideration the past as a whole (the several stages in the life of a setting) is seen against the contemporary situation and vice versa. But what is it that renders all the stages in the past of a given setting equivalent to its contemporary state of being? Even though every phase in the past of a setting once was modern, nonetheless, it is through the current perspective - at every time - that its past is assessed and appreciated. The present is inevitably the common basis upon which the relations between new and old will be assessed, interpreted and evaluated.

Contemporary times not only ascribe current uses and appreciation to the built environment but also dictate which aspects of the past are significant today. People interpret the past in the light and for the sake of today even if they are not fully aware of that. In the context of this discussion the past always emerges as a later reconstruction and not as an objective set of realities or actualities. It is in this sense that some aspects or characteristics of the past are assessed to be valid today, while others are not. Contemporary values dictate which aspects of the past are of contemporary importance, which should be changed to accommodate the current reality and which are recognised as obsolete. Oblivion for particular periods or aspects of the past represents that part of the past we are not even aware of. Yet, even this mode of relating to the past i.e neglecting it, is determined by the current, every time, perspective.

In this study we consider as "synchronic quality", in a setting or building or whatever is considered as context for architectural novelty, whatever characteristics belong to the present in terms of use, significance and appreciation. Conversely, we consider as "diachronic quality", at whatever level of context, whatever characteristics used to be a synchronic quality in the past or at least whatever is today interpreted to have been a synchronic quality in the past.

Acknowledgement of a diachronic quality, it might be argued, belongs to the present exactly as contemporary qualities become history. Precisely so, since the dialectic relation between synchronic and diachronic characteristics qualifies both of them as aspects of an entity, the context we refer to, characterised by their interaction. For example, to acknowledge through our experience today the characteristics of the Roman street plan of Chester in England is to acknowledge a diachronic quality of Chester which also participates to the present (Fig. 4.20). Consideration of the Roman characteristics of Chester as a walk about, as an enclosed city organised around the intersection of *cardo* and *decumanus* axes of an original Roman camp, is possible in two ways. First because these characteristics are experienced today as memory or evocation independently of their material existence and secondly because they are there today i.e they have reached today in terms of their material presence as parts of the Roman wall and the street plan. Consideration of these characteristics, however, is not limited to their original use and significance. Instead it encompasses several changes in their use and appreciation through several periods not to mention other historical periods which added their own characteristics to the already existing Roman town. In relating new architecture to the historic context of Chester, contemporary characteristics are engaged not ^{only} with the Roman characteristics and their several appreciations but also with the Mediaeval ones of the same setting to mention only one more (distinctive) phase in Chester's history. Diachronic characteristics quoted, evoked or associated in a new scheme, or abstracted out, or even neglected are treated as such through the perspective of the present.

Conversely, the established characteristics in a setting and the significance they hold today, stretch their existence back to all its history. The past influences the present by forming its background in terms of spatial forms and their meanings. It is against these characteristics that every novelty will be inevitably associated with and evaluated. In other words the historic characteristics of a setting prescribe somehow its path of development and impose some limits on what can be considered as contemporary in it. As a consequence, contemporary characteristics are projected to the past in terms of origins of a contemporary use and/or significance or even due to the physical endurance of past artefacts. For example the Edinburgh castle can be conceived both as a Mediaeval artefact reaching contemporary times and as a contemporary edifice, in terms of use and significance, stretching its life backward.

Buildings often outlive the purposes they were built for and as a consequence their physical duration acquires several appreciations during their lifetime. Furthermore, not only what physically survives calls for current interpretation but also whatever exists today in a setting as memory i.e. whatever aspect of the past is of socio-cultural significance today.

Every context, while never failing to be a diachronic being characterised and identified by its past characteristics, also presents every time we experience it a present state of being. In other words, as we have already argued in Chapter Two, the *genius loci* of a particular setting has a diachronic existence which is manifested at any given time i.e. synchronically in different materials and forms.

Genius loci refers to the local identity of a setting which relates to all its past without being confined to any particular aspect of it - to its formal characteristic or any particular historical period in its past. The *genius loci* of Edinburgh, for instance, relates both to the Mediaeval and the Georgian times of the city despite the spatial differences between them. Furthermore the *genius loci* of Edinburgh does not exclude the other less distinctive periods in its "life". So, *genius loci* refers rather to the way that a particular place has been qualifying time for its growth than to any specific stage during its development.

The need for one entity transforming through time will constitute the basis for our examination of existing settings as contexts for new architecture. *Genius loci* thus is attributed an abstract even fictional qualitative character - the other being concrete, describable, pragmatic and measurable - which holds together the different instances of a particular place through time. This fictional, abstract quality is at the same time its potentiality of being diversely concretized and manifested at different times, in our equally fictional conceptual - as opposed to its concrete reality - consideration of it.

The apparent dichotomy synchronic vs diachronic is here refuted on a dialectic basis where both exist as dimensions of a fictional diachronic entity acquiring every time we experience it a synchronic concretization and realization, an entity under transformation i.e. a setting undergoing change. Our dialectical consideration of contemporary and historic qualities becomes possible and meaningful because both opposing qualities operate on the common basis of what can be called a "contemporary horizon", which encompasses - at every time - the current characteristics of socio-cultural life such as the uses and meanings in the man-made environment. Within this horizon synchronic and diachronic characteristics are assessed and acquire their significance. This common basis of interaction - what in chapter five we will refer to as the "third term" of dialectics -. This "third term" both underlies and generates opposite temporalities, or rather emerges with dialectical interaction, and needs to be considered as far as dialectics of the opposites is the reasoning tool in this study.

A new building and its surrounding necessarily enter a physical and visual rapport. Their coexistential "being there" qualifies the new building as a contextual event. But certainly this is not enough to establish a profound and lasting relationship between them or to

address the problem of relating new to old architecture as a whole.

Every new building in a given setting is engaged in a dialogue not only with current life but also with buildings of the past in that setting. Our interpretation measures the potentialities of any architectonic intervention to acquire temporal depth and contextual roots by addressing and being related to contextual values, while excluding the possibility of any haphazard architectonic intervention, the attitude of "anything can do".

Spatial coexistence is not enough to sustain the dialectical process between synchronic and diachronic dimensions. Even if a new building visually relates to the form and geometric configuration of a setting, as for instance the Building Regulations for the historic settings of Greece prescribe, it nevertheless fails to acknowledge and express the profundity of associations between people and their place. It follows, so to speak, the *natura naturata* instead of the *natura naturans* analogy.

The culture of a place encompasses a set of people past and present and a respective set of places. What is needed from any architectural novelty is an openness towards its history in order to enhance the local history and anticipate its future development and life.

Consideration of these dimensions is necessary not only to improve the qualities of a place but even to preserve them. There is no such thing as a quality-free space and this is especially evident in the historic settings we examine here. So, any kind of architectonic intervention cannot be neutral by just ignoring or avoiding contextual consideration. It will necessarily be an intervention and will affect the place; only it will do so negatively.

The man-made environment is the stratification of several successive interventions. The built fabric of the built and the unbuilt space is layered through time due to changes of function and taste. Several contextual threads lead to the realization of every single building, of every urban artefact and these threads although changing directions, remain always with it or at least these connections, relations and associations with its context are what make it significant (31) (Fig. 4. 21). A new building enters in rapport with its context in a multiplicity of instances for a multiplicity of interpreters. What is needed is a conceptual schema able to *interrelate* these instances. This interrelation between several levels of interpretations is of particular importance to our study. It ensures that there is not a mere, haphazard multiplicity of interpretations but a continuity between them springing from the potentiality of an architectonic intervention to relate with its context in a holistic sense (32).

Experiencing a setting in an impressionistic way, we experience it as a synchronic entity, as the presentness of its being at that particular time. We are not referring here to

the context's visual image, in a photographic sense, but to its presentness as being alive now in terms of use and/or significance.

Shifting to its experience as a dynamic, diachronic process, we see it as presenting simultaneously its diverse historical aspects and temporalities in what we may call a cubistic way. Again we do not refer to its static historic images but the modes it used to be alive. Diachronic stratification of such kind relates to the notion of phenomenal transparency.

Colin Rowe in relating Cubism with the architecture of Le Corbusier, draws on the work of Moholy-Nagy and Gyorgy Kepes and discusses the notions of literal and phenomenal transparency (33). Phenomenal transparency is used to describe the superimposition and interpenetration of forms in order to "overcome space and time fixations". Diachronic experience relates to the interpenetration and superimposition of historic dimensions in analogy to what "phenomenal transparency" refers to in relation to forms. Diachronic experience is the discovery of the dynamism of forms within time. It is this sort of transparency which allows experience of the diachronic dimension in a setting, the particularity of its places and the particular temporal qualification in every part of it.

Having used above in an analogical sense the temporal aspects of impressionism and cubism to illustrate respectively the synchronic and diachronic characteristics of space, it is important to avoid any implication concerning fragmentation in our experience of them. No distinction between the association of perception with the impressionistic approach and conception with that of cubism is here implied, since we believe that both synchronic and diachronic characteristics, temporal impressionism and temporal cubism, are experienced in an equally wholistic sense.

It is also necessary to clarify here that the experiencing self is always treated in this study as one. Questions as to the "I" and "me" modes of the self debated in social psychology (34) or the self as "I" and "you" debated in existential hermeneutics (35) are beyond the aim of this study. Similarly, causal or a-causal experience are neutral to our debate. (It should also be evident by now that Jung's notion of "synchronicity" coined to describe the a-causal occurrence (36), is in no relation to the use of the term in this study).

A new building, even when it manages to express the diverse past stages in a given setting by addressing its diachronic typology, nevertheless fails to give it a present face value. However good an account it gives of the setting's history it will fail to animate it in the present. Museum-like attitudes towards conservation and infill in historic settings result in a lifeless and a discontinuously historic environment where the continuity of a life process is missing. On the other hand, attempts to give a sort of freshness and presentness in

a given setting by offering thrills fail to succeed for long if they lack the temporal profundity, the diachronic roots and values, needed for a lasting relationship with their context.

Both temporal qualities, contemporariness and synchronicity, are equally important in human settlements. Diachronicity guides and anchors any novelty and traces the future identity of a settlement, while synchronicity expresses contextual values in a way that is always contemporary. Synchronic and diachronic values of the built environment are *equi-potent* and *equally important* and it is in this sense that their dialectic consideration becomes, intelligible and important in our study.

Old, long esteemed and celebrated buildings in historic settings "offer" to the whole setting their diachronic values. Ruins or archaeological sites within settlements present an exaggerated polarisation of diachronic values (37). On the other hand contemporary buildings ascribe to the settings they are grafted into values of newness by their contemporaneity. Recycling of architectural elements, re-use of urban artifacts or even minor everyday transformations in human settlements, present both values since they re-address the problem of relating new and old at the level of the way they are synthesized.

Synchronic characteristics in a given setting are necessarily associated with novelty, something being alive the moment we experience it, since it has been transformed to be contemporary. When a new building manages to express this quality it affects the setting as a whole. Beyond inferring a change in the volume of a setting it promises contextual renewal, an injection of life and a promise for it.

No intervention is additive. Every single addition or infill changes its surrounding at several levels; but in order to be considered as life-enhancing in various interpretations, it has to be absorbed in its life process and anchor its existence to the deepest layers of the context besides its participation and contribution to current life. Conversely, every diachronic characteristic must find its way to the present through new architecture.

This potentiality of an architectonic intervention to evoke diverse associations and relationships with its context is needed for different interpretation in different circumstances. It measures its adequacy to relate to the context in the most comprehensive sense.

To recapitulate, synchronicity in our experience is appropriation for what a setting currently is, implying all sorts of novelties i.e. whatever is experienced as "being there now". Synchronicity refers to new materials, new buildings, renovation of existing ones, new uses or even contemporary aesthetic appropriations of old artefacts.

Diachronicity is appropriation of what a setting has been in the past, contemporary experience of its retrospective values. It is experience of what the setting has been, implying all sorts of historic values in the widest sense. Age value, monumental value or historic values of whatever nature, are here considered as diachronic ones.

It is beyond doubt that both opposing temporal qualities are interchangeable in our experience of them. Newness, for instance, can be experienced in historical perspective and historical values as contemporary. In other words what justifies and legitimizes their consideration as opposing, equally important values is the fact that both historic and contemporary characteristics are present and past in everyday life (Fig. 4. 22). On this common basis their dialectic interaction becomes meaningful in our interpretation of new architecture in historic settings.

In the new town of Milton Keynes we experience all the synchronic qualities we have been talking about. Modern technology, new modes of social life, accommodation of contemporary needs fulfill every expectation for an up-to-date contemporary town which is "alive now". But it fails to convey any diachronic characteristics in the socio-cultural or environmental realm. We cannot experience any past mode of its existence and thus nothing can guarantee, so to speak, that this present, alive and novel thing has the potentiality to qualify time according to human needs. It was presented as a ready-made, completed spatial organization to a newly formed social structure. If it was originally appreciated for its promise for future life due to its newness, lack of a past disqualifies it as something which will keep even its synchronic values in the future. Lack of historical depth necessarily implies lack of anchorage for contemporary values as well. Every human setting was new once but at least in most cases tradition at the social level was there able to render the man-made environment meaningful and capable of growing together with the people

In deserted and ruined Italian hill villages we experience all the diachronic qualities we have been talking about (Fig. 4. 23). A rich history which goes back millenia and all sorts of monuments combined with the time-worn buildings convince us that a setting full of life in countless historical moments has been there. We nevertheless fail to experience contemporary life continuing a life process which has been going on for ages. Nothing can guarantee that it will be qualifying time in the future as it has been doing in the past, while everything that is there provides the best evidence for its potentiality to do so.

When we acknowledge the equal importance of both contemporary and historic qualities, their dialectical interaction becomes intelligible and meaningful. Anchorage to the past and novelty are equally important to human life. If we nowadays appreciate with little

doubt Mediaeval cathedrals covered with the patina of age, we have to consider that at the time of their creation they were appreciated for being brand new. We have also to consider that nearly all Renaissance architecture, which we also appreciate, was created at the expense of Gothic buildings. On the other hand the need for diachronic values equally characterizes life as such. During the Renaissance period in Italy amid the renovation frenzy, sentimental value for old buildings and regrets for useless renovation were not rare. Two millenia before, the Classical Athenians after the Peloponnesian war, although ~~the~~ rebuilt from the foundations the temples on the Acropolis, nevertheless deliberately kept fragments of the old buildings in the North wall to be seen from the Agora and remind to the people of the earlier temples (Fig. 4. 24).

The architect Rodrigo Perez D'Arce in his attempt to urbanise and "contextualize" modern architecture like Le Corbusier's Chandigarh or James Stirling's buildings in Runcom, "historicizes" them i.e. sees them diachronically. In order to transform modern buildings in a meaningful contextually way in his projects, he endows them with sort of temporal depth and the diachronic values they lack. He stretches temporally the contemporary image of modernistic interventions, projecting it into the future to root it contextually. A reappropriation of modern buildings is thus achieved even by revealing future appropriation as obsolete monuments of internationalism (Figs. 4. 25-32).

In our attempt to understand and evaluate the built environment *vis-a-vis* new architecture, we attribute relations and associations between new and old architecture. It is interesting to see how the dialectics between imitation and contrast works in order to assess such relations.

We take for granted that the adjacency between new and old ascribes to them a particular relationship. But since anything could be built in the context of an existing setting we have to consider its potentiality for associations in a more comprehensive sense. If it is to be an appropriate novelty and not a mere juxtaposition.

Imitation as an intention for similarity between old and new architecture at whatever level (form, materials and so forth), borrows the initially diachronic characteristics of the model, and attempts to transform and present them as synchronic ones. Revivals of all kinds, despite their being separated in time from their models, attempt to associate with and bring them forth. They attempt to perpetuate the already existing values and strive to render historic characteristics as contemporary as well.

Contrast as an intention for difference between old and new architecture at whatever level transforms its initially synchronic characteristics into diachronic ones. Its synchronic characteristics derive from the diachronic ones of the context it contrasts to.

Copying, uncritical imitation, attempts to perpetuate superficial historic characteristics; but by doing so it only brings forth the act of copying and not the acknowledged aspects of the past it aims at.

Juxtaposing i.e. uncritical differentiation, as an end in itself, aims at reacting against the diachronic characteristics as its only contemporary quality. It does not present a synchronic quality of its own, but just a negation of the model it is in contrast to. In becoming involved in a commentary on the existing qualities, it fails to present an alternative contemporary one.

Experiencing the Landkreis Administration offices at Benberg (Fig. 4. 33) in a synchronic basis, we can say that its imitation of the surrounding spires, unites it with the context. On the other hand its differentiation in the sort of peakness is represented by the sculptural elaboration of bare concrete in an irregular-natural crystal-like conical form, separates it from what used to be there. Although both the act of imitation and that of contrast imply a temporal distance from the context they equally enter in rapport with it.

We shift then to the experience of the temporal distance between intervention and context to see to what extent one penetrates the other, experiencing context and intervention in a diachronic sense, as a temporal process. We take for granted that the specific context continuously changes in order to express the changing socio-cultural situations. Imitation negates "context as it was" and "context after the intervention" as successive instances of a living organism. Contrast, the new materials and the different articulation of the skyline in the new building, confirms the before and after of the context as stages in a life process. The imitative dimension of the new building confirms the contrasting dimension of the new building confirms a contextual life which is still in process.

Architectonic interventions should *equally* confirm and negate their context if they are to represent and express contextual values in a multiplicity of levels, while being something in themselves at the same time. Continuous contiguousness to the context in a diversity of levels while acquiring equally diverse identification at these levels, relates an architectonic intervention both to the synchronic and diachronic temporal qualities of this context. Imitation amid contrast and vice versa or the dialectics between them assessing the relation of new to old architecture - as is the case in creative imitation or creative contrast - *unite and separate them equally* so the architectural novelty is to be effective towards contextual renewal.

Consideration of the synchronic and diachronic dimensions of time as revealed through the dialectics between imitation and contrast endows the context with temporal qualities necessary for its interpretation as a diachronic temporal process as well as a

synchronic spatial configuration.

4. 12. CONCLUSIONS

Relating new architecture to old is not a problem of spatial considerations only. It is mainly a problem of interpreting the complex temporal fields related to the totality of an existing setting. The introduction of architectural novelty means relating a creation of the present to an already established process of architectural development.

As an attempt to go beyond the spatial consideration of human settings and make possible the interpretation and evaluation of new architecture in them in a dynamic way, we have introduced a temporal perspective into contextualism. The modes of interaction between new and old were discussed by adopting a dialectical conceptualization capable of interrelating several levels of interpretation.

Considering the man-made environment in terms of synchronic and diachronic characteristics, we examined the dialectical nature of time; as a continuous process and as discrete historical moments. The present, at every time, is the obvious reference basis and the filter through which the past will pass. We can freeze the process of development for a setting at a particular period and proceed to assess where it came from, what is it at the time we interpret it and where it is going. So, a change in a setting can either be seen as a temporally flat novelty, relating only to the time it appears, or as a change which affects the whole history of this setting and relates to all its stages in the past.

Continuity in the man-made environment was seen through the dialectics between unity and diversity in the process of architectural development. In other words, we addressed continuity as a balanced dialectics between what is an internal rhythm of development of a given setting and what is externally imposed to it as historical circumstances. Continuity in a setting was seen as the golden section between its ability to remain itself, while being responsive to renewal.

Constructive and destructive aspects of time, as examined in this Chapter, revealed the dialectical nature of time as building up artefacts, qualities and meanings and time as obliterating them. A novelty in a setting is always created at the expense of something else, which existed before. So, it is not necessarily good or bad unless an evaluation is provided of what has been lost and what has been gained.

Finally, interpretation of the man-made environment in terms of permanent and ephemeral characteristics attempted to reveal that the phenomenon of change itself has a

dialectical impact on the ontological status of an entity. An entity which changes, such as a building or a street, ceases to be what it used to be in order to be something else. Yet, all changes in a setting are assessed as such against some sort of permanence in that entity. The dialectics of ephemeral vs permanent also revealed the complementarity between time as absolute and time as relative. In the hermeneutical approach of this study this dialectics constitutes *par excellence* the ultimate one, because it reveals more explicitly than any other dialectical pair the historical relativity of understanding.

Diachronic qualities in an historic setting already exist there while synchronic qualities are those inferred and realised by change. The dialectic relationship between them is necessary in order to define each one of them, while they always remain in opposition.

Interpreting a setting as a context of new architecture we have to think of its diachronic qualities as synchronic in order to create analogically a contemporary quality which will be as potential as historic qualities are for us today (Fig. 4. 34). Conversely we have to think of attempted architectural innovation as all historical characteristics once were in order to analogically introduce novelty. In other words, the past and the present at a site have both to be treated as contemporary, in considering them as potent present; and both as historical, in considering them as potential history. Similarly, continuity and discontinuity, constructive and destructive and temporary and permanent aspects of change are interrelated.

Change, as the result of the dialectical interaction of the diverse temporal modes in the spatial environment, is thus always kept within a dialectical system. This system relates and holds together all changes as phases of the contextual process.

CHAPTER FIVE

SPATIO-TEMPORAL CONTEXTUALISM & PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS

5. 1. INTRODUCTION

In this Chapter we will examine how the theoretical framework set so far, can relate to the interpretation and evaluation of new architecture in old settings.

The first part examines how interpretation occurs and its inevitability in everyday life. The second part examines how a dialectic conceptualization, suggested in previous chapters, can relate to the interpretation of new architecture in historic settings and provide criteria for its evaluation.

The examples analysed in depth in Chapter Six along with others will illustrate the use of the interpretative methodology suggested in this Chapter and demonstrate its power.

5. 2. CONTEXTUAL ARCHITECTURE: A QUESTION OF INTERPRETATION

5. 2. 1. WHY CONTEXTUALISM?

The context of a particular setting, that is the various socio-cultural preconditions it presents to any new architecture intended to relate to it, has been adopted in this study as the best possible touchstone on which to assess and evaluate new architecture in it. The built environment in a given setting is considered in this study, as the expression, through actual and virtual space, of the contextual socio-cultural life. As such it conveys all the socio-cultural values invested on it through time and constitutes the best possible frame of reference for any new architecture attempting to relate to it and be meaningful in its context. Moreover, the spatial permanence of artefacts in a given setting facilitates unavoidable connections and interrelationships between them. Any new architecture in this setting is necessarily linked, positively or negatively, to what is there. The Catalan architect Ignasi de Solà Morales in his essay "From Contrast to Analogy" writes:

The design of a new work of architecture not only comes physically close to the existing one, entering into visual and spatial rapport with it, but it also produces a genuine interpretation of the historical material with which it has to contend, so that this material is the object of a true interpretation which explicitly or implicitly accompanies the new intervention in its overall significance. (1)

This is always true, he argues, although he acknowledges earlier in his essay:

The relations between a new architectonic intervention and already existing architecture is a phenomenon that changes in relation to the cultural values attributed both to the meaning of historic architecture and to the intentions of the new intervention. (2)

Morales argues that even the notion of contrast employed by the Moderns in relating new architecture to existing settings, was a mode of contextual consideration (3). In contemporary times, however, we have moved from contrast to analogy as a mode of relating old and new in architecture, seeking compromise between them in the place of the Modern utopian ideal.

In any case, modes of relating to a given setting always accompany any architectural novelty in it. It is against a particular setting, that any new architecture in it will always be considered, interpreted and evaluated. Architecture, unlike painting or music, is necessarily the unavoidable art of everyday life, always experienced against and within its surroundings. This fact taken for granted, we will attempt in this study to discuss the conditions under which contextual consideration can be helpful in guiding successful interventions.

So far in this study, we have focussed on old historical settings, where a strong identity exists because of a long development. Nevertheless, it seems necessary to discuss the problem in general, because the exact limits between what can be considered a historic setting and what cannot, are beyond any clear-cut definition. What is more important, the problem of architectural renewal is worth considering in all settings, however old or historic they are.

A comprehensive consideration of new architecture in established settings, is thus emerging, not without some questions. What do massive utilitarian housing schemes tell us about the people and their values and in what sense can there be of any significance for new architecture intending to relate to their context? What do anonymous council flats tell us about the particularity and the identity of the people living in them? And what can we say about contextual consideration in Dallas, a city which emerged out of the desert only

20 years ago? Or, to put it more generally, what can we say of any place which has no distinctive historical past or a culture which is not expressed in architectural terms?

Even in the above cases, people living in a setting share values, particular to themselves, which distinguish them from any other community. Societies in the contemporary world although share internationalism to a certain degree, ~~they~~ also maintain some characteristics of their own identity. A unique historical development characterizes each one of them and conditions, to a certain degree, its further development. Even if the same prefabricated residences are used in new towns in England and France alike, the socio-cultural life invests different significance for each one of them and develops in a particular way. Even if the actual space in both cases is equally monotonous and alien to the people inhabiting it, virtual space, i.e. the way they use space and the qualities they attribute to it, ~~is~~ is unique for each socio-cultural entity.

However similar in terms of materials, construction techniques and formal articulation architecture can be worldwide, it is domesticated in a different way in different socio-cultural conditions. This is particularly important *vis a vis* the ubiquity of modern architecture in today's world. People in Chandigahr, for instance, use space in quite a different way from whatever Le Corbusier had in mind. Narrow lanes are used as market places and cows are taken to the fifth floor of the apartment houses, because of their religious significance.

Buildings often outlive the purposes they are built for and as a consequence people live in an environment created in different from their own socio-cultural conditions. The natural environment is always something that people find before them and modify. In historic settings the coherent local culture that produced many - perhaps all - historic environments has been replaced by a less localised one. Yet, despite the degree of its localisation, a socio-cultural entity is worth considering in terms of the way it domesticates its spatial environment.

In Chapter Three we introduced for that purpose the notion of virtual space to describe the socio-cultural significance of the man-made environment, independently of its actual, physical existence. Both actual and virtual space in a given setting, to whatever degree they are integrated, suggest values relevant to the socio-cultural life that takes place in it. So, even the same architectural forms should be considered in a different way for different settings in our interpretations, when experiencing them or attempting to introduce novelty to them. Only in this way we can do justice to their identity.

Contemporary architecture even in these cases can search for identity, if that is intended, while accepting a degree of internationalism, which is evident, unavoidable but

not necessarily evil (4). Every place can participate in the world culture in its own way and new architecture, within this conceptual framework, can adopt a critical standpoint and reject or improve an existing setting in its own terms. Whatever the proposal for the future development of the setting, it has to make the best out of whatever quality exists there already. Interpretation in this case has to discover the people's disposition towards their physical environment, what they envisage for the future and what they have already established as values through socio-cultural activity.

If the context of a particular setting is not considered as an appropriate model for contemporary architectonic intervention in it, what else could plausibly be so? A legitimate alternative to contextual consideration can be found in traditional societies. Contextual consideration implies a relativistic approach to the evaluation of new architecture. The particular setting where new architecture is being grafted into, considered at several scales, constitutes an absolute in itself frame of reference. In such a context nothing is timeless. This situation is particularly characteristic to the modern societies, that is the societies which value more than anything else progress and technological development.

This is not the case with the traditional societies. These societies adopt a totally different philosophy of life. For those peoples timeless qualities constitute their tradition and are the basis of their life and culture. It goes without saying that modern societies share some permanent characteristics, while traditional societies are not stationary. But still it is important to distinguish between societies that subdue tradition to progress and societies which subdue progress and change to tradition.

In traditional societies the spatial environment is considered as a direct and a-historical imitation of a model, shared by all members of the society. Buildings are meaningful in the sense that they all express symbolically a socially shared and accepted archetypical model. The buildings in a particular traditional setting *are interrelated through their common derivation from archetypical models*. If every building is a manifestation of the timeless archetype, every building cannot but relate to other buildings produced in the same way. Continuity in the built environment then follows as a matter of course the socio-cultural continuity, and architectural development is not considered as a problem every time that a new building is to be built (5).

In a modern, secular society the case seems to be quite the opposite. If there is any common ground between people living in a setting, and we believe there is, it should rather relate, at least partially, to the spatial environment they share and the meanings and values it conveys, which have been created by socio-cultural life. For non-traditional societies, which is the object of this study, the associations between new and existing architecture

can only be established after a new building is built and according to its potential for contextual significance. In an age of scepticism, the context of a particular setting seems the best plausible starting point and anchor for new architecture, even if it is to express characteristics, which go the particular culture of the context.

Modern societies are characterized by a strong historical awareness and a belief in individual responsibility for the creation of the future. The buildings of a given setting are related historically as successive in time expressions of socio-cultural life in this setting, and any new architecture is considered within such a historical process.

New architecture can only relate to old settings in an analogical sense i.e. imitating and contrasting to them at the same time, in a way which is defined by the current cultural values. In this sense, historical understanding relates to dialectical hermeneutics i.e. interpretation of the past in the light of and for the sake of the present, rather than in any analytical, objective method.

In such a relativistic approach, where the existing context and not some archetypal model suggests the values to be imitated by new architecture, the diametrical opposition between Modern and traditional societies is confirmed. In modern architecture, the individual building "attempts" to be significant on its own; it claims universality and the status of a model in itself. In traditional architecture, the individual building manifests a preexisting archetype and derives its importance from it.

In the Western context, even the most celebrated works of art cannot constitute objective archetypes for imitation, i.e. archetypes of objective value for everyone. Even the Classical Greek architecture, postulated by the exponents of the Modern Movement as the universal source of architectural values *par excellence*, cannot be considered as such (6). Aesthetic relativity ensues, implying that we have to look for artistic beauty in contextual terms.

5. 2. 2. THE HERMENEUTICS OF ARCHITECTURAL CHANGE:

INTERPRETING NEW ARCHITECTURE IN OLD SETTINGS

Architectural creation, contextually seen, derives from an understanding of the setting and its evaluation. Through the dialectics between imitation and contrast, new architecture can express an interpretation of its context in contemporary terms. Interpretation relates not only to what exists in a given setting, but also reveals the contemporary point of view, at the time it is experienced.

In assessing relations between old and new architecture, the question of interpretation

is a fundamental one to the whole thesis; it refers to the way we understand and evaluate our physical environment (7). It is within an interpretative process that we assess imitation and contrast between a given setting and new architecture in it. New architecture in a historic setting is mainly evaluated against its surroundings and as a consequence it comes to express, manifest and finally acquire in itself a certain way of understanding its surroundings and communicating with them, whether this is the intention of the architect or not. This interpretation process occurs not only in our attempt, collectively, to evaluate new architecture in a historic setting after it has been built, but also provisionally to guide architectural intervention.

New architecture in a historic setting can generate a diversity of interpretations depending on the diversity of people who experience it or, perhaps, the different times they experience it. Yet all interpretations are linked by a common purpose; to accommodate a specific novelty in a setting. However varied interpretations can be, they are nonetheless in close relation to a particular architectural novelty, built or intended to be built. A given setting cannot be interpreted in a definite, absolute sense. Its identity is in constant development and as such it can only be defined *vis a vis* a specific project for intervention in it. It might be two different things for two different interventions. For instance, it might be appropriate to keep some of the characteristics of a setting in view of a large scale development, while it would be more appropriate a total contrast in the case of a minor change in a building. What a setting is, depends also on the character of the intervention, its functional purpose and so forth. So, we cannot argue for *an interpretation* of a given setting, but rather *an interpretation process* defined by both, old and new architecture. This interpretative process can relate either to a finished building or to a project for a new building. Interpretation is constantly defined and regulated by both sides; what a setting has been and what it "wants to be" *vis a vis* an intended intervention and what the intervention can be in this particular setting, how new architecture can relate to a given setting and plunge into its historical depth and be incorporated in its process. This bilateral definition of architectural renewal, and architectural change in general, can, perhaps, ensure that the development in a setting proceeds "in a growth conducive and life enhancing way" (8).

Interpretation thus is a twofold operation; it relates to the past as much as to the present, future aspirations being part of the present. It continuously shifts from the context before renovation to the context after its renewal. Appropriate intervention and contextual continuity can be defined from both perspectives; what the context has always been and what it is about to become. In other words, interpretation of new architecture in a historic setting, as it is used in this study, should attempt a fusion between new architecture contextually derived and its context in view of new architecture in it. The dialectics between imitation and contrast, in relating new architecture to old, can also describe the

interpretation of this relation as *a process of understanding*, whose end is either to evaluate a new building or guide its creation. Interpretation is here intended to be a constant mediation between past and present and not an objective understanding of the past.

The notion of interpretation treated in this sense surely touches on a much more general field of theoretical enquiry. The theory of philosophical hermeneutics, as developed by Hans-Georg Gadamer, constitutes such a field, from which we can draw for the purposes of this study. In the following pages we will attempt to show that Gadamer's theory illuminates the specific problem of architectural renewal, as a problem of interpretation, and endows it with a catholic significance and broader perspectives.

The problem of architectural renewal is basically a hermeneutical one, or at least it will be considered so in this study. As a consequence, the theoretical approach adopted here is embedded in the broader debate concerning human understanding. Philosophical hermeneutics developed *vis a vis* the specific architectural problem, will provide a theoretical framework sufficient to enhance architectural interpretation and evaluation and to guide architectural creation. Ontological hermeneutics as an interpretative method defies the demonstration of its power and its illustration in terms of analytic applications. So, we will rather refer to the case studies discussed later in Chapter Six in a general sense, treating them as particular instances of the more comprehensive theoretical framework discussed in this chapter.

5. 3. THE ONTOLOGICAL HERMENEUTICS OF HANS-GEORG GADAMER IN RELATION TO ARCHITECTURE

The work of the German philosopher Hans-Georg Gadamer will be the hub of our theoretical framework the aim of which is to contribute towards a theory of meaning concerning architectural change in general and the relation of new architecture to old in particular. Gadamer's seminal work "Truth and Method" provides an excellent investigation of the phenomenon of understanding in the broadest sense (9).

Understanding for Gadamer is a central phenomenon of human life. Interpretation constitutes our whole world and the only reality we, collectively, live in and make sense of. Gadamer, throughout his work, attempts to establish the fundamental issues of a theory of meaning. Towards this end he proceeds along the lines of the late Heideggerian ontological hermeneutics. There are several reasons for using Gadamer's theory in this thesis. For Gadamer meaning resides only in our dialogical encounter with the past as a whole, what he calls tradition. He clearly shows that life itself is this dialogue with the past, the

dialogue between past and present. In the following we will examine some of the basic points in Gadamer's work in relation to the purposes of this thesis.

Interpretation for Gadamer entails fusion of historical horizons in the light of the present rather than a single horizon of the present. As he expresses it:

...the horizon of the present cannot be formed without the past. There is no more an isolated horizon of the present than there are historical horizons. Understanding, rather, is always the fusion of these horizons which we imagine to exist by themselves...In a tradition this process of fusion is continually going on, for the old and new continually grow together to make something of living value, without either being explicitly distinguished from the other. (10)

Tradition in Gadamer's theory encompasses far more than the past we, collectively, are aware of. Tradition is whatever claims an affinity with us. This point provides a useful springboard for the interpretation of architectural change, which is the subject of this study. The architecture of the past, whatever periods of history it has survived from, makes a claim upon us, collectively, by virtue of its participation in contemporary socio-cultural life. Apart from the physical encounter with historic buildings of several periods, the collective memory of a society is constituted from its past. Our relation with the architecture of the past goes far beyond the historical periods we have a knowledge of. In fact, the architecture of the past defines the terms and conditions of our encounter with new architecture. Tradition, conceptualized in these terms, is whatever links the interpreter and new architecture (11).

Historical settings, seen as contexts for new architecture, should be rather understood in the contemporary way and against the framework of contemporary values. Values which have no contemporary significance cannot reach our present horizon of understanding. As Gadamer writes:

Historical consciousness is aware of its own otherness and hence distinguishes the horizon of tradition from its own... The projecting of the historical horizon, then, is only a phase in the process of understanding, and does not become solidified into the self-alienation of a past consciousness, but is overtaken by our own present horizon of understanding. *In the process of understanding there takes place a real fusing of horizons, which means that as the historical horizon is projected, it is simultaneously removed.* (12)

Prejudices for Gadamer are the conditions for understanding. They constitute what we are and as such they are rather enabling than prohibiting the understanding of the past. Gadamer argues that we cannot bracket them, for there is no knowledge and no understanding without them. Yet, as soon as we accept the value of prejudices, a problem creeps in. How can we distinguish blind prejudices from prejudices productive of knowledge? Gadamer answers, that it is only through our openness to the truth that tradition claims, that we can constantly test our prejudices about understanding. As Richard Bernstein comments on this point:

In opposition to Descartes's monological notion of purely rational self reflection by which we can achieve transparent self-knowledge, Gadamer tells us that it is only through the dialogical encounter with what is at once alien to us, makes a claim upon us, and has an affinity with what we are that we can open ourselves to risking and testing our prejudices. This does not mean that we can ever finally complete such a project, that we can ever achieve complete self-transparency, that we can attain the state which Descartes (and in another sense Hegel) claim is the *telos* of such a project, the attainment of perfect or absolute knowledge. To think that such a possibility is a real possibility is to fail to do justice to the realization that prejudices "constitute our being": that it literally makes no sense to think that a human being can ever be devoid of prejudices. To risk and test our prejudices is a constant task (not a final achievement). (13)

Thus, interpretation actually and inevitably occurs as a process of wholistic experiences, outside the scope of any analytic mode of understanding, yet ontologically significant. We need to emphasize here the inadequacy of reason *vis a vis* understanding of tradition, because reason, by functioning within it, cannot make any claim upon tradition.

Due to the role that Gadamer ascribes to preunderstanding, his theory of philosophical hermeneutics has been described by Jurgen Habermas as "a rehabilitation of prejudice" (14). It is true that preunderstanding, or what Heidegger called fore-structure of knowledge, is exactly the point where all metaphysical assumptions in Gadamer's theory converge. Nevertheless, preunderstanding is a necessary and unavoidable metaphysical basis, in order to describe best the phenomenon of understanding in general. We always interpret on the basis of some conceptualization, which again is a form of understanding. Understanding thus is a cyclical process, which nevertheless is ontologically positive at several levels it manifests itself. As Gadamer puts it:

In fact the horizon of the present is being continually formed, in that we have continually to test all our prejudices. An important encounter of this testing is

the encounter with the past and the understanding of the tradition from which we come. (15)

And he argues that "This recognition that all understanding inevitably involves some prejudice gives the hermeneutical problem its real thrust" (16). It was the prejudice of the Enlightenment against prejudice, Gadamer argues, which gave a negative aspect to the term.

We have discussed elsewhere that by context we mean all the preconditions that a new building will meet in a given setting. These preconditions relate to people's preunderstanding of their setting. This preunderstanding constitutes the tradition to be interpreted, evaluated and renewed with every new building in that setting (17).

Understanding, interpretation and application, Gadamer argues, are one unified process (18). Prejudices are the conditions of this process, which proceeds from a preunderstanding of the whole to the understanding of the part and back to the whole again, establishing the circularity of understanding. In Gadamer's words:

The movement of understanding is constantly from the whole to the part and back to the whole. Our task is to extend in concentric circles the unity of the understood meaning. The harmony of all the details with the whole is the criterion of correct understanding. The failure to achieve this harmony means that understanding has failed. (19)

Thus understanding is conceived as a self propagated circular process which "is neither subjective nor objective, but describes understanding as the interplay of the movement of tradition and the movement of the interpreter"(20). Gadamer, following Heidegger, conceives the circle of understanding not as a methodological one, but as an ontological structural element of understanding. He diverges from the Heideggerian existentialism when he acknowledges the communicative aspects of understanding when he writes:

The anticipation of meaning that governs our understanding of a text is not an act of subjectivity, but proceeds from the communality that binds us to the tradition. (21)

At this point Gadamer clearly moves away from the Heideggerian Being towards Language, as late Heideggerian philosophy had suggested (22). Gadamer clearly abandons the objectivity and the universality of existential hermeneutics and grounds his philosophy to the relativity and communality of its linguistic medium. The existence of a language in

all circumstances of human experience is a universal phenomenon; yet, every language brings forth the Being in its own terms. Thus tradition is essential if we are to understand the Being. This point is extremely important to support our argument about the contextual derivation of meaning and criteria for the evaluation of novelties in it. It shows the need for contextual engagement of new architecture in order to become meaningful (23).

According to Gadamer, interpretation attempts to justify what is there and, at its best, can go as far as to grasp the reality of the past for the sake of the present (24). The horizon of the present and the prejudices it entails, is an obstacle which must be overcome by being aware of our prejudices, in order to reveal the truth of the past. He treats tradition as the basis of our dialogue with it and as such tradition cannot be questioned. Tradition, as a closed system, has in itself all the power and the authority for its future understandings-interpretations-applications. If interpretation fails to acknowledge this, it must remedy this situation.

Tradition for Gadamer is an overall ontological and epistemological process within which we, collectively, are trapped. Yet it does not confine our understanding; on the contrary it enables it and provides a measure of objective control against which we can test our prejudices in our understanding of things.

As we have noted already, tradition for Gadamer encompasses not only what we recognize as our past but even what we do not. Tradition makes a claim upon us and our openness towards it, is the best way to test our prejudices. Thus, Gadamer, despite the fact that he suggests our dialogue with tradition as the way to truth, is finally inclined to accept that truth lies on the side of tradition. He clearly acknowledges the authority that tradition exercises upon us by claiming its relevance to our lives. Gadamer thus accepts a hierarchy for the present in which tradition occupies the rank of authority.

Our reservation about Gadamer's approach, in the context and for the purposes of this study, concerns this last point. Interpretation is here considered for the sake of the new as well, which also claims an equal with tradition authority upon us and relevance to our lives. Interpretation illuminates and evaluates the old not only within its tradition, but in the light and for the sake of the present (with its future aspirations) as well. Our aim is not confined to revealing the meaning and relevance of the architecture of the past for the architecture of the present for the present, but inclined to changing the architecture of the past as well by introducing novelty to it. Interpreting the past in contemporary terms is only part of the present horizon and novelty cannot be confined only to the way we appreciate historic buildings. A critical disposition towards the past and its transformation according to our future aspirations is also possible. New architecture will partially emerge out of a

dialogue with the past of the locality it is to be grafted into, but not^{be} totally determined by it. Only in this way^{can} the dialogue between old and new architecture receive its full value. The tradition in a setting is neither a necessary evil we have to abandon in order to introduce novelty to it, nor is it an ideal to be perpetuated as it is. It is a reality we, collectively, attempt to interpret for the present's sake. The architecture of the past, thus, guides, anchors and conditions contemporary architectural creation, without constituting its ideal end.

If truth for Gadamer lies nearer to tradition than anything else, in this study we intend to conceive the dialogue between us and our tradition not as the dialogue between what is there in the tradition and our remoteness from it. It is not a dialogue to recover the authority of tradition, but a dialogue towards renewing tradition and creating the tradition of the future as well. We not only happen to be distanced from our tradition; we also want to go away from it as well. Our relation to tradition is a move to and from it, whatever part of it we are aware of. Moving away from the truth of tradition is not necessarily a predicament of the human situation; it also expresses the human will to change it, however^{it} itself is part of tradition. Novelty does not come inevitably in our attempt to make sense of our past in contemporary terms, but it is intended too, in the light of whatever makes our times different from our tradition.

Whatever kind of truth it is that Gadamer attributes to tradition, which is manifested in texts and works of art, we think it rather lies in our dialogue with them in our understanding of them, than in either side of it. This process alone can claim its potential for truth as long as it is kept operative. If novelty and tradition, as opposites, can sustain a process of dialectical interaction, in our interpretation of the past, they are then able to create a potential field for truth. Otherwise, if truth is closer to tradition or closer to novelty, the dialogue between tradition and novelty is biased and predetermined. If tradition claims an authoritative role in this dialogue, as Gadamer argues, then its superiority will reverberate at all the stages of its interaction with novelty.

In this study we conceive tradition and novelty as dialectical opposites, equipotent and equivalent to our lives. If the need for novelty is within a tradition itself, then it is novelties that make traditions too. But if tradition cannot provide a measure of objective control in our interpretation of it and intervention to it, what could possibly be considered instead? It is suggested that a dialogue between tradition and novelty, as far as it can be kept alive and operative, can be such a touchstone for validity in our interpretation and evaluation of both, tradition and novelty. The openness of the interpretative process proves best the indefinite circularity of our understanding. Interpretation is conceived as an indefinite process of moving from the whole to the parts and vice versa. This process of

understanding can never be a closed and finite one; yet it is ontologically significant in its way. To remain open in this process, and we agree with Gadamer at this point, is the best we can do to achieve truth, within a tradition we belong to.

Hannah Arendt challenges Gadamer's theory on similar grounds (25). She challenges Gadamer's key concept of tradition by the concept of revolution, or revolution mentality. Although Arendt's remarks are more concerned with the practical and political aspects of philosophy, they expose the inadequacy of Gadamer's dialectics as such. She argues that:

Authority is incompatible with persuasion, which presupposes equality and works through a process of argumentation. Where arguments are used, authority is left in abeyance. Against the egalitarian order of persuasion stands the authoritarian order, which is always hierarchical. (26)

True dialectics presuppose equality rather than hierarchy. So, although truth is never complete, the process itself is constructive.

Preunderstanding, as a part of tradition itself, is subject to interpretation only towards a better understanding, without ever to be abolished. It accompanies the interpretative process throughout without ever giving its place to "objective" knowledge. It is our belief that however ahistorical our attempts to understand are, or subject of modifications in the light of new evidence, they nevertheless are complete. *Interpretation is thus considered as a series of wholistic approaches* (27).

Preunderstanding is a human reality deriving from our being in the world. It accompanies us in our attempt to make sense of the world we live in and ourselves. As such it resists any analytical reasoning. In this study we adopt the notion of preunderstanding, after Heidegger and Gadamer (28), as the most acceptable metaphysical foundation for our discussion. In fact, all positivist theories of interpretation (29), or critical hermeneutics (30), argue for a "tabula rasa" approach to understanding. Their assumption of a "zero degree" of understanding, which could lead to an objective interpretation, is equally metaphysical.

A strong belief underlies this thesis that we have to make the best elaboration and use of an accepted subjectivity towards objectivity rather than seeking the objective way of understanding by neglecting the relativity (historical and subjective) of our understanding. Even if there is such a thing as objectivity in understanding, it is beyond human grasp and acquires its meaning only as a fictitious end. It becomes a metaphysical end this time and not a metaphysical starting point.

In the meanwhile understanding takes place at several levels of everyday social interaction and human life. As lack of a manual of physics does not prevent us from riding a bicycle, to the same extent, we think, the fact that understanding is inevitably subjective, does not prohibit human knowledge from being formulated at every stage of its development and being advanced.

This is not to suggest the unimportance of methodic historical research in revealing and understanding the past. In fact quite the opposite is the case; historical understanding informs and participates in the interpretation process, but it is a dimension of understanding and not its whole reality.

Even if we take for granted the inevitability of pre-understanding for interpretation, it is still necessary to consider its dimensions, i.e. the levels on which interpretation takes place, in relation to the object of understanding. How do we interpret new architecture in relation to its context? Materials, construction techniques, texture, colours, formal configuration, spatial disposition and volumetric articulation are some levels on which interpretation can take place on visual grounds i.e. relating to its appearance. The functional level, the way new and old function interrelate can be another one. Furthermore, understanding can consider the symbolic mediation of the above cited parts or aspects of a new building in relation to its setting. Interpretation thus relates to the designation or recognition of several aspects at several levels of consideration, their interrelations and their contextual significance (31).

A new building, while relating to its context through several of its parts and aspects, introduces novelty at several levels of contextual consideration. Novel aspects of a new building, the others being those derived from the context, can be conceived as such across the entity of the building, the entity of the street it belongs to and so forth. Whatever relations we can assess, at several levels, between new architecture and existing setting they can be interpreted within time i.e. how they operate, how they change and how they develop, so that to relate new and old in temporal perspective.

5. 4. STRUCTURATION OF LEVELS IN ARCHITECTURAL HERMENEUTICS

5. 4. 1. LEVELS OF INTERPRETATION IN PAUL RICOEUR'S HERMENEUTICS

The French philosopher Paul Ricoeur in his study "Time and narrative" develops a theoretical framework similar to the one developed in this thesis, in order to examine the correlation between narrative, i.e. narrating a story, and the temporal character of human

experience. As Ricoeur puts it:

...whatever the innovative force of poetic composition within the field of our temporal experience may be, the composition of the plot is grounded in a preunderstanding of the world of action, its meaningful structures, its symbolic resources, and its temporal character. These features are described rather than deduced. (32)

In arguing so, Ricoeur not only places poetic composition in context but he also indicates some of the levels on which preunderstanding, interpretation and finally evaluation take place. Meaningful structures, symbolic resources and the temporal character of any novelty are some of its basic characteristics, according to which every novelty is evaluated against the background of our preunderstanding of the context. Based on the Aristotelian definition of plot, Ricoeur considers a plot as being an imitation of action and proceeds to ground preunderstanding in action (i.e. the semantics of action, its symbolic mediation and its capacity to be narrated). These levels of human action are subsequently to be imitated by narrative.

These aspects, dimensions or levels of action can form a useful analogy in our attempt to examine interpretation in relation to preunderstanding. Similarly to Ricoeur's analysis, interpretation of new architecture in relation to its context is a twofold operation, is presupposition and transformation. Presupposition is formed according to the contextual preconditions, while transformation of these presuppositions occurs in the light of an introduced novelty. A given setting establishes the preconditions. However our interpretation might transform them in the light of several contextual levels of consideration, it is through contextual engagement that it will acquire its innovative potential.

Preunderstanding of the visual, the structural and the symbolic aspects of a setting before its renewal, however different for different people, conditions the interpretation of new architecture in it. No uniform system of interpretive levels can be a blueprint, since the designation and interpretation of levels depend on the particular situation every time and the entities we identify and assess change on. What is a part of an entity, what is a whole and in what sense does it change, and how does it affect its context have all to do with the particularity of our experience of them. Furthermore, the levels on which we interpret new architecture depend on the symbolism we can ascribe to each entity within several times in history. Of course, symbolic potential can precede to guide our designation of parts or aspects of the new architecture we can identify with. For instance, the festive character of Rossi's *teatro del mondo* enabled its association with the *teatri* of the Venetian tradition. As a consequence, its centrality, its relations to the lagoon and its temporal character

emerged all out of its original symbolism as a festivic structure. The distinction between structural, symbolic and temporal features, attempted here does not suggest a specific order in our experience and interpretation of new architecture. It is only a convenient way of making sense of our experience of the built environment.

All parts and aspects of architecture pertain to the structural, symbolic and temporal designation we suggested, although in varying degrees of complexity. Another point that should be made here is that different parts and aspects of new architecture are experienced in a different way. A facade of a building, the view of a building we get from a narrow street, some part of it which might catch our attention, are aspects that can be perceived simultaneously. The plan of a building or its volumetric configuration have to be conceived rather from a piece-meal, or sequential, perception of them.

Materials, geometric formulation, the texture and the structure of the urban fabric, to the extent that they convey aspects or characteristics of the context, are some structural features that precondition the interpretation of the new. On the symbolic level we, collectively, identify the symbolic mediation of forms, patterns, materials in relation to the reality of the context. Symbolic aspects of a setting, established through socio-cultural life, condition understanding of the symbolic dimension of novelties. As Ricoeur defines it, following Cassirer, symbolic forms are cultural processes that articulate experience. So, symbolic forms are not explicitly symbolic but rather enhance symbolic mediation (33). Finally symbolic articulation bears more precise temporal elements from which the capacity of contextual dimensions to be narrated and perhaps the need to narrate them comes from our understanding of them.

By symbolic mediation we mean the ability of things to refer to something else outside themselves. In this sense everything can enhance symbolic mediation, since everything relates to something beyond itself, by virtue of our conceptualization of things. Gadamer makes this point clear by arguing that:

In the last analysis, Goethe's statement "everything is a symbol", is the most comprehensive formulation of the hermeneutical idea. It means that everything points to another thing. This "everything" is not an assertion about each being, indicating what it is, but an assertion as to how it encounters man's understanding. (34)

Symbolic mediation conceived in this sense, relates directly to the interpretability of architecture.

In Chapter Six, the constituent elements - conceived as structural features - of the man-made environment, such as the materials, the construction techniques, the formal configuration and so forth, will be seen interrelated within a temporal dialectical structure. In discussing both the context and new architecture in it, in terms of parts and entities that we designate and experience, their structural features, their symbolic dimension and their place in the process of development for a given setting will be assessed. Interpretation thus can relate to the human experience of continuity in the man-made environment, that is, experiencing a given setting as a narrative.

Evaluation of new architecture occurs when all the constituent elements of new architecture, that is, the structural aspects we can designate, their symbolic significance and their ability to be narrated in our experience of new architecture in an old setting, are seen within a temporal dialectical structure, on the basis of which their interrelation with contextual characteristics and their significance for the life of a particular context is assessed.

5. 4. 2. DESIGNATION OF DIALECTICAL LEVELS IN THE INTERPRETATION OF ARCHITECTURE

Preunderstanding of a setting in relation to new architecture in it, already built to be evaluated or about to be built to be assessed and guided, always determines to some degree the designation of levels upon which interpretation will evolve. This designation not only determines but is also to be tested in interpretation through the polarities introduced in Chapter Four.

Preunderstanding of the Greek vernacular architecture, the Classical architecture, the Attic landscape, the climate and the Greek culture contribute to the levels we examine in Chapter Six. As we come to understand a plot by certain events or instances we happen to identify with, we similarly approach architecture and interpret it through some characteristics relating to our previous knowledge, previous experience, state of mind we happen to be in or the perceptual entities we happen to encounter. Each entity that we can designate, can be then considered at many levels of symbolic reference in its context. A particular pattern of stones in Pikionis' paths, for instance, can be taken as an entity, "a structural unit" in Ricoeur's terminology (fig. 6.69,70). This pattern associates with the Cyclopean wall surrounding the Acropolis rock in the Bronze Age, the archaic altars, the pre-Classical structures or even to vernacular buildings.

The parts or aspects of new architecture that can be considered as entities may be specific formations, the materials used or even some particular view of a new building. Whatever has been recognised or designated as an entity, can then be seen operating within

the symbolic and temporal realm in association with its context. The ability of an entity to sustain a contextually relevant interpretation process measures its legitimacy as an aspect to be assessed in relating new and old architecture.

All levels of interpretation that can ensue in assessing relations between new and old architecture, can be seen through the polarities introduced in Chapter Four. Synchronic and diachronic aspects of relating new to old architecture address the history of a setting as a meaningful narrative. Unity and diversity aspects of relating new to old architecture pertain to the identity and the particularity of a setting. Constructive and destructive aspects of relating new to old architecture evaluate the development of a given setting. Temporary and permanent aspects of relating new to old architecture unveils the different temporalities of various aspects which characterize a setting and assesses permanence and change in its identity. Interpretation thus occurs as a series of stages of preunderstanding and the continuous transformation of these preunderstandings at several levels. The contextual image is transformed and renovated, while transformation is conditioned and partially determined by the context. In fact, the case studies in Chapter Six will be interpreted within these polarities.

These polarities are based on the assumptions that: 1. What used to be a setting in the past is also, to a certain degree, part of the present in that setting. 2. The same context which was manifested in a diversity of forms throughout its history today is used and interpreted in a new way and needs a contemporary expression. 3. We construct the contemporary expression of a setting by destructing some aspects that have been there before. 4. Permanent qualities in a setting, or whatever is considered to be so, find their way to the present and coexist with less permanent ones.

So, in our interpretation of the relation between new and old architecture, we have to accept our preunderstanding, which is contextually conditioned, and see how it operates within our interpretation process. In this sense it is rather inadequate to interpret the man-made environment in terms of styles, historical periods, certain constitutional buildings or any selectively imposed historical discretization. History is continuous, however inevitable and real is our need to designate and interpret it in phases.

Architecture is in continuous development and unavoidably meaningful - although not in the same sense for every one - in an everyday basis for its social context. This is not to subscribe to some sort of populist approach which will reduce architecture to ready made meanings; it is rather postulated that architecture must be meaningful in a multiplicity of levels in order to cope with the diversity of human experience it is going under.

5. 5. DIALECTICAL HERMENEUTICS AS A METHOD OF CONTEXTUAL INTERPRETATION

We have argued so far that contemporary architectonic interventions, in order to relate to existing historic settings, have to communicate with them in a diversity of interpretative levels.

In Chapter Four we introduced the dialectic filters of synchronicity/diachronicity, unity/diversity, constructive/destructive and ephemeral/permanent, to assess in what way new and old architecture can be interrelated at the diverse levels we discussed so far. In this part we will try to formulate out of Gadamer's ontological hermeneutics and Ricoeur's theoretical investigation of the narrative, some notes towards a dialectical hermeneutics.

Dialectics provides a useful structuring method for the interpretation process without impairing its continuity. So, despite the designation of levels of understanding in interpreting and evaluating new architecture in old settings, these levels are here considered as only a conceptual approximation to an otherwise unanalysable continuous process. Dialectics is capable of acknowledging opposing aspects of architectural change and of doing justice to the wholistic nature of any architectural novelty, that is, its ability to be significant at several levels of interpretation.

This study suggests the articulation of such a dialectical system able to encompass all diverse interpretations under *one process*, which constitutes a framework for all possible contextual interpretations to operate. It suggests a process, the generative potentiality of which can reveal a comprehensive appreciation of the diverse interpretations, while interrelating them as parts of it. The legitimacy of every interpretation can be rendered as such through its potentiality to continue and generate the process, relating new architecture to an existing setting in ever new ways of contextual significance. New and old architecture in a historic setting have to be connected in a systematic way, if their lasting communication is desired. It is through this interpretation process that new architecture is engaged in a continuous and indefinite interaction with the existing setting. Such an interaction is a prerequisite for new architecture attempting to be a creative intervention in its context.

The notions of imitation and contrast constitute the tools of a dialectic interpretation based on the polarities introduced in Chapter Four. This interpretation operates at several levels, generated through the consideration of several aspects of new architecture and its setting. In proposing such a system we aim at a comprehensive interrelation between old and new.

Implicit to the above consideration is the belief that dialogue is characterised by an

intrinsic creativity compared to rhetorics based on formal logic. Formal logic cannot accept a value and its opposite as equally important. Dialectics instead is based on the existence of opposing principles and values. If there is a need for both antithetical values, *if they are acknowledged as equally important, only then dialectics of the opposites can be considered as a creative method*. It was the detection and the appropriation of antithetical, yet equally important to human settings, environmental spatio-temporal qualities, that stimulated such a methodological choice in this study.

Once dialogue is established between new and old architecture, it is then able to build up values which cannot otherwise exist on either of the opposites that are engaged in interaction. It is this sort of surfeit of value, which renders the dialectics of the opposites a creative process. The more the dialogue between them proceeds, the more interrelated they become, the more open and familiar to each other. Architectonic intervention and existing setting thus, through their mutual interaction legitimize, understand and illuminate one another. Through this dialectic relationship new architecture acquires contextual identity and subsequently changes the setting, where it is being grafted into, in a contextual way.

The context although characterized by identity and difference in itself as we argued in Chapter Three, nevertheless presents an oneness, a particular to it identity in relation to any other setting. This *oneness* characterizes any entity we happen to designate in our attempt to relate old and new architecture. Dialectics as a method of inquiry respects and does justice to this double-sided nature of identity.

A new building, for instance, endorses the identity of the setting, where it is grafted into, in two ways; by imitating its context in what is lasting and true, and by differing from it in what is distinctly new and contemporary. For this reason, in this study, dialectics penetrates both: the tools (imitation and contrast) with which we assess relations between new and old architecture, and the perspectives (the four polarities) through which we conceptualize the relations between old and new architecture at several levels.

What unites and renders legitimate the interaction of opposite spatio-temporal qualities is the potential of the existing setting as their common denominator. Opposition then has to do with identity and difference in itself, the "self" being a setting in development.

Tradition and novelty interact dialectically having as a common basis for their dialectic opposition the "life" of the context, which needs them both in order to exist. The polarities suggested in Chapter Four, although abstract structures, nevertheless allow for an adequate conceptualization of the interaction between new and old architecture, realized at several levels.

The "life" of a setting needs both the quality of being a synchronic object while being part of a diachronic process, being one while being different every time, destroying while constructing and remaining a permanent quality while changing. It constitutes the common denominator and the power for the dialectics between new and old to operate. It constitutes the "third term" for their dialectic interaction (35). The passage of time "makes" life possible, ours and the objects' we want to be alive too, even if by ascribing to them a sort of vitalism by virtue of human life. That is to say that a setting is alive only by virtue of the life of the socio-cultural entity it accommodates.

Old and new characteristics interact dialectically at several levels. New parts of a building interact with other parts of it, derived from its context. The unity of the building itself is this time the third term for the opposition between new and old parts of it. At this level new and old elements interact at a level different from that at which new architecture and its context do. At this level a harmonious combination of new and contextual elements is at stake, while at a higher level, new architecture as a whole is considered as the novel part which has to establish a dialogue with the setting it is grafted into.

It is interesting to note here that we cannot ascribe dialectical opposition between, for instance, the context of an existing setting as it was before the insertion of new architecture and the context after the architectonic intervention. These entities are just successive in time stages in the contextual process of development, distinct in time and as such there is no third term for their possible interaction. They cannot coexist at any time in a given setting and for that reason their dialectical interaction is meaningless.

New and old architecture are antithetical aspects of the contextual entity and at every level of their interaction, in our interpretation, the outcome of their rivalry is ambiguous at indefinite levels of consideration. This ambiguity of positive ontological significance, what Plato called *aporia*, is their potentiality to stimulate and sustain the interpretation process.

Aporia remains, because the creativity of a dialectic process does not lie at the supremacy of one of the opposites towards a definite end. Its creativity lies rather in its potentiality to sustain an interpretation process, which nevertheless creates values and establishes associations between architectonic intervention and existing setting at every level of interpretation. Interpretation thus is not expected to reveal a *definite meaning* in a given context, but rather enter an interpretation process which reveals significant contextual values, as it evolves. There is no hierarchy among the diverse interpretation levels, since each one is equally relevatory about both the setting and the intervention. Yet, some meanings are in the nature of things and pertain to all contexts, while others characterize in

particular a specific locality.

The existing spatio-temporal entity of a particular setting seems the best possible frame of reference for such an interpretation process, even if this process is finally to supersede contextual significance and reveal more general levels of significance. New architecture may aspire to qualities relating to the nature of things, such as, for instance, freedom, openness and permanence. But this aspiration will be an outcome of its engagement with the culture of the particular place in the context of which new architecture is grafted. This is not to suggest that a localised culture is the only way leading to general aesthetic merits, but rather to show that contextual engagement does not exclude them. Instead, through contextual reference new architecture expresses such general qualities in its own way. The festive quality, for instance, as a general quality that can be experienced in many places, is addressed, in Rossi's *teatro del mondo*, through a Venetian filter, as we will see in Chapter Six. Similarly, Pikionis in his landscaping of the Acropolis, addresses the universality of a religious place, religiousness as a translocal quality, through the perspectives of the Classical culture and the vernacular tradition.

CHAPTER SIX

THE DIALECTICS OF HERMENEUTIC EXPERIENCE IN TWO CONTEXTS

6. 1. NOTES CONCERNING THE INTERPRETATION OF NEW ARCHITECTURE IN HISTORIC SETTINGS

We argued in Chapter Three that imitation/contrast dialectics describe the complex web of relationships between an architectonic intervention and the context of the particular setting into which the intervention is being grafted. In order to conceive the man-made environment as a dynamic temporal process as well as a static spatial configuration, we introduced in Chapter Four a dialectic conceptualization of the various manifestations of time as experienced in the relations between new and old architecture.

In such an approach, even antithetical manifestations of time find their place as equally needing to be acknowledged by new architecture. Some modes of interaction between space and time such as, synchronic and diachronic, unitary and diverse, constructive and destructive, and ephemeral and permanent, were considered in dialectical pairs in order to address the antithetical aspects of architectural change.

In Chapter Five we examined, with the aid of philosophical hermeneutics, how the understanding of the whole guides the understanding of its parts and how from understanding the parts we are led back to the understanding of new whole. In other words we came to show understanding as a cyclical process. The scale of the whole in interpreting new architecture in a given setting is a varying one, because any architectural intervention in that setting changes it in a different sense at several level of reference. An addition to a historic building changes in a different sense the building, the street it belongs to, the setting and so forth. Knowledge of a given setting as what it has been, what it is at the present and what it wants to be *vis a vis* pending new architecture in it, determines partially not only the parts and entities we, collectively, are going to designate, but essentially the criteria for the interpretation and the evaluation of new architecture.

In this Chapter we will attempt to see, through a detailed examination of two case

studies, how all the spatio-temporal polarities work together, how they are connected and correlated through the interpretation-evaluation process in our attempt- as architects or experiencers-to understand and evaluate novelties in historic settings. In other words, we will examine how the conceptualization of time proposed in Chapter Four, relates to the multiple layers of meaning in the man-made environment and the degree of their acknowledgement in changing it, as it has been discussed in Chapter Five.

Interpretations at different levels, dialectically related, are considered within a process with which we, collectively get engaged. Conversely, this process is indefinite yet significant in different ways for different people at different times. A dialectic process of reading-interpretation is proposed rather than some definite interpretation, whether a definite interpretation is to be the "mens auctoris", or any other specific one.

The physical characteristics of a new building and its surroundings are the most obvious starting points towards assessing the relation between old and new in a given setting. The materials, the construction techniques, the formal configuration, the volumetric and planimetric articulation of both a historic setting and the new architecture in it, are some physical characteristics. The knowledge and the previous experience of the particular setting will determine, to some degree, even the physical features that we, collectively, are to designate in relating new architecture to it, not to mention the symbolic significance in contextual terms of these physical features.

In Chapter Four we made the point that only an ideal experiencer, with full knowledge of a setting and the socio-cultural process in it, can assess most adequately an ideal relationship between new and old architecture. Yet, if new architecture aims at this ideal state of harmonious co-existence with its surroundings at several levels, it should also make sense for normal everyday experience. Thus, knowledge of the context at normal circumstances could be considered at any probable level, i.e. it could vary from the knowledge we get by observing the spatial articulation of a new building and its surrounding to the more complex forms of incorporating historical and specific socio-cultural aspects in association with their spatial expression.

6. 2. THE VENETIAN CONTEXT AS MANIFESTED THROUGH ALDO ROSSI'S "TEATRO"

6. 2. 1. INTRODUCTION

In Chapter Three we provided a critical presentation of Aldo Rossi's theoretical approach to architecture. Rossi throughout his writings and his works has been always interested in a permanent typology of architecture. Criticism of his works has been often solely focussed upon the nature of the typology he advocates. In this Chapter we will examine not the legitimacy or the arbitrariness of the typology he uses, but the way he applies it according to local characteristics in one case study, the *teatro* of Venice.

Irrespectively of the typological tools he uses, we will try to interpret his *teatro* on the basis of its context at several levels of reference, i.e. its surrounding buildings, the adjacent area and the canal, Venice as a whole and so forth. In other words, we will try to understand the way he uses his typology, the modifications and adaptations he makes according to contextual characteristics of the place ~~into~~ his *teatro* is grafted into.

In his "Scientific Autobiography", Rossi provides *in passim* some fragmentary comments and reflections on Venice, which stimulated and informed his design of the *teatro*. Occasional recurrence of Rossi's quotations in the following pages does not imply that they can be taken as evidence for the understanding of his work. It only illuminates further some points, which are present in his work nonetheless. In other words, in the following we will refer to aspects of his work as they can be experienced by anyone.

6. 2. 2. STRUCTURAL FEATURES - A FIRST DESCRIPTIVE READING

On November 11th 1979, Aldo Rossi's floating *teatro Veneziano* or *teatro del mondo*, emerged within the Venetian lagoon for the first time on the occasion of the Biennale. Built in the Fusina shipyards, it was brought out to the Venetian context of buildings, Venetians and tourists as a completed edifice and anchored at the *punta della dogana*, in front of St Mark's *piazza* and the Doge's palace (Fig. 6, 1).

The skeleton of the edifice, made of ~~steel~~ scaffolding tubes, was fixed upon a pair of ~~steel~~ beams on a oblong barge. The outside surface and partly the inside was clad with perpendicular timber plates (Figs 6. 2-5).

The barge was the floating foundation upon which the whole edifice was constructed. An enclosed parallelepiped 9.5m long and wide and 11m high constituted the main volume, the central space of the *teatro*. Above a height of 11m the main volume was transformed

into an octahedral drum 6m high, which was surmounted by an octagonal pyramid (Fig. 6. 6).

The centrality of the *teatro* was further emphasized above the pyramid by a metallic axis, which pierced a sphere and backed a metallic triangular flag at its final point. The whole edifice followed a tripartite articulation, i.e. the main parallelepiped volume, the octahedral drum, and the octagonal roof and it was completed with two staircase terraced blocks 13m high, which contributed further to the centrality of the edifice (Fig. 6. 7-9). A terrace at the height of 11m provided a panoramic view. A blue painted strip looked like a kind of *ballustrata* and went round the terrace. A similar blue strip at the top side of the drum emphasized further the centrality of the edifice and mediated between the metallic colour of the roof and the yellow of the timber cladding (Figs 6. 10-12). The main entrance provided access to the stage, while the lateral ones gave access, through the staircases, to the gallery (Figs 6. 13-14). All three entrances were facing the place in front of the *punta della dogana*, the old customs office (Fig. 6. 15).

The central hall, the interior of the main volume, provided two tiers of seating, set opposite each other on each side as people passed through the main entrance and looked out through the oppositely sited window opening, leaving the space in between for acting. Above, hanging, there were two perimetric galleries, while at the terrace level a third one, of octagonal shape, completed the auditorium and communicated with the terrace through eight doors, each one beneath a window on each side of the drum (Figs 6. 16-18).

From within the *teatro*, people had a view of the nearby floating boats and barges, while they were being observed from outside as part of the theatre and from within as actors of an ongoing play.

6. 2. 3. SYMBOLIC DIMENSIONS, OR ASSOCIATING THE "TEATRO" WITH THE VENETIAN CONTEXT

The *teatro del mondo* or *teatro Veneziano*, as it was called by its designer Aldo Rossi, first appeared coming from the lagoon pulled by a tug-boat (Fig. 6. 19). Floating among barges and gondolas and superimposing its mobile configuration on the townscape, the *teatro* constituted yet another unexpected scene for the Venetian context. Its image, ambiguous and elusive as it appeared from the distant part of the lagoon, started to generate associations to its immediate context even before it was clearly visible. First of all, by the way it entered the Venetian context it commemorated once more the festive character of Venice. Yet another carnival, yet another ritual was on (Fig. 6. 20).

The already known, the familiar tug-boat, introduced something new, a new object for the Venetian context, yet in a familiar manner. Everything had been sometime new in Venice and everything had come from the sea. Gold, building materials, new objects, ideas and whole civilizations came from the sea. That very lagoon had witnessed throughout its history the fusion between East and West, and the Venetian urban tissue manifests eloquently this multiplicity and diversity of styles, ideas and civilizations.

Anchored in front of the *piazza san Marco* and the Doges palace, but responding to the fluctuations of the lagoon, Rossi's teatro appeared as a natural extension of the land (Fig. 6. 1). The centrality of the main volume the drum and its roof, reinforced further from the aisle-like side staircase blocks, referred immediately to the centralized Renaissance, Byzantine and Baroque temples, which were scattered in the surrounding land (Fig. 6. 21). Although of a temporary character, it illuminated the hidden order of an already familiar setting. Its octagonal roof resembled an abstraction of the existing roofing systems. It addressed and summarized at the same time their diversity.

Imaginary unfolding of the drum and the roof could allude to the Doges' palace, which is surmounted by flat triangular vertices, while frontal view of the roof alludes to the pediments of the Palladian Neoclassical churches in the vicinity of the *teatro*. Were the roof of the *teatro* hemispheric or terraced, it would lose the multiplicity of interconnected associations.

Observed from the land, the octagonal cupola also associated with the rectangular pyramid of the bell-tower in piazza San Marco and offered a geometrical abstraction of the nearby cupolas. It went as far as to encompass the towers of the mediaeval Venetian wall, the Romanesque bell towers and the whole Italian tradition of hill castles (Fig. 6. 22). Starting from the immediate surrounding context of the *teatro*, where it got and deposited meaning, it extended its symbolic range to more comprehensive contexts, i.e. the whole Venetian city, Italian coasts, Italian hill towns, Italy, the mediterranean world. Even if it were a novelty, it immediately became recognisable, familiar, communicative and meaningful. It illuminated its context from a new perspective and rendered it meaningful in a new way (Figs 6. 23-24).

6. 2. 4. ATTEMPTING A DIALECTICAL INTERPRETATION

6. 2. 4. 1. INTRODUCTION

So far we have exposed some guidelines along which a "normal", subjective interpretation should evolve. The material used for the construction of the *teatro*, its formal configuration, its volumetric articulation, its function and the symbolism of all these, were some of the most obvious levels of reference in interpreting the *teatro* in relation to Venice and vice versa. In the following we will attempt to provide a dialectical framework upon which the relation of Rossi's *teatro* to Venice can be assessed. This framework is necessarily a multi-layered one in order to encompass the diversity of levels on which new and old can be associated.

In Chapter Five we argued that the degree of comprehensiveness that such a dialectic interpretative schema can attain would be adopted in this study as the most reliable criterion for assessing the degree of integration between new and old. Yet, a comprehensive interrelation between new and old architecture can only be an abstraction. In reality there is always a hierarchy within which some aspects of a setting or of the new architecture in it become finally more important than others in expressing the identity of that setting. What aspect is more important than others and in what sense varies not only for different settings but also for different times we come to interpret them. Along these lines we will attempt to interpret Rossi's *teatro*.

6. 2. 4. 2. SYNCHRONIC AND DIACHRONIC ASPECTS OF VENICE

The materials used for the construction of the *teatro* were wood and metal. The timber cladding, which covered the exterior and partly the interior, was a clear reminiscence of the old wooden bridges of the Venetian lagoon and the timber constructions upon it. Wood had been for centuries the main building material to support the foundations of most buildings. The metal cladding of *teatro's* roof related to all the bronze and golden plated Byzantine and Renaissance domes. The scaffold materials used to support the whole structure, gave to it a festive quality. The barge upon which the whole edifice was welded had been long associated with the carriers of everyday commodities in Venice.

The scaffold iron tubes and the timber plating of Rossi's *teatro* facilitated from the first moment its reading as a novelty belonging to the present. Like a circus tent on the village green, it emitted the freshness of a new edifice. Destined to last only for a while, the materials and the technique used for its construction revealed its character as a festive building, which claimed only a temporary value. In using materials with an anti-

monumental character, Rossi claimed a clear relevance to the present. Yet, even in terms of materials the *teatro* dwelled near its sources and its context. Bridges, ships, the poles which support the foundations of most Venetian building, were all made of wood. Rossi's *teatro* was just another festive machine joining its predecessors in a diachronic festival. The *teatro* gained roots within the Venetian tradition, while in its appearance Venice gained a current image.

A most obvious characteristic of the *teatro* was the centrality of its spatial organization. The amphitheatre and the galleries are organized around a central open space, which soared to a pointed roof. The lateral staircase blocks reinforced further the character of a closed and self contained central *teatro* with a centre.

As a new object Rossi's *teatro* is a whole world in itself. Its austere geometric contour and its clear articulation of volumes prescribed its definite limits in relation to its context. Anchored near the land, it provided a link with the existing Venetian setting. Otherwise, it offers a stage capable of being a world in itself. It represented what the French philosopher Michel Foucault has described as *allotopia*, a place which physically is somewhere, yet it is a complete world in itself. Rossi's *teatro* offered a unique place, from where Venice could be seen in a new way: the whole city as a floating stage where the play of life is being continuously played.

The centrality of the Renaissance utopias could also come to mind as a most relevant precursor. Leonardo da Vinci's ideal temple, the mediaeval towns of northern Italy and the round edifices of the Venetian carnivals could be taken to articulate a continuous chain, where Rossi's *teatro* could find its place and justify its significance. The *teatro* could equally belong to the present and to the long Venetian tradition. It was a contemporary focal point and the converging point of all the *teatri* of the past.

Similar links with the Venetian past could be established, if an interpretation of its function was attempted. Rossi's *teatro* as a temporary theatre on a festive occasion, could stand a dialectical interpretation, i.e. as a functional building of the present and as a present repercussion of the festive constructions of the past.

Rossi, in his Scientific Autobiography suggests that even the square windows with the crossed mullions can be considered as an aspect of the *teatro* which related to the Venetian context. Some other aspects of the *teatro* also claimed their relevance to an interpretation aiming at assessing its synchronic and diachronic characteristics. Some of them derived from the symbolic significance of previously discussed levels of reference. For instance, the centrality of the *teatro* related to such dialectical pairs as inside/outside, complete/incomplete and ordered/disordered in relation to the Venetian tradition. The

construction technique of the *teatro* and its materials could also lead to more comprehensive polarities relating to the historical depth of the Venetian context and the contemporary significance of the *teatro*.

The change that Rossi's *teatro* had inferred upon the Venetian context could also be interpreted along the same dialectical lines. Rossi's *teatro* was a symbolic building. It was a representation of a building rather than a building itself. Abstraction of past typologies, memories of the vernacular tradition of northern Italy and images of the Venetian landscape could be taken as some symbolic references. Rossi's *teatro* represented, summarized and critically stood within the Venetian context in its own way. It was a multi-purpose, symbolic and ambivalent structure that introduced to its context the essence of the whole city; the elusive character of architecture and the fragile purity of architectural styles. It addressed the architecture of Venice as a collage of typologies, forms, materials and building techniques. It seemed to be a recomposition made from a diversity of memories. It related more to the past as a whole rather than any particular part of it. It contrasted to the specific morphology of the surrounding buildings in order to catch the mode of their coexistence. It abandoned any stylistic imitation in order to imitate the more essential characteristics of the Venetian multiplicity and formal diversity. It brought to the surface a latent typology, fictional and abstract as much as congenial to its context. It clearly expressed a critical standpoint instead of a superimposition strategy. It did not offer any new element to the already existing formal diversity, but a new synthesis of whatever had been there as a form, as a symbolic image or as a distant memory. Rossi's *teatro* was a novelty which derived from its context, yet going beyond the existing context in order to illuminate it in a contemporary way. Something new is proposed, yet it surely appears to be Venetian. Venice could be seen differently after the introduction of the *teatro* in her context. A different Venice, yet still the same Venice. In terms of the conceptualization proposed in this study, Venice seemed to preserve its continuity, while being grafted with a novelty. Whatever aspect of the theatre we could come to interpret, we would realize that the diverse aspects of the *teatro* manifest a congeniality to its context, while critically reappropriating it.

A critical appraisal of what is still a valid characteristic of Venice to be imitated by new architecture in it and what is not presupposes a hierarchy and an evaluation of the properties of the Venetian context. Some properties of the past still consist^{as} integral parts of the Venetian identity; others less so, while others are a matter of the past only. The festive character of Venice is still an alive characteristic of the most celebrated city. On the contrary, copying a floating theatre of the past for today would be a repetitive act. In Rossi's *teatro* we realize the fact that whatever characteristics it intends to perpetuate, it must do so at the expense of others, which necessarily have to be considered as less important or

irrelevant to the present.

The extrovert character of the Venetian carnivals were contrasted by the *teatro's* introvert reflection of the Venetian reality. In order to emphasize the hermetic centrality of this "utopia", Rossi clearly abandons any specific historical connotation. He abandons monumental materials and monumental orders in order to address an archetypal simplicity, much closer to the essence of Classicism than any reiteration of Classical themes. Rossi's *teatro* in its lasting dialectical relationship with its context, equally imitates and contrasts to its surroundings. It abolishes some aspects of Venice in order to render others intelligible. After all, this destruction and creation process is exactly the relation between the Venetian land and the lagoon. *Teatro stands at the threshold where land and lagoon claim each other.*

6. 2. 4. 3. TEMPORARY AND PERMANENT PROPERTIES OF VENICE

The *teatro* not only stood at the threshold between land and sea, but it had a threshold existence too. It represented the permanence of a diachronic typology, while floating in the lagoon, and it was a temporary edifice while addressing the permanent characteristics of Venice. It managed to sustain, in our interpretation of it *vis a vis* the Venetian context, an active dialectics between what is temporary and what is permanent in it. This dialectics in particular has a specific importance for the Venetian context.

Venice had always had a fragile life at the threshold between the land and the lagoon. The lagoon brought to Venice everything which was then solidified in the land. The permanence of the land and the ephemerality of the lagoon had always been the antipodes, the polarities in between which Venice was kept alive and thriving. The monumental building in the land expressed what Venice had achieved, while the lagoon kept changing Venice, always challenging her monuments and her whole existence.

Observed from the lagoon, the rough outline of the *teatro*, appears to be added to what is already there on land. The world of the lagoon seems to have been solidified in a single structure. Although it matches the Venetian context, it nevertheless represents a different kind of structure. In juxtaposition to all the other buildings, it did not follow the piecemeal in situ construction, which we encounter in everyday life. It came from nowhere going to nowhere, but anchored for several months somewhere, in Venice. Appearing in a completed form, it commemorated the carnivals of Venice, when several floating constructions appeared for a short period of time. Particularly, its appearance as a completed construction and the ephemeral, the temporariness of its existence, associates with all the Italian tradition of the 16th century *teatri mundi*.

Far from representing any particular of the Renaissance *teatri*, Rossi's *teatro* represented their true successor by constituting, as its predecessors did, 'the marriage of utopia-the globality of the experience promised by a central space-to the phenomenal, the relative, the transient, embodied by the provisional character of the stage machine'. Its austere geometry, its absolute simplicity and abstraction, endows it with a metaphysical quality. Rossi's *teatro* finds itself at the threshold of existence. It exists as the spirit of the lagoon, as the spirit of Venice and, at the same time, it does not exist in that it does not finally take a profane contemporary form. His minimal construction implies the opposite of the actual, bustling Venetian life.

Anchored at the threshold, where land meets the lagoon, the *teatro* renders explicit the double face of Venice, that of the permanent, immobile buildings, and the other of the mobile, floating world of the lagoon. These two faces of Venice, like the double face of Janus, oppose and complement one another. It is this dialectic interaction, which causes the immobile world of the Venetian land to become subject to change and the mobile world of the lagoon (the barges, the boats and the gondolas) to be considered as permanent through this kind of perpetuation of movement and change. The lagoon, through time, influences the land world and the land world renders legitimate and permanent the fluctuating world of the lagoon. And it is this very spatial configuration of the *teatro*, which indicates such a reading concerning the dialectical relationships between what is permanent and what is changeable, between qualities of long duration and ephemeral ones, what is stable and what is mobile.

The main volume of the *teatro* appears stable, permanent and horizontal in its massiveness, while the few square windows contribute further to its compact character. In contrast, the drum facets due to the unavoidable perspective in which they appear ~~remind~~ tend to a rather elusive round movement and an upward rise expressing a latent dynamism. The round movement of the drum makes possible the transition to the next facade of the edifice, in which the same "T" motif appears ~~raised~~, elusive and subject to change this time. The side blocks, initially stable and permanent, start fluctuating in tune with the lagoon's rhythm, as people moved round. What exists as a hint in the one side, appears as the prevailing order in the next side providing alternatively stability amid change and change amid stability and interrelating the various parts between ~~themselves~~ as well as to a whole.

The *teatro del mondo*, the theatre of the world, represents through its fluctuations on the lagoon, all the dramatic character of Venice. The lagoon seems to be the source of life for Venice and its death at the same time, and the permanence of its temporary nature, or the temporary permanence of the *teatro*, refers directly to the Venetian drama.

A theatre in its widest sense is, perhaps, what all Venice is about. Every building is a stage setting of a theatrical performance and a whole world in itself, while at the same time it constitutes a part of a more comprehensive theatrical world, the world of Venice.

And it is so, not only because of the fascinating juxtaposition of all the diverse spatial configurations which constitute the setting, but also because of the people, Venetians and tourists, walking around, observing the balconies around and being observed by the people on these balconies, who happened to be there and who will come down to the *piazza* a minute later. Rossi's *teatro* represents in an abstract sense this kind of living everyday Venetian theatre.

The balconies become galleries for the *teatro* and the *piazas* become the performance place, the orchestra. A whole world, outwardly expressed and unfolded, is here reconstructed in a reversed, involuted and condensed form. The continuous play between walking and wandering people, is here kept alive in the interior of the *teatro*, where galleries, staircases and mutual observation contribute to the theatricality of the contextual reference, the world outside the *teatro*, which is visible from the all round window openings. The two side staircase blocks emphasize the centrality of the main volume, which is further reinforced by the two succeeding in height blue strips, which in turn culminate to the natural blue of the sky, reflected on the metallic roof. There is an interplay between the blue of the sky and the blue painted strips of the *teatro*. At the level of the upper gallery, what seems painted blue to the outside observer, is a view of the Venetian sky, the negative of the Venetian skyline, which the *teatro* dweller confronts.

Teatro del mondo imitates in a creative manner and renders explicit the basic characteristics of the immediate as well as the most comprehensive context, and at the same time it is a complementary contrast to what it refers to and associates with.

Whatever our hypothetical narrative about the *teatro* and its context would be -and it will be such a narrative, different for every observer and interpreter, in an attempt to understand it - by observing and interpreting it, our image about Venice will be reinforced and justified rather than collapsed, as we will keep walking around Venice, connecting the image of the *teatro* with the context of Venetian space and life. What exists as a clue or a hint in the *teatro*, finds its full justification and legitimization in every part of Venice we encounter.

Additional information about the history of Venice, her folklore, her festivals, the arts and the everyday life throughout history, which form an inseparable complementary part of what exists in built form and fabric and which we get somehow, as well as new images of the built environment, clarifies the first image and renders explicit facets of Venice which

are diffused everywhere. According to our knowledge of Venice, the image of the *teatro*, keeps triggering associations and leads to a lasting relationship with its context.

6. 2. 4. 4. THE DISCUSSED DIALECTICAL LEVELS OF INTERPRETATION AS ONE PROCESS

Venice has been chosen as a distinctive example for the articulation of our theory, because it represents a context 'par excellence' for the evaluation of any kind of architectonic intervention and for the measurement of the adequacy of contemporary architecture. The peculiarity of the Venetian environment represents in exaggeration the whole problem of architectural development today i.e. if we have to build in old settings, what to build and how to build. Venice is for most the city of dreams and of nostalgia, the Venice of Byron, Ruskin, Shelley or Proust, an almost mythical environment. But at the same time Venice is an alive city like any other and resists the ruinous fascination of the Romantics. Venice represents, perhaps more than any other setting, the dilemma of being preserved as it is, or being renovated.

A consideration of Venice as yet another place to build, as the modernists would have thought possible, could be disastrous for her unique character. But, nevertheless, keeping Venice as she is without any renewal without any renovation to make her livable, means an equally disastrous decision. A city is spatial configuration as well as human content and in either case of the above we lose one of them. What resolves this dilemma, or rather renders it a false one, is a renewal in the "Venetian way". New architecture can find the real, every time, Venice to associate with and "anchor" at. What is necessary is an association in a wholistic sense incorporating all the locally existing values and establishing a relationship in all possible levels. The creation of new architecture in an old setting can render explicit latent values, not less important than spatial forms and patterns suggested by any morphological analysis. According to Eugenio Montale:

A city is a secret matrix of events and situations, the rather metaphysical site, whether geographical or geometric, of encounters that a different scenario would change and without loss of significance. (Cited in: Aldo Rossi, The architecture of the City)

Aldo Rossi with his *teatro* attempts, rather successfully, to provide a solution to the above stated problem. We are not going to discuss here his method, his typology, but only how he applies it to build in a particular context and particularly to the Venetian context. Rossi is using geometrical *pezzi e parti*, to articulate a language of abstract forms. The only thing we can criticize is the manipulation and use of this language according to the

context it refers to. Far from comparing the *teatro* with his autobiography of statements and projects, we have to interpret it only in terms of its performance in the Venetian context.

What measures and evaluates his typology and its application is the evaluation of his solution according to the problem. It is this kind of criticism we have applied so far to Rossi's typology in our attempt to interpret his *teatro*, far from any consideration concerning other projects of the same architect, associations within the architectural profession, or criticism of a theory in vacuum. The *teatro* may in the end be associated with values and references not of the particular context, but this can only ensue because of a contextually integrated interpretation.

Teatro del mondo, through its contemporaneity and its presence in St Marc's basin addresses all the ephemeral structures of the lagoon, the boats which float around, the gondolas and their kiosks and furthermore by being so acquires temporal depth commemorating the *teatri* of the 16th century (Figs 6. 25-26). It is not round and transparent and it does not have caryatides, but nevertheless it constitutes the *teatro* of today. Through its contemporaneity^{it} acquires temporal depth, triggering associations with past 'contemporary' structures and through its diachronic examination^{it} acquires contemporaneity, by being different.

It is cultural memory, which anchors it to the past events of Venice, and by being yet another event itself extends its temporal dimensions from its temporal depth to contemporaneity and even to future memory, our considerations of how it will be remembered in the future, acquiring temporal extension. In the same way it relates to the Venetian churches through its central volumetric articulation and its cupola, or the Venetian houses through its painted blue window cornices, resembling the stone cornices of the old Venetian houses and the iron bars, or to the Venetian theatrical character by constituting another focal point, another stage machine, rendering solid the threshold between the two coexisting worlds of the Venetian context.

Four centuries after the appearance of the last *teatro mundi*, Rossi's *teatro* renders vivid a temporal gap as far as the built manifestation is concerned, but nevertheless establishes a unity and is 'sincere' to the memory of the *teatri*, which never ceased to exist. It provides a complementary contrast, from the temporal point of view. As far as the particular building is concerned, it contrasts to all the group of *teatri* and in relation to the contemporary context of Venice it is something different from it creating a meaningful diversity in Venetian history. By 'catching' the common thread, the genius loci of Venice, it appears as familiar and expected, while, as a true monument, it appears as a spatial

discontinuity to redeem time; it marks a novelty and redirects the process of development in Venice.

The destructive face of time, which devours the foundations of Venice, the materials, the whole built fabric, seems to compensate with the offspring of a new edifice. Time compensates for its destructive force by constructing as well. And the Venetian lagoon, the danger for Venice, which is devouring her gradually, suddenly creates a new edifice as if by reconstructing the already devoured part of the diachronic Venetian *body* (Fig. 6. 27).

The *teatro* is loaded with an ambiguity. Its closed, hermetic and highly abstracted spatial configuration deny its transitory and ephemeral nature. It relates to the fixed and closed to themselves, to Palladian built statements and to the numerous mannerist *capricci*. It 'catches' not only the ephemeral spirit, as a floating structure, but nevertheless 'catches' also the permanence of the recurrence of such events. It is a monument to all the events. It achieves its monumentality through its temporariness, exactly as recurring rituals and festivals acquire their permanence through their recurrence.

After considering how it achieves its anchorage to the Venetian context it is time to examine the change which is inferred upon the context after the introduction of a new 'object'. The *teatro* creates a contrast to the existing context and this contrast is a necessary one in order to imitate the process which created cumulatively whatever constitutes the context. Venice changed with the insertion of the new edifice but nevertheless remained the same. *Teatro* as a sensitive and sincere response matches the context and adds to it while transforming it. Through its spatial configuration and potential symbolism it goes beyond its ephemeral state of being and becomes a legitimate image of and for Venice.

No possible interpretation can ever be so ambitious as to aim at revealing the fact of a work of art. Any reading cannot pretend to be an exhaustive one. What is of importance here is the ability of the architectonic intervention, as a work of art, to acquire several levels of interpretation, its ability to resist any complete and exhaustive reading, leaving the observer-interpreter in the *tertium quid*, i.e. to the third state between two dialectic opposites - to whatever level these opposites interact and complement one-another - , to a state of potential and powerful ambiguity, ever pregnant with yet another meaning.

6. 3. RESPONDING TO THE CLASSICAL IDEAL:

PIKIONIS' ARCHITECTURAL INTERVENTION TO THE CONTEXT OF THE ACROPOLIS AT ATHENS

6. 3. 1. INTRODUCTION

Walking upon this land, our heart rejoices like the child's first joy in our movement within the space of creation, this successive destruction and redemption of our balance that is walking. It rejoices in the advance of our body upon this sculptured band that is the ground. And our spirit is delighted by the infinite combinations of the three dimensions of space that fall in with and change around us in every step of ours, and can be altered even by the passage of a cloud in the sky. We pass by this rock, the trunk of this tree or under its crested leafage. We ascend and descend along with the land upon its convexities, its hillocks, its mountains or deep in its valleys. We enjoy the flat stretch of the plain, we measure earth with the labour of our body. This solitary path is infinitely superior to the city's highways because in every undulation of it, in its turns, in the infinite alterations of spatial perspective it presents, it teaches us the divine hypostasis of individuality which is subordinated to the harmony of the whole ... We study the spirit that each place yields ... Here the natural forces, the geometry of the earth, the quality of light and the ether define this place as a cradle of civilization ... Light created this cosmos. Light preserves and procreates it... Walking upon this land, realm of the limestone and clay, I saw the rock being transformed into architrave and red clay colouring the walls of an imaginary cella.

The Greek architect Dimitris Pikionis wrote the above lines in his seminal article "Sentimental Topography". In it, Pikionis expressed his most intimate and profound relationship to the Attic landscape (Fig. 6. 28). Fifteen years later, in 1950, he was commissioned for the improvement of the landscape around the Acropolis at Athens and the nearby hills.

From 1950-1957 Pikionis in close collaboration with other architects, craftsmen and students of architecture, landscaped the approaches to Acropolis and the Philopappou hill providing the stem of a path network spreading to the greater green area which encompasses the hills of Acropolis and Areopagos to its North-East part, and the hills of Philopappos, Pnika and Nimfon to its South-West (Fig. 6. 29). Near the place where all footpaths from the southern hills converge, as one ascends the promenade to Philopappou hill,

Pikionis renovated St. Dimitris Loumbardiaris chapel and built a refreshment-place environed by a landscaped precinct.

In what follows we will try to provide an experiential understanding of the whole complex as an architectonic intervention in one of the most prestigious settings. In other words, we will try to show how Pikionis' intervention manifests in architectural terms an interpretation of the Classical spirit, dominant in the particular setting, and how by responding to it, it acquires its own qualities for contemporary Athenian life.

6. 3. 2. EXPERIENCING THE CLASSICAL AND THE CONTEMPORARY: A FIRST DESCRIPTIVE ENCOUNTER

There can be several ways in which Pikionis' intervention to the context of the acropolis can be experienced. People tend to use extensively the area, as it constitutes one of the few green areas left to the overdeveloped contemporary *megapolis* of Athens. Taking a stroll round the hills, using a particular path as a ~~shortcut~~ on an everyday basis, or intending to reach the Classical acropolis, are some ways of encountering and experiencing Pikionis' work.

As we are following a limestone-paved path, we are gradually witnessing its transformation into something particular. Subtly ordered patterns emerge to the surface, while marble is introduced amid other kinds of limestone and the paved surface starts to fluctuate in resonance with the anomalies of the ground (Fig. 6. 30).

An olive tree pulls around it several limestone plates in a specific formation, a marble bench occasionally flanks the loose edges of the path, steps are carefully carved out of a slope and plated with marble, water conduits run along the fringes of the paths and merge into the greater area (Figs 6. 31-34).

These stonepaths, while penetrating the landscape, present a particular relationship with it. Conscious or not we may be of the history of the place, we nonetheless feel a unique relationship to the envioning landscape as Pikionis' stonepaths start telling several stories and triggering associations with their context.

The overall network of stonepaths is constructed in the most uncontentious way by adopting long used footpaths instead of designing new ones. Footpaths used for millenia are materialized in Pikionis' intervention acquiring an explicit identity. Paces of bygone ages are petrified to form the contemporary paths. Part of the promenade ascending to the acropolis hill is reinforced with concrete to provide suitable and enduring surface for vehicles, while the rest of the network is paved with several types of limestones.

The renovation of St. Dimitris Loumbardiari's church is a careful recreation. Congenial to the Byzantine spirit, the church is only partly rebuilt. The exterior surface is elaborated with marble and brick fragments, reverberating familiar symbols of the Christian religion. A simple narthex is added, while the stone paved precinct encompasses its perimetrical stone benches.

The refreshment place is half indoors and half outdoors, the two parts interwoven and open to each other. It provides verandahs, pergolas, gates and small niches on the walls to create an intimate space, while being in the open air. Timber constructions and stone articulated walls partly roofed with tiles form the main part of the building, while the rest of it remains unroofed facilitating stay in the open-air, of particular importance to Greek life throughout the ages due mainly to the fair weather but also to the extrovert Greek character (Figs 6. 35-36).

Experiencing Pikionis' intervention as a whole one gets the impression that despite all the transformations along the way and the local adaptations, the whole network presents a striking unity. The stonepaths, the small church, the refreshment place, the precinct and all the particular places spread in the whole area, are nothing but instances of an entity, variations of a theme which has to do with the particularity of the context.

There are several reasons for these thoughts as one experiences the place. It initially appears as a fragmented order of stones, as the glimpses of the Classical acropolis one can get through the olive-trees' leafage, as one ascends on the acropolis hill or any of the nearby ones. The texture of the walls, the geometry of the construction, but mainly a hidden common spirit behind, experienced yet concealed to positive analysis, leave little doubt that there is a common thread linking the diverse parts of the path network.

6. 3. 3. THE ATTIC LANDSCAPE AND ITS MATERIALS

One of the themes that one is continuously reminded of, while experiencing Pikionis' stonepaths, is the particular identity of the Attic landscape. The omnipresence and predominance of the limestone is one of its main characteristics. The Classical writer Xenophon wrote:

Attica has a plentiful supply of stones from which are made the fairest temples and altars and the more beautiful statues for the Gods. (Wycherley)

Indeed one hardly fails to notice that the Attica basin has been exceptionally favoured with limestone. Massive limestone beds extend from Pentelikon mountain to Piraeus and

further to the black limestone of Eleusis, flanked by Hymettos mountain. Pikionis in his intervention presents to us sort of micro^{geo}graphy of the Attic landscape. Stones along the paths emerge in the same way the acropolis rock emerged due to some geological process. According to Greek mythology, it was this very rock that Goddess Athena struck and an olive tree appeared, symbol of peace. All ^{the} history of Athens started with the Goddess she was named after (Fig. 6. 37).

Limestone formed the acropolis rock and provided the first shelters to neolithic dwellers. We can witness still today these caves on the north part of the rock. Caves, altars, sanctuaries, offering niches on the rock's surface span millenia of human life and provided shelter to Gods and humans long before the Classical times (Fig. 6. 38). It is as if the rich limestone beds, latent underground the Attican landscape, suddenly were fused together to form the Acropolis rock, an extreme manifestation of what otherwise is everywhere around. During the Mycaenean ages this limestone rock provided the foundation for the Kings' palaces and after these it witnessed the continuous presence of temples (Fig. 6. 39).

Pikionis uses grey limestone not in any specific pattern but rather as fragments of the acropolis rock, or even partial appearances of the underlying material, which spreads around the hills and then disappears in the foundation of the contemporary city. Pikionis arranges stones of all sizes, shapes and colours as floating mats and shifts them accordingly, taking into consideration the particularity of the contextual landscape, to form dense and loose parts. He leads the current somewhere or lets it free, responding to the situational characteristics (Fig. 6. 40).

Pikionis uses every stone with the loving care and dexterity that an archaeologist unearths fragile ruins and the result appears almost natural, as if Pikionis contribution was only to unearth what was there. Yet, it is evident that it is a contemporary work. Pikionis' intervention in its completeness and correspondence to contemporary needs and functions cannot but belong to the present.

At the utilitarian level, for instance, the paths network bridge the gap between the car dominated megalopolis and the steep rock hill of the acropolis. Inviting cars and coaches up to a certain point by reinforcing the pavement properly, Pikionis avoids a superficial polemics against the contemporary facility of the car, only to establish the merits of the walk on a higher level (Figs 6. 41-42).

Pikionis' paths form currents of stones which flow around the hills sweeping in their way the people walking on them. Sensitive to the presence even of the smallest bush or olive-tree, they shift and adapt gently their flow, while enhancing it. This stone-stream slows down at the precinct of the church and the area by the refreshment center. It

stagnates for a while to continue its flow afterwards towards the nearby hills. The acropolis rock completes this metaphorical image. It can be the only possible source of these streams which overflow to create ramps, steps, benches or even rising to articulate a building (Fig. 6. 43).

Scattered amid the grey limestone paths that environ the acropolis and the nearby hills, pieces of white marble appear gradually. White Pentelic marble, a kind of limestone itself, in Pikionis' words "miraculously metamorphosed by titanic heat and pressure into its characteristic crystalline structure", epitomises all sorts of limestones. Pure, white and crystal-like clear.

Transparent opaqueness is not an oxymorous characterization for the Pentelic marble. It describes it best since it allows sunlight to pass through only to keep it inside. It was in fact this material, a piece of marble lying in the mud, that stimulated Pikionis to study the Attic landscape. In the stonepaths around the acropolis he uses it in the same way, as a jewel in the grey limestone context; emerging *in passim* and waiting to be discovered (Fig. 6. 44).

Pikionis spares the white marble for geometric patterns that are literally thrown in front of our eyes, as we look down, while ascending to the hills. Somehow, marble pieces are to their grey context, what Classical temples are to the rock. The same material, white marble, was used for what was to epitomise Greek architecture i.e. the Parthenon and the other temples on the acropolis hill, substituting earlier timber, clay and porous^{-stone} structures.

The 'free flowing' grey limestones relate to the amorphous rock in the same way; marble geometric patterns, emerging through the grey canvas, relate to the equally ordered temples. What is needed for these relations to be attributed, is the human presence and participation in its physical and spiritual sense.

Speaking of materials we can also notice how Pikionis is able to use brick as well as limestone. In the small church of Loumbardiaris, brick and stone are juxtaposed while participating in the overall synthesis (Fig. 6. 45). Mycaenean tiles, archaic and classical pottery, sun-dry clay as the basic material of the first temples and the dominant one in domestic architecture and Byzantine tiles, form the quarry of Greek history for Pikionis' materials.

A wooden *propylon* marks the threshold between the promenade to Philoppapos hill and the precinct defined by the church and the refreshment place (Figs 6. 47-48). Tree trunks are used to construct a *pergola*, a small garden and fences here and there.

In the light of these simple structures the whole intervention abandons for a while the Classical era to enter the timeless vernacular realm. The stonepaths now associate with stone yards throughout Greece or even the cobble yards of the Greek islands. And the geometric patterns happily accompany the traditional pebble patterns. Also, this propylon could easily be considered to imitate the Mycenaean timber colonades and later the timber portico of the first temples, forerunners of their Classical petrification in white marble.

Pikionis manages to treat all materials with equal respect, but establishes a hierarchy among them by appropriating a situational logic in parallel with an overall subtle ordering. He carefully fuses materials together in an ordered way but doing justice to them. We do not feel these materials and the constructions as imposed on the landscape. They never acquire more emphasis than a tree or a cluster of bushes.

6. 3. 4. MEANINGFUL PATTERNS

Pikionis' stonepaths alternatively converge to a geometric formation and diverge to a free flow of stones again (fig. 6.49). This dialectics of order and disorder penetrates the whole architectonic intervention and deserves our attention.

As we walk along, fragments of white marble in geometric patterns appear almost accidentally. Any sort of rhetoric ordering or ^amere utilitarian one is absent; yet we cannot speak of haphazard disposition. An ambiguity is created, but not a disturbing one because it is meaningful at every stage of interpretation, despite the fact that it defies complete analysis. We are happy to encounter a square piece of marble amid broken limestone. We are not lost in a chaotic assembly of stones. We start feeling orientated in space, able to distinguish between different parts of the path network. We feel content with the individual marble presence amid a mass of stones and this leads us to realize the particularity of every single stone. We pass by a specific formation only to encounter another one further on. We evaluate every stone, we acknowledge the particularity of each one and the way they all participate in each pattern.

Straight lines, realised in marble pieces, contrast to surrounding natural forms. In this sense the Classical temples appear something completely different from their natural environment. Their pure geometric forms complete the long process of their evolution from natural forms, yet these forms defy natural lines (Figs 6. 49-50).

Parthenon becomes meaningful as the epitome of human creation, the other being the natural. Acknowledging its origins in the Mycenaean *megaron* and the Doric tradition, it marks a decisive break from them. Tree trunks, used for all sorts of buildings throughout Greek history, have been perfected in the exquisite geometry of the fluted columns and

marble slates in perfect orthogonal shape have substituted the sun-dried tiles.

In Parthenon we witness the epitome of human creation being offered as a God's house. It clearly indicates that Classical Greeks believed in Gods, but also a belief in their own ability to create. Parthenon stands as man's greatest contribution to nature, as something that nature cannot create, or at least it can only do it in the human mind.

Time, in nature's service, tends to 'naturalize' everything and Parthenon defies that. Still today the brightness of its columns and the acuteness of its angles resist the natural process of decay and the historical vicissitudes. Parthenon defies even the nature of human vision. It seems that 'optical illusion', as for instance when we see straight lines as curved and parallel lines as diverging, is masterly anticipated and compensated. Optical refinement, that is, slight curvature in all the architectural elements, resulted in a perfect appearance of a geometric edifice, unlike any natural creation. One could go as far as to understand Parthenon as materialized abstraction and petrified perfection.

The way things appear is of seminal importance to understand the development of Classical Greek architecture, as well as Pikionis' fiddling with detailed construction. The glaring sun of the South, the Greek light penetrates everything exposing every minute feature of the landscape so that to be seen. The Greek writer P. Giannopoulos said of the Greek light:

...clarity is the power of light. The only regulator of the arts is how something is seen. It is seen, hence it is possible to refine it infinitely. Here is the necessity of detail. It is seen, hence every excessive protuberance will be disturbing. Here is the necessity for lack of throng, superfluity, exuberance. (P. Giannopoulos, The Greek Line)

Apollo, the shining one, was the God of the arts and the human intellect; and light, etymologically related to how something appears, was the more important factor in every work of art. When the Classical Athenians were building their temples they attempted to bring to light the quintessence, the permanent principles of nature (Fig. 6. 51).

Under the same Attic light and moulded into the same bare and austere landscape, Pikionis interprets the marble sculpture of the Classical temples in a 2-D representational mosaic. Nature again is concealed underground and only some partial appearances remind us of its overt Classical manifestation. Pikionis, in the way he constructs his stonepaths, is equally scenographic with the temples, in the sense that takes great care how things appear. Different limestone colours and the juxtaposition of grey limestone and white marble in

particular, allow him to play with light and shade in a petrified form (Figs 6. 52-53). The third dimension is found in the olive-trees, the bushes and the people who enliven it. If Parthenon is a complete and perfect creation in itself, Pikionis's paths find their completion in contemporary life.

It is no accident that the Athenian acropolis, the realm of perfection, was the Gods' realm, and the Athenians the imperfect mortals, but worthy of these Gods. The ideal Classical temple however was not to abolish nature or even conquer her. In fact it is nature in the *natura naturans* analogy i.e. nature as principles of creation, that provided the archetype for the Classical temple and it is in this sense that it is a tribute to her, while complementing her at the same time. Classical forms are ransomed from the appearance of nature.

Nature is subordinated to the austerity of geometrical composition. If nature was to be found everywhere in the Attic landscape in the trees, the stones, in the living organisms, the Classical Athenians had managed to create her archetype as well, her principles and her life power.

The Classical order reverberates in Pikionis' geometric compositions, which constitute a sort of dynamic field attracting around them the adjacent context, while being carried away in its flux.

6. 3. 5. THE WALK AND THE WAY

Improving the landscape around the acropolis and the nearby hills, is not Pikionis' only purpose. The walk itself, as the way to them, is treated as being more important. A walk in its utilitarian, recreational or spiritual sense is what Pikionis is after. The paths are utilitarian but not the shortest possible, they are recreational but not just for providing a solid ground for somebody who wants to breath fresh air in a natural environment. Pikionis intends to stimulate various associations, to appeal to the walker in a wholistic sense.

It is a happy coincidence that approaching acropolis from the north, we follow a street called *theorias* (of theory), which gradually merges into Pikionis' path. Keeping its name from the Classical times it reminds us that *theoria* was the foundation for Classical Greece's intellectual achievement. Literally meaning observation, it originally implied looking at something, viewing, observing with the eyes and later came to mean observation of the mind, that is, contemplation, speculation, arriving at conceptual principles.

What constitutes Pikionis' intention cannot but remind us of the ancient *peripatos* (walk around), which went round the foothills of the acropolis from the archaic and even Mycaenean times, leading to the altars and the sanctuaries sculpted on the rock (Figs 6. 54-57). The contemporary stonepaths in the greater area around the acropolis, are saturated

with memories from these archaic pathways, the realm of Goddess Hecate who accepted offerings laid down on the paths, the Classical paved streets marked by stone boundaries, the so called *horos* (boundary), the public streets at the agora with *hermes* ^{the} (God Hermes' heads) alongside to protect the walkers.

Pikionis' path on the north of the acropolis hill, revives in contemporary terms the last 100m of the Panathenaic procession (Figs 6. 58-59). This procession started from Eleusis after the mysteries; it followed the sacred way through Kerameikos to end up on the acropolis at the Parthenon. The Classical Athenians chose the single theme of the Panathenaic procession to depict on all four sides of the Parthenon frieze. The Panathenaic procession epitomised for Classical Greeks all forms of ritual processions, a dominant ritual form throughout archaic Greek history.

Pikionis acknowledges all these dimensions and manifests them in his contemporary intervention which still carries a pious, religious significance. Contemporary experience of the stonepaths becomes 'a litany of pilgrims in some modern Panathenaia'. In these paths our 'pace changes, it becomes rhythm'. Millenia after the Classical processions, he manages to maintain the qualities of the forest path, the sacred way and the public street. Only he does that in a contemporary way and this, the main issue of this thesis, is the reason for dwelling in his intervention as a paradigmatic one.

6. 3. 6. ATTEMPTING A DIALECTICAL INTERPRETATION

6. 3. 6. 1. A MATTER OF HIERARCHY

Adopting the Classical era as our touchstone is an eclectic attitude. Yet, it is justified by the influence, the inspiration, the common origin and the reference point that the Classical times acquired at all subsequent stages of cultural development in Greece. Clearly Pikionis addresses the history of the Acropolis, of Athens, of Greece, of the Mediterranean and so forth, only he does that through a more evident reference to the Classical times. The same spirit prevailed to justify the puristic approach to the Classical culture against any other subsequent period, when the Classical temples were cleared from all subsequent accretions and modifications. Turkish buildings, the mosque, Frankish and vernacular houses, Byzantine churches, had to be removed to reveal the Classical remains which were valued most at the beginning of the 19th century. Pikionis despite the dominance of Classical references in his work, also recollects the monuments of all subsequent periods, which although materially absent on the Acropolis now, are acknowledged as equally participating to the history of the site, the history of Athens, the history of Greece and whatever more comprehensive context we can think of.

6. 3. 6. 2. THE ANCIENT AND THE MODERN

Pikionis' arrangement of the path-stones appear at first contrasting to the Classical temples. They appear fragmented in juxtaposition to the completeness of the Classical orders. Loose stones in search for a pattern, contrast vividly to the rigidity of Parthenon's Doric columns and this contrast gives a sort of contemporariness to Pikionis' intervention (Figs 6. 60-61).

Pikionis' paths are alive as part of the contemporary life. Although initially they present a borrowed from the Classical temples existence, they finally acquire their own identity. The Japanese architect K. Kurokawa wrote characteristically:

At the top of the ascent Pikionis' road comes to an end. When I looked back I saw a crowd of people unconsciously enjoying walking up the opposite slope to the acropolis. The Parthenon was displaying its usual cold shape and I thought that while the Parthenon may express the dead form of ancient Greece, Pikionis' road expresses the living space of present-day Greece.

In Kurokawa's terms the merits of Pikionis intervention are expressed as contrasting to the Classical context. A clarification is needed here. Pikionis' intervention is not just different from Parthenon. It is a complete contrast to its context and as such it is because of complete understanding that ^{it} is able to be meaningfully juxtaposed to it. A concrete-slab pavement, for instance, could also be considered as contrasting to the Classical context, but only in a trivial sense i.e. as something which is different, while it does not necessarily communicate with its context. Concrete slab pavement or uniform tiles could only be assertive interventions to the Classical context and an uncritical differentiation from it. They could only maintain a borrowed existence without offering or creating anything new.

Classical architecture was part and parcel of a philosophy encompassing all aspects of life and Pikionis wants to create something equivalent by seeking for the contemporary Greek identity. The same glaring sun and limestone is there. The harsh and austere landscape little differs from the Classical one and some of the olive trees are much closer to what for contemporary Greeks is a legend. The sacred precinct of Goddess Athena is still venerated. Yet, some contemporary connective bonds between all these elements are loose or missing.

What in previous chapters has been described as "third term" of dialectical interaction is evident here. These paths share a contemporaneity alongside their relation to the ancient temples. This fact enables a cross-fertilization where ancient life finds its way in

contemporary forms and present day life traces its roots in the traditional context. On one hand these paths are contemporary ones. Functional, practical, providing benches in the way and overall easy access to the Classical site (Fig. 6. 62). On the other hand by their distinct particularity, their identity in each part and as a whole against any other path ascribe to them the quality of being "diachronic vehicles" enabling them to constitute the link between the Classical and contemporary Greek spirit.

Approaching the Parthenon and the other Classical temples, we associate them with the paths as their physical continuation and extension to contemporary life. In fact we cannot avoid noticing that both share a quest for order and this constitutes the common ground for their dialogue. Pikionis in articulating his paths imitated the Classical temples in this sense, only to reveal through that the way in which they differ as well.

The contemporary-ancient dialogue becomes meaningful and fertile exactly as in the nearby Athenian Agora Socrates, Plato and Aristotle used dialogue to address all the philosophical issues. Philosophical dialogues reveal in written form what the temples also demonstrate. The Classical *metron*, the golden mean in all sizes and proportions, the notion of balance and harmony do not but manifest the continuous dialectics between the Dorian and the Ionian styles, the passive and the active architectural members, the natural and the man-made.

Pikionis intervention exaggerates what is latent and continues a dialogue, which has been going on since then. The supremacy of the human mind, the outmost creation of the individual who alongside its Gods, creates as well as continues the Gods' creation.

Classical Greece represents the transition of traditional societies to the modern situation. Originated in a religious society, they reached a point of humanising even their Gods, making them take part in everyday life. And these temples express exactly this fact; the perfect co-operation of Gods and humans, itself being a human creation for ^{the} Gods' sake. The existence of Gods through the human belief in them and the human existence as ^{the} Gods' creation- a perfect dialogue finding expression in a perfect manifestation. Hesiod in his Theogony had already referred that Gods and mortals sprang from the same source, and it is on the Athenian acropolis where the human mind coincides with its source. Even Plato's ideal temple of the ideal republic was visualized as the Parthenon. A society which reached the human ideal only at the price of losing it again afterwards, inviting and stimulating all subsequent generations to laboriously redeem it (Figs 6. 63-64).

In contrast to the Classical ideal, Pikionis juxtaposes a humble human creation, reassembling the fragments of the ideal in order to understand it properly through the filters of historical vicissitudes. Fragmented materials, fragmented patterns, fragmented images of

human and divine order. He carefully recomposes memories, material fragments, historical qualities and values and in this sense renders the Classical antiquity accessible, practically and essentially, literally and metaphorically, to contemporary society (Figs 6. 65-71).

Contemporary Athens being an accumulation of Greek citizens from all parts of continental and island parts-in juxtaposition to the citystates, although later democracy was extended towards allies from all Greece- finds its best contemporary architectonic expression in these paths which attempt above all a contemporary search for "Greekness". It is a happy coincidence that Anafiotika- an area in the northern part of the acropolis hill -is inhabited by immigrants from a remote Aegean island completing in this way the mosaic figure of diachronic Greekness. The Aegean element, source of the Classical tradition, redeemed in modern times.

Pikionis' stone-paved "currents" that stretch up to the acropolis and the nearby hills, express in the most profound way the contemporary situation. A current of contemporary Greek life made up from past materials and orders but fragmented and in flow. Geometric patterns, fragments of architectonic orders are literally emerging and submerging while we follow the current.

Are these fragments of materials, patterns and orders, to imply their lost order in a nostalgic sense, or are ^{they} there, perhaps, to manifest their innate potential towards another order (Figs 6. 72-74)? Pikionis does not provide answers; instead he renders meaningful the questions. If Classical architecture was an architecture for an age of perfection, Pikionis' paths is an architecture of the way. It is the architecture of the process. If Parthenon is a triumphant manifestation of the human enterprise, Pikionis' architecture emphasizes the way towards an end as more important. In the contemporary post-modern situation, devoid of any absolute truth and dogma, Pikionis clearly adopts a meditative standpoint but so inextricably connected to the Classical absolutism that it finally ends up by complementing it.

In contrast to contemporary ideals the Parthenon appears rigid, dominant and complete in itself as a spatial existence. As an ideal it defies growth and life. Contemporary qualities, as manifested in Pikionis' intervention, mix along with historic ones in a dynamic dialectic schema contextually meaningful at its every stage. This dialectic schema does not discriminate against the Classical or contemporary architecture. It acquires its dialectical existence simultaneously and pays tribute to both.

Classical architecture necessarily is projected into contemporary Athenian life and is evaluated according to contemporary values. Pikionis through his intervention only materializes this reality. In turn, it is always against a context that we evaluate our contemporary

achievements. Pikionis chooses the Classical architecture as his touchstone for his intervention in the vicinity of the acropolis, while the Byzantine and the vernacular elements predominate at Loumbardiariis complex (Figs 6. 75-76).

6. 3. 6. 3. THE CONTINUITY OF THE CONTEXT

Pikionis acknowledges all Greek history and in particular focusses on the Athenian one, but he establishes a hierarchy through a certain viewpoint in his attempt to conceive all Athenian history as a whole and to address what is lasting and true. This unification viewpoint for Pikionis is *arete*, virtue. David Holden wrote about this point:

... (Pikionis') creed is that good architecture grows more from virtue than from knowledge-which is why, he reflects, much of modern Athens is so bad. Virtue, he believes, resided in the ancient Greeks because they understood their own nature and its relationship to their land. Equally, it belongs now to the Greek peasant whose simple, traditional forms express by instinct the principles of modesty and proportion that the ancient made into a philosophy.

But Pikionis, in Holden's words, is neither an ancient nor a peasant himself. Pikionis is a seeker of virtue. He acknowledges a sort of timelessness in it and seeks it throughout Greek history. Many can criticize him for his eclecticism; hardly can anyone deny that eclecticism in general is unavoidable in any assessment of the past; few could suggest an acceptable alternative.

Pikionis conceives all phases of Greek history as instances of a coherent whole and critically injects to it contemporary life. Oneness, or unity, allows him to establish a continuity and a sense of place despite his temporary stepping out to interpret the context. Matisse once expressed this dialectic structure of artistic creation when he said:

...when painting an artist must be believing he is imitating nature but when he stands back to think, he must use abstraction.

Beyond historical limits Pikionis finds a common thread, what he coins as virtue, which allows him to follow it to the present. He finds the landscape as a manifestation of the mystery of matter, exactly as matter incorporating its principles and forces is moulding the landscape while being landscape itself. The same force which is concretized in the Classical temples, the Athenian democracy, the sounds of language, the hair of Zeus, the gown of the peasants, the Greek dances, the flute in the Doric columns and the *krotafos*, temple of Aeschylus (Figs 6. 77-78). Pikionis in compassion with nature feels the

opposites to interweave and create the one. And he strives to understand everything from the one.

The dialectics between the Dorian and Ionian traditions becomes now intelligibly resolved in the Classical temples. The Ionian element in Classical society recapitulated all the archaic cults of the feminine. The cult of Demeter relating to mother earth and the archaic deities of Persefoni, Gaia, Pandora, the myth of the Amazons are only a few examples of pre-Homeric Greek religions. The mild temperament of Asia and the fast growing landscape could not but shape the feminine Ionian thought. The Dorian conquerers stand on the opposite side, the masculine power and the philosophy of action.

The Classical statue of *kore*, always in elegant *peplos*, gown, manifests elegance and charm while the Classical statue of *kouros*, always nude, manifests strength, power and rigour (Figs 6. 79-82). In Goddess Athena we find the balance. A woman warrior, elegant but powerful as well. Dialectics of the opposites becomes the key issue to understand the Classical mind. Individuality finds its place along with society. It is no wonder that in Athens of the 6th century we find the first signed work of art, and individuality culminated later in rivalry in the arts, in the Olympic games, in politics and in philosophy. On the other hand democracy, equality under law. The *agora* becomes the place *par excellence* where dialogue takes place. In the Classical times Ionian thought is integrated with Dorian action and Ionian philosophy with politics. In the arts of the Classical times, the perfect relation of parts to the whole as subordination of the parts to the whole without losing their individuality, becomes reality.

Oneness, or unity, through abstraction and dialectics, characterizes any synthesis, any attempt towards balance and harmony. Unity between passive and active architectural members, characterizes the harmonious logic of construction. Unity between the Ionian symbolic imitation of nature, the stylistic depiction of its appearance and the Dorian abstraction, pure imitation and depiction of the essence of nature, characterizes Classical perfection (Figs 6. 83-86). Oneness between the individual and the society characterizes democracy. In this sense Pikionis attempts a synthesis in his interpretation of the past in order to attune his own creation to the existing unity and subsequently create a new one.

This oneness of the setting in the present, is what connects invisibly the levels of interpretation which support any joyful experience of the Athenian hills in the vicinity of the Classical acropolis.

6. 3. 6. 4. THE DIALECTICS OF DESTRUCTION AND CONSTRUCTION

Fragments of past orders becomes the only available material in Pikionis' hands and he carefully recycles them, making the best of all the associations and qualities that every piece of marble carries. He acts as a *bricoleur*, to use here Levi-Strauss' term. He collects diachronic fragments, pieces of past structures to articulate his own. Destruction, caused by historical vicissitudes and aging, ends up to provide a basis upon which Pikionis erects a contemporary architectonic creation (Fig. 6. 87).

Eclecticism thus presents a double face; evaluation of some instances of the past at the expense of others. We mentioned already how Frankish towers, Turkish accretions along with earlier Hellenistic and Roman strata, had to be sacrificed for the sake of the Classical temples. Hardly can anyone argue against this eclecticism and still fewer can deny the double face of eclecticism, and that eclecticism is intervention. Before Pikionis' landscaping, utilitarian concrete pavement provided access to the Acropolis and still today a light concrete band runs through the temples. Pikionis left the latter as its neutral appearance accentuated the importance of the temples (Figs 6. 63-64). The path network around the hill, however, was too neutral and passive a tribute to the Classical times. It only respected an antiquated monument and not an alive part of contemporary life in Athens. Pikionis rejected this utilitarian or passive approach and decided to create a contemporary response, an active acknowledgement of the Classical values. The earlier concrete path was either too passive or too assertive to communicate and establish a dialogue with the history of the site.

6. 3. 6. 5. PERMANENT AND EPHEMERAL QUALITIES

Pikionis does not limit his horizons by considering the classical temple alone as empty form. Instead, he goes ^{on} to understand the life process behind the Classical architecture. He goes beyond that to understand the Attic landscape, the rock of the acropolis, the geometry of nature, what happened to the limestone from its fiery liquid state to the solid rigidity of its present rocky condition (Fig. 6. 51). In fact he never stops philosophizing, enquiring about the nature of things with nature considered as in the *natura naturans* analogy, that is nature as what appears to be as well as the forces which create, transform and destroy things. He clearly continues the way of the early Ionian philosophers, their inquisitive search of nature in its forces. A story is told about Pikionis' reaction when a stone in a part of the whole intervention broke after laborious fiddling. Pikionis was delighted and declared that his path should follow the jaggedness of the rock.

Classical architecture clearly indicates the ability of Classical Greeks at geometrical

perfection. Geometry was used as a unifying conceptual system towards abstraction and oneness beyond the diversity of the manifestation of forms. Geometry as the power of abstraction, and not as sterile symmetry or empty patterns, served the Classical Greeks to achieve order. Yet, they went beyond that in creating also something alive far from the sterility of a dead symmetry, or any patterned system. Geometry, although a magnificent tool, was not considered as a true source of creation. Geometry as an end could not achieve a perfection to last. It remained a tool, a means to achieve something beyond that, perfection.

Pikionis in his intervention clearly "historicizes" geometry as a conceptual system, a tool of another era, to reach its deepest essence and its ultimate purpose, the strife for order. Dealing with geometrical patterns in passim, he renders geometry a relative tool in relation to the timeless quality of the human quest for order, whatever that order could be at every time and however it can be expressed.

Pikionis' intervention shares this striving for perfection only in another sense. In juxtaposition to measurable and quantifiable geometry he places every stone in symbolic, almost natural formations. He creates an equally disciplined order, as every artistic creation should do, only his order is of another kind subtly related to the Classical one. Ancient temples, or rather Classical from the time of their early formation and their origins amid forrests and natural landscapes, created an order of different kind to the natural one around. Pikionis in his intervention redeems the natural one in contemporary terms. Nature and man once again need to be united at least for the few hundred metres that the path network covers. The fate of humanity to find and create order is once again here celebrated. The marble pieces of the Classical era, once in order, falling subsequently apart only to be reassembled in another order in Pikionis intervention.

Should he attempt to create a strict geometric pattern throughout, it would belong, at its best, to another era. It could not be perceived in the process of walking in the sense the free standing Classical temples can. More, geometry is not the order of our times. The Parthenon was to be one, stable, perfect geometric piece of sculpture, to be seen from every point in the Athenian Agora. It was meant to be the immutable amid an ever changing life process taking place in its vicinity. Today, things have changed. Pikionis strives for something equivalent. He attempts to create something in analogy and he imitates and he contrasts to the context in his attempt to change it in a contemporary way, while keeping what is still significant and alive.

His prime concern is to articulate in architectural terms what still is alive of the Classical temples, the Hellenistic agora and the Byzantine monuments, to mention only some of

Pikionis' quarries of reference. The fusion of references he attempts is one of his age and although he does not intend to be assertive and monumental, he creates qualities and facilitates the creation of others through everyday life, which will remain there and will characterize the place as time passes by. Reaching the refreshment place, the most contemporary part of the whole composition, we have the best view of the acropolis.

Pikionis' intervention attunes us to its ultimate dialectics between the new and the old. Contemporary life is defined at the intersection, or the fusion, of both the ancient and the modern, the humble and the ideal, the everyday and the timeless, the human and the divine. Pikionis' intervention is neither too servile to the ancient, nor too assertive of the new. He communicates with the the past and continuous it in the present. Contemporary life inevitably is revealed as an allegory of the way, the middle path between Classical idealism and vernacular realism. The virtue of the Classical period allows Pikionis to think of the Classical culture as vernacular; and the timelessness of the vernacular allows him to think of it as Classical (Fig. 6. 88). As we walk along the paths on the hills around the acropolis we become aware of the contemporary qualities of life along with its timeless ones. After all, if contemporary life is to share anything at all with that of the Classical times, it is that life always existed between Eleusis and Parthenon; Eleusinian mysteries symbolizing human life as a continuous process of death and recreation and the Parthenon symbolizing the permanency of the ideal.

6. 3. 7. CONCLUDING REMARKS

Pikionis' paths follow obediently the curves and irregularities of the ground. They are "natural", naive, humble and anonymous. Yet, they respect the characteristics of each place. Although a common order is shared, there is no repetition. In contrast to the assertive character of the Classical temples, Pikionis' paths are closer to the vernacular spirit. Parthenon's base emerges out of the rock as the only horizontal line in the landscape. It is perfectly geometrical, yet it is not symmetrical and each column participates to the temple it belongs to in its own way. No two columns are exactly the same in that the position of each dictates its particular optical refinements. What is more important, order for the Classical Athenians was a joint enterprise with their Gods.

Pikionis shares the religious character of the place, but clearly in his approach the intellectual quest for order, the human ideal, has been substituted with faith. It is a pious approach to what he acknowledges as a perennial Greek virtue, as it is expressed in the unpretentious buildings of vernacular Greek settlements. In discovering this latent thread spanning the whole of Greek history, he is able to contribute to the narrative identity of the place.

At the end Pikionis' paths remain open to interpretation. Their identity swinging between the ancient and the modern, enhance a wide spectrum of cultural significance and anticipate future interpretation, evaluation and intervention. The final "aporia" remains unsolved; are these paths foundations for a forthcoming new order or, perhaps, remains of an old one?

6. 4. DISCUSSION - INTERPRETATION AS PARTICIPATION

In the previous examples we attempted to articulate an interpretive framework likely to illustrate their potential as successful interventions in their context. Rossi's intervention in Venice and Pikionis' at the Acropolis of Athens have been suggested as indicative, although in exaggeration, of what seems to be the case in most situations, where the relation of the new to the old is at stake.

Pikionis' architectonic intervention constitutes a realm of concrete experience and as such, by definition, defies any exhaustive interpretation, while it can sustain several interpretations relating to the context. Interpretation is here used not as some sophisticated, intellectual activity, but as the unavoidable outcome of our resonance with what we experience and the need to make intelligible sense of it. What is attempted here is a personal fusion, yet attempting to describe and provide the ground for a web of possible legitimate (contextually significant) interpretations. Thus, interpretation neither exhausts nor restrains various associations, allusions and evocations, people can identify with. Yet, it provides a common ground to interrelate them. Pikionis' landscaping appeals to us directly, as a whole exactly because it is not exhausted in sterile rhetoric but engages instead in a lasting dialogue with its precursors at the same setting and mainly with the epitome of them, the Classical architecture.

Rossi, in his *teatro*, attempts to render an abstraction of Venice, out of an apparent multiplicity of architectural idioms. He attempts to find the converging point amid the multifarious formal diversity of the Venetian context and follows a reductionist approach to distill out of a rich vocabulary what is of importance today. He imitates Venice in order to keep her identity, while he critically opposes what is there in order to manifest what is alive today. Through his *teatro* the whole history of Venice is evoked, while all the historical diversity finds its to the present. Rossi's *teatro* is emblematic, formally and functionally alike of the Venetian identity, while encompassing its diverse facets.

Pikionis faces, perhaps, the opposite problem from Rossi's. He considers the Classical temples as the archetype and the ideal of all Greek culture and attempts to render the

Classical culture apprehensive in contemporary terms. Pikionis takes his commission to redesign the access to the Acropolis and the nearby hills as a challenge to provide access to them in a metaphorical sense as well. He renders the Classical culture as part of the Greek vernacular tradition and this allows him to recompose the mosaic of Greekness, as it emerges diachronically. Pikionis intervention is a humble approach to the Classical spirit and its extension into the present, which is what a path to the Acropolis should be.

In both attempts we come to assess their relation to their contexts in terms of imitation and contrast. Through these concepts we come to realize the identity of a context behind its apparent diversity and, conversely, the potentiality of identity for diversification. Both cases illustrate, perhaps in exaggeration, the real problems concerning the relation of new to the old in the man-made environment; the constant oscillation between maintaining the identity of a setting while keeping it alive by formal diversification, as the socio-cultural entity changes.

In both examples interpretation occurred as a necessary consequence of our participation and involvement with what is experienced. Interpretation accompanies and attempts to reason about some of our feelings, while it anticipates and enhances others. In each of the above examined cases interpretation took place on a diversity of levels, depending upon the entities that could be discerned or designated for each case and their actual significance in time. These considerations are important, since they manifest the ways in which people make sense of the built environment they live in and understand architectural change.

In other words the structure of each intervention emerged out of the particular and idiosyncratic character of each case. The landscape, the materials, the geometrical patterns and the particularity of the formation for the path network, seemed to be appropriate to consider. In Rossi's *teatro* the volumetric configuration, the way of construction as a ready made object, and its particular function, seemed to characterize it best. These levels of interpretation and their outcome were considered, in particular, through the polarities introduced in Chapter Four. What is more important in both cases, is that new architecture provided the terms for its experience, in its context, and the criteria for its interpretation and evaluation.

No blueprint for interpretation could do justice to the particularity of each case. So, every interpretation is expected to be subjective, depending on the experiencer, that is, his state of mind, his familiarity with the place and even his knowledge of the cultural history of the place, where new architecture is grafted on. In Chapter Four we described the anticipated experiencer as "ideal", that is, with full knowledge of the setting, where new architecture relates to. However fictional this assumption appears to be, it does not seem to

impair the validity of our theoretical framework, as far as different interpretations *can be interrelated* as aspects of a coherent whole which invites many readings, while excluding arbitrariness. In Pikionis' intervention, for instance, it is not a problem if somebody identifies more with the Byzantine elements, the vernacular, or the Classical ones. In fact, it is inevitable that different people will identify with different aspects of the paths. Yet, it is obvious that these paths can hardly facilitate and legitimize inappropriate interpretations based on irrelevant ideas. For example, despite the influence that Japanese architecture and Japanese gardens had on Pikionis, there is little doubt that his architecture could not be thought in a Japanese context where, for one reason, specific symbolism and spiritual emptiness should predominate. Pikionis' work instead favours the intellectual abstraction and the humble simplicity of Greek architecture.

The interpretation process, as described above, could be characterized as playful. As with play, it acquires its existence through human participation. New architecture in this sense never emerges in a definite and complete sense, but is rather continuously revealed. In both cases of new architecture in historic context, several contextual interpretations of the new architecture contribute towards a unity of the context, because - as legitimate interpretations - they reveal several aspects of it. An overall order is suggested, which leads, by virtue of being the common denominator, from one aspect to another. Coherence between contextual associations, allusions and evocations in our interpretation, interweaves contextual references so that the quality of a place can unfold continuously, while being illuminated from different angles.

CHAPTER SEVEN

DIALECTICAL HERMENEUTICS AS A VALUE JUDGEMENT THEORY

7. 1. INTRODUCTION

Dialectical hermeneutics, as developed so far in this study, is not a neutral theory, i.e. capable only of describing the relations between old and new architecture. It can also judge the appropriateness of new architecture by measuring the comprehensiveness of its dialectical relation to its context.

So far we have given emphasis to the continuity of the interpretation, which binds together new and old architecture in a setting. Continuity within the interpretation process can adequately address the wholistic nature of architectural novelty, which relates to a setting as a whole at several levels and participates in the process for its development. This continuity evolves from one level of significance to another with no specific hierarchy followed in its succession. One aspect of a new building *vis a vis* its context and vice versa does not lead to another in any deterministic way, but rather in a ludic one. Continuity is not treated as an *a posteriori* concept used to describe the interpretation process. It is rather an inherent potential of it. So, the transition from one level of interpretation to another relates more to the creativity of new architecture in a setting, because of its appropriateness in it, rather than to any structuralistic schema.

Play, considered in its philosophical dimensions, is here employed to describe, in an analogical sense, the mode in which an appropriate novelty is engaged dialectically with the setting it is grafted into. Consequently, it can also be used as an evaluation criterion for new architecture in old settings. Consequently, the problem of reliable criteria for the evaluation of new architecture in existing settings arises.

In the second part we examine the possibility of an ultimate goal, or rather the potential of the interpretation process *qua ludic*, to guide interpretation and inform the evaluation of new architecture in old settings.

7. 2. DIALECTIC ARCHITECTURAL HERMENEUTICS AS PLAY

The dialectic process which characterizes the struggle of the opposites in contextual architectonic interpretation and the overall interaction between old and new architecture, can be described as play (1). Inherent potential, creativity and a evolutionary character, allow for the interpretation process relating new and old architecture to be conceptualized, in an analogical sense, as play. The importance of the interpretation process over each of its diverse levels of realization also allows for this analogy. Moreover, this analogy is further reinforced by the fact that the multiplicity of interpretations, succeed one another not in any methodic, predetermined order but they rather follow a playful transition from one level to another. Play describes both the indeterminacy in the struggle of the opposites at every particular level, the state of *aporia*, and the transition from one level to another in the interpretation process.

The notion of play permeates the whole of this study as it is intrinsically related to the dialectics of the opposites (2). Some of its characteristics will illustrate further its relevance to the architectural issues discussed here.

The flow that characterizes the interpretative process of new architecture *vis a vis* its context, as with play, is more important than some definite end or even the interpreter. One interpretation of the rapport between old and new architecture evokes or suggests another and the interpreter is just the means to reveal and maintain that process. Whatever the starting point of the interpretation process, it subsequently works in such a way, in contextual terms, so that at every level it illuminates, suggests and reveals contextual dimensions, as it unfolds indefinitely. Again the life of the setting, if new architecture in it enhances it, is the power behind the unity between different interpretations and their interplay. As we have already mentioned elsewhere (Chapter Five) , Heidegger has described this indefinite process of understanding and interpretation as a circular process, which nevertheless is ontologically positive. This process is treated here in the same sense. Indefinite, yet ontologically significant in its manifestations.

Play binds successive wholistic interpretations while on another level it binds all the interpretation process to the object of interpretation and the interpreter. The notion of play also suggests, in an analogical sense, the creation of a symbolic field meaningful in contextual terms instead of any definite and deterministic association. It expresses best the symbolic ambiguity which characterizes the interpretation process itself.

Another reason that allows for the interpretation process to be theorized in analogy to play, is its lack of some specific goal. In other words the importance of the process over its particular instances, manifested as different levels of interpretation, renders^{it} legitimate for

the interpretation process to be theorized as play along with the playful interchange of the opposing facets at various levels. Furthermore, creativity is here considered as the main characteristic of play and it is in this sense according to Gadamer that Plato, Kant and Schiller conceived aesthetics in terms of play, the other way being that of a *spoude*, an analytical scientific investigation (3).

Gadamer also conceptualizes the notion of play as the phenomenological notion *par excellence*, to describe the hermeneutical process. For Gadamer, the concept of play provides an alternative to ^{the} Cartesian model towards "objective" knowledge. In aesthetic understanding in particular the notion of play is best equipped to address the kind of knowledge and the kind of truth that is transmitted, and which no scientific method can do justice to.

Despite the subjectivity in Schiller's theorization, play still can be the most adequate notion to address the ontology of aesthetic experience i.e. the experience of art as being. What is more important, despite the fact that play is played because it is not serious, from the player's point of view, play is not defined negatively i.e. as the opposite of seriousness. Play has its own ontological status and as such it is serious as well although in another sense from seriousness. It is serious, yet aimless, without a definite purpose. In Gadamer's ontological conceptualization of art, play occupies a central position (4). Attitudes to play, Gadamer argues, are subjective but play itself isn't. As he puts it:

If, in connection with the experience of art, we speak of play, this refers neither to the attitude nor even to the creator or of those enjoying the work of art, not to the freedom of a subjectivity expressed in play, but to the mode of being of the work of art itself. (5)

Play serves the best model for describing the in-between position of artistic creation where ambiguity and *aporia* constitutes its power and not the lack of it. It describes better than any analytic method the creativity in the rivalry and the struggle of the opposites.

Formal logic, working within the limits of a binary framework i.e. either a thing is or is not something, cannot acknowledge the autonomy of the several levels of meaning where despite the indeterminacy of the dialectic ludic process, meaning is ascribed. It cannot adequately address the *aporia*, the stage of ambiguity which cannot be reduced to a binary level. An ever changing *aporia*, is the creative source for the multifaced interpretation process, in order to address the ever changing contextual frames of reference. T.S. Eliot had spoken of many faces of a poem and William Empson in his study "seven types of ambiguity" has argued about the creativity of ambiguity and its potentiality to generate values (6).

Several other characteristics of play are of major importance to our study. For instance, the quality of flow i.e the quality of successive transformations characterizing the process of play, describes best the transition from one level of interpretation to another. Play depends on the player, and following our analogy, interpretation can occur in indefinite ways, legitimate, yet always unavoidably subjective.

For instance, Rossi's *teatro* is susceptible to several interpretations in relation to its context. Some people may start understanding it from its festive character and see it within the Venetian tradition of festivals. Others may start from its fragile lifetime and associate it with the evasive face of Venice. To others its austere, centralized conception may represent an abstract configuration of the Renaissance, Byzantine and Baroque temples of the Venetian setting. Yet, these particular instances, among others, can always be interrelated within an interpretative process. In other words whatever the starting point for the interpretation, an indefinite dialectic process will evolve.

These characteristics of the interpretation process are quite compatible with our treatment of human experience as open, without a specific purpose for definite knowledge. Gadamer argues even that:

The nature of experience is conceived in terms of that which goes beyond it; for experience itself can never be science. It is in absolute antithesis to knowledge and to that kind of instruction that follows from general theoretical or technical knowledge. The truth of experience always contains an orientation towards new experience. (7)

And further:

The dialectic of experience has its own fulfilment not in definite knowledge, but in that openness to experience that is encouraged by experience itself. (8)

Following Gadamer, we think that play is closer to truth, whatever truth might be, than any analytical method, which necessarily legitimizes only what is not ambiguous. We have to indicate the terms under which play can be established but finally interpretation is a ludic process which although susceptible of framing, never allows its outcome to be determined. In Gadamer's terms:

As the play is ambiguous, it can have its effect, which cannot be predicted, only in being played. It is not its nature to be an instrument of masked goals that only have to be unmasked for it to be understood, but it remains, as an artistic

play, in an indissoluble ambiguity. The occasionality it contains is not something pre-given through which alone everything acquires its true significance but, on the contrary, it is the work itself, whose expressive power is filled out in this, as in every occasion. (9)

Unlike hermeneutical theories focusing upon the work of art and its creator relationships, the psycho-social data relating to the time of its creation and appreciation, or even centering upon the autonomy of the work of art, or upon the reader-interpreter relationship ("rezeptiontheorie"), we focus upon the dialectic interpretative process itself. This process, play-like, engages reader and work of art in a communicative basis where both participate, interact and change. The work of art conditions the reader and the reader in turn is projected upon the work of art. This play is, of course, necessarily "coloured" by the social characteristics of both the reader and the work of art, but nevertheless it retains its primacy over each one of them. In this way we not only understand, but we also formulate our approach towards its renewal. Thus, not only passive interpretation of a specific context occurs, but its elucidation in the present perspective, whether this is for the sake of the experience or to guide new architecture. Finally, interpretation of the relation between new and old, conceived as play ends up by changing a setting and the experiencer of the setting himself.

7. 3. NEW ARCHITECTURE AS CREATIVE INTERVENTION: OPENNESS TO CONTEXTUAL INTERPRETATIONS AS A CRITERION FOR AESTHETIC EVALUATION

If the interpretation process *qua* ludic has no ultimate goal, there arises the problem of reliable criteria for the evaluation of architectonic interventions in existing settings. In an ideal, fictional situation new architecture should be rendered contextually meaningful at all levels. In reality, the more open the process of interpretation can be, the more likely it is to address the context as a whole. It is here argued that the very indefiniteness of the interpretative process constitutes its potentiality (10).

If new architecture in a given setting is infinitely meaningful in its socio-cultural context, then it really addresses and renews this setting as a whole. In this sense, openness to interpretations in an architectonic intervention is a measure of its validity (11).

The dialectics of the opposites, as revealed through the imitation/contrast dialectics between new architecture and its context, create a dynamic field able to sustain every contextual interpretation, if new architecture is appropriate. New architecture addresses its

context as a whole beyond the diverse levels at which the ludic interpretative process manifests itself. The concept of play determines more than anything else the essence, the *katholou* (entireness) and the true nature of a setting, the diverse levels or aspects of which are only representations of its being (12).

Every setting is characterized by a uniqueness in reference to every other setting, while it is also characterised by the interaction between identity and difference in itself. The ludic hermeneutical process in this sense attempts to understand and relate to the unity of this setting.

The spirituality of a given setting, its *genius loci* or its *katholou*, account for its being manifested in several forms. It is one thing, an entity and our diverse interpretations are only aspects, dimensions and manifestation. It is a multiplicity generated by and aiming at the one. As Mondrian expressed it:

A work of art is a monument able to play games with the masses. (13)

Only creative, i.e. appropriate, architectural intervention can give the power for the continuity amid various interpretations, allowing the transition from one level to another in our understanding process, generating, so to speak, contextual interpretations.

We have showed in Chapter Six how interpretation can evolve from one level of interpretation to another. The materials, the construction technique, the use, and the symbolic significance were seen as aspects through which we could assess the relation between new and old architecture. We have also examined in both Rossi's and Pikionis' interventions how one aspect relates to others.

In less successful examples the interpretative process cannot be sustained. The ludic dialectics collapse and finally new architecture relates only to itself. Some new buildings intended to relate to their surroundings manage only to keep the streetline, the texture, the materials or some blueprint morphology. They attempt to create a link with their context but they finally fail if they are limited in one or two aspects only and these not necessarily the most important. Often their dialogue is exhausted after a few gimmicks and they can only^{be} interpreted to be self-referential.

The new building in Fig. 7. 1 clearly attempts to relate to its surroundings. It contrasts to the old buildings by a striking difference in the materials used for its construction and the construction techniques employed. The concrete slabs contrast to the timber frame, while only the decorative aspects of the old construction techniques are imitated. In contrast to the old, the new building hides its structural articulation. Apart from these aspects

the new building seems "content" with this sort of superficial association only. It exhausts itself in a brief comment of its context and apart from it it can express no real engagement with it. The only thing that makes it belong there is an a-critical, if not indifferent, commentary to a past morphology. It reverses the significance of the half-timbered Mediaeval buildings but ~~does not clarify~~ the purpose of this novelty. Does the new building express anything more except, perhaps, ^{than} that the present is different - no matter in what sense - to Mediaeval times?

The new building in Fig. 7. 2 attempts to create a link with the historic centre of Amsterdam by keeping up with the height of the adjacent buildings. It can express nothing more than a functional building, reluctantly subdued to the Building Regulations. In other words, it clearly expresses a forced co-habitation with a ^{context} otherwise irrelevant to it. Although intended to relate, it finally expresses a fragmented relation.

The new building in Matignon street in Paris, Figs 7. 3-4, "attempts" to incorporate organically like fragments of the facade and some parts of the interior walls of the old building, which was demolished to give its place to the new one. The morphology of the old building is re-composed partly by the insertion of stones from the old building and partly by tracing its image in glass. The new facade is like a cubistic expression of the already existing materials and forms. The result is better than, for instance, copying the old building, by using the same materials or the same morphology or keeping the old facade. In the way it is this new building is more responsive to the present use, materials and taste. Apart from this morphological play in the facade and in two interior walls, the composition of the new building has nothing to do with its context. The function of an office building might be the same worldwide but it calls for a different way if it is to be more than a purely utilitarian shell. Such a fashionably selective attitude towards the past express only the appreciation of the past as "retro" or kitch.

The new building in Figs 7. 5-6 in Ravenna, is more appropriate to its context than the previous examples. Restoration of part of the old facade and its integration into the new building has been done in a more creative way. The old building is used in the new synthesis not only as a decorative element, as was the case before, but as an integral part of the whole building. The old part is used not because of its historic significance alone, but as materials, as colours and as morphological articulation capable of being incorporated into the new building. The building as a whole relates to its context from a specific standpoint. It imitates in some ways aspects of its context, it contrasts to others but never fails to be itself and express to relate to whatever characterizes its context. The structural articulation of the new building reverberates in brown aluminium and brown tinted glass the arch articulation of the old building, the colours of the surrounding buildings. The light relief on

the facade expresses an articulation of the texture responsive to the nearby neo-Romanesque and Byzantine churches and buildings.

The new department store in Stuttgart, Fig. 7. 7, is intended to relate to its context by copying the gable roofs of the nearby Gothic buildings. This intention to relate clearly results in bad mimicry, which cannot even present the sculptural qualities of the gables it copies, not to mention concerns about the meaning, the relation to materials and so forth.

The new extension of Prado museum in Madrid, Fig. 7. 8, expresses a more sincere intention to relate primarily to the old museum and secondarily to Madrid. It contrasts to the old building in terms of materials but it manages to keep with vertical emphasis a very delicate articulation.

Finally, a multi-storey garage building in Heidelberg, Fig. 7. 9, totally betrays its function as a garage in order to keep up at the visual only level with the gables of the surrounding Mediaeval houses. Its volumetric articulation expresses an empty gesture to the scale and texture of its context. Again it expresses a forced relationship between aspects of the setting it intends to imitate, such as degraded volumetric configuration and gables. Needless to say that in cases like these, where imitation is so superficial, there is no intention to critically contrast to the architecture of the past. Whatever is interpreted as contrast, for instance in this case, materials, texture, function and so forth, is only an unthought meaningless juxtaposition.

The degree of openness to contextual interpretation, in evaluating new architecture *vis a vis* its context, can best be assessed in experiencing new architecture and its context. Any evaluation on visual grounds only is doomed to be partial and non-representative. As we will discuss in the following pages, experience of new architecture can be broken down to several aspects but the assemblage^{of} these aspects cannot do justice to the wholistic nature of experience. Yet, it is also important, perhaps more so, to see how an interpretative process can work for the evaluation of new architecture at the project stage. Equally with architecture as a finished edifice, a project can be subjected to evaluation and its performance assessed, even at a provisional basis, in terms of its contextual relevance.

An architectural project is the only thing we can interpret and evaluate before the actual realization of a building. The production of architecture can only be tested, controlled and formulated at the project stage. It can also best be modified and altered. Even the intentions of the architect, expressed in the design or in^a text, can be assessed according to their contextual relevance and their referential depth.

The international architectural competition for Les Halles market in Paris, is a typical

example of the need for evaluation criteria to assess new architecture in old settings (14). Charles Moore's intention to create a little French village clearly show how superficial contextual consideration can be. Moore's project expresses a kitch attitude to Frenchness, to Paris and to a market place. On the other hand Richard Ness's or Gaetano Pesce's approaches show an attempt to address some deeper characteristic of the new market while envisaging its future development.

New architecture in historic settings, if it is intended to relate to them, must be symbolic of its context in the broadest possible sense, in the sense that Goethe defined a symbol, open to the world. Symbolic potential thus relates more to a poetic ambiguity than to a specific correspondence described by semiotics. Also Rossi, similarly to the conceptualization of openness attempted here, advocates such an openness as an objective criterion of beauty. He writes in his Scientific Autobiography:

Transcending specific analogies, I saw more and more clearly how much beauty lies in the place where matter encounters different meanings. Nothing can be beautiful, not a person, a thing, or a city, if it signifies only itself, indeed if it signifies nothing but its own life. (15)

An inkblot can also be susceptible to several interpretations, but it is absurd to postulate that every inkblot, like those of the Rorschach test in Psychology, is a work of art. Diverse interpretations of an inkblot relate rather to the human diversity projected upon it, than to the potentiality of the inkblot itself. ^{The} several interpretations that an inkblot may be susceptible of, lack a common denominator and a common source. In this study multi-interpretability of new architecture cannot ^{be} considered as an aesthetic merit *unless there is an interrelation between, or within, the diverse modes of understanding, interpretation and evaluation, related to the context.*

So far we have been seeking to address architecture as art and we have been pursuing that from a contextual perspective, i.e. as an intervention. In this sense new architecture relating in a wholistic sense to a setting it is grafted into, neither reveals nor conceals, but means to reverberate here the relevatory ambiguity of Delphic oracles. It constantly invites and encourages interpretation in contextual terms. Its truth, its value as a work of art, lies in the interpretations it can achieve. Again, interpretation is here conceived not as a definite historical explanation, but as ontologically relevant to the interpreter.

Beauty is not something residing in it but it is achieved through the mediation of the interpreter as a dialectician, as Plato had argued (16). In our conceptualization, new architecture, or at another level the renewed context, is an object of play and not play itself. In

order for play to be established a player is also needed. Play is important in its being played. The potentiality of new architecture to enhance play is of fundamental importance and our whole concern in this study. Human participation gives reason, purpose and value to architecture.

We could even go so far as to say that the emotional response to creative architectural intervention is, on one hand the stimulus for the ludic process of interpretations, and on the other a sort of precognition or intuitive pre-understanding of all the possible interpretations it can stimulate. It is this direct addressing of the whole which can subsequently be analysed in a diversity of interpretations^{that are} contextually meaningful.

This immediacy of experience is qualitatively different from each one of the various contextual interpretations that can be achieved. Gadamer has provided an excellent clarification of this point. In discussing the notion of *erlebnis* (experience), Gadamer traces its relation to the older terms *erleben* and *erlebte*. We quote from Gadamer:

Erleben means primarily "to be still alive when something happens". From this the word has a note of the immediacy with which something real is grasped - unlike something of which one presumes to know, but the confirmation of which through one's own experience is lacking,... But at the same time the form *das Erlebte* is used to mean the permanent context of what is experienced. This context is like a yield or a residue that acquires permanence, weight and significance from out of the transience of experiencing. Both meanings obviously lie behind the form *erlebnis*, both the immediate, which precedes all interpretation, treatment, or communication, and merely offers a starting point for interpretation and material for working, as well as its discovered yield, its lasting residue (17).

Erlebnis ensures both the openness of an entity which we experience and its manifold manifestations in the various, contextually orientated, interpretations. It goes without saying that it does not occur the other way round. Any analytically conceived system of interpretations cannot render an artefact emotionally powerful, otherwise any definite series of justified symbolisms should be enough as an aesthetic criterion. It is impossible for any series of interpretations to address a work of art as a whole, since ^{they} cannot overcome the indefiniteness of contextual interpretations springing from it. However, communication, engagement and interpretation of new architecture at various levels related to its context, can enhance its experience as a work of art, contextually derived but finally autonomous as well.

In fact what we postulate in this study is not some sort of scientific hermeneutics i.e. understanding and evaluating according to certain rules of interpretation, by exhausting the power of the work of art in its analysis. We rather attempt to ensure and guide a hermeneutical poetics, what Susan Sontag calls "erotics of art"(18). In this sense meaningful does not refer to meaning as a secret message to be decoded, but rather as appealing to our experience in the form of an ontologically positive ambiguity.

The reality of creative new architecture in reference to its indefinite contextual interpretations can be paralleled to that of the reality of an object placed between two parallel mirrors in reference to the infinity of its reflections on them. It could be said, that the sum total of all the diverse reflections of the object equals the object itself. Yet, we can only have a finitude of its reflections and although a definite number of them are enough to suggest the existence of the object, they are still far from its reality since they cannot overcome some more of its reflections.

Similarly, *mutatis mutandis*, creative new architecture in a given setting, emits towards its context at various levels, indefinite associations, evocations and relations, paralleled to the reflections of the previous example, generated by its reality as a contextual being. Imitation of its context and contrast to it are, in our interpretation, the "mirrors" through which new architecture is identified and differentiated from its context, imitating it while criticizing it, presenting identity and difference to it, manifesting the dialectical aspects of its being.

New and old are interpreted at various levels, exactly as reflections of the object are of different orders i.e. reflection, reflection of a reflection and so forth. Each of the mirrors, i.e. imitation and contrast, represents the entity under interpretation in a higher order than its previous one. Transition from one order to another is a series of transformations within an evasive, ludic process. Only the indefiniteness of the interpretations legitimize the reality of the new architecture. Yet, every interpretation leads, suggests and enhances the experience of new architecture.

At this point we think that the Sufi motto, "the wise finds the one in the thousand and the thousand in the one" (referring to the 1001 Arabian nights) expresses eloquently the dialectical relation between the oneness of a setting and its power for inexhaustive manifestations. To find the one in the thousand is the architect's task so that the new creation will be rendered meaningful in a thousand ways.

CHAPTER EIGHT

POWER AND LIMITATIONS OF A THEORY CONCERNING ARCHITECTURAL CREATION

8. 1. CONCLUSIONS :

DIALECTICAL HERMENEUTICS OF ARCHITECTURAL CHANGE AS A THEORY OF/FOR CONTEXTUAL ARCHITECTURE

Architecture is more than its physical and formal appearance. Every single building, or part of it, carries with it the time of its construction, the modes of its appropriation, the changes it has been under and the socio-cultural events it has witnessed. As such, it participates in a particular socio-cultural context and is characterized by particular qualities and meanings which constitute its identity.

The context of a particular setting can be the best possible frame of reference for any new architecture in it, if continuity in its development is required. New architecture is necessarily measured against its context; the physical setting and the socio-cultural life in it. If the contemporary internationalism has led to environments bereft of meaning, contextualism seems to be the best way to re-endow architecture with a sense of belonging.

The previous chapters have contributed towards a theoretical framework concerning the interpretation and evaluation of architectural change in general and of the relation between new architecture and old in particular. Assuming that new architecture establishes a real dialogue with its context, we sought to describe the characteristics and the potential of such a relationship.

Dialectical hermeneutics, as elaborated in this study, evaluates architectural novelty according to its potential to sustain an ever significant interaction with its context and an ever fruitful dialogue with it. If such a dialectical process collapses, it will be a mark of weakness and inadequacy on the part of new architecture to relate to its context.

Contextual engagement of new architecture can finally be of value not only for the context but for its own significance as well. The offsprings of their dialogue can only be a

renewed context and an anchored novelty at various levels of interpretation. In this thesis we assume such a dialogue and in an abductive sense we use it to evaluate new architecture.

It is obvious that if such a theoretical framework contains any value at all in interpreting architectural change, it could also be used to suggest and guide architectural intervention in its formation process. Evaluation occurs not only when architecture is encountered as a finished object but also at every stage of the design process and it can guide, shape and determine new architecture to a considerable degree.

In this study we conceive new architecture in an old setting like a seed and we attempt to build into it all the ingredients of its context, so as to secure a dialogue and a wholistic relation between new and old architecture. Contextual ingredients in new architecture will lead neither to a replication of what is there already, nor to some inappropriate novelty, based on contextually irrelevant ideas. The need for change, a contextual ingredient itself, will secure that something new will come out, while the rest of the ingredients, relating to the bonds between people and their environment, will render architectural novelty communicative, familiar and significant. In this way new architecture will be an offspring of its context, however different from it.

In dealing with the theoretical aspects of architecture in this study, it has been somehow assumed that if the ideal project for a place is the best possible, then the real building will be the best possible as well.

The functional efficiency of architecture, the means of construction, the economics and the client are some of the decisive filters through which architecture, however well informed from theory and however perfect in its conception, has to pass through in order to comply with its requirements.

Nevertheless, if the best possible project for a site has been reached, not only the contextual ingredients^{that} have been built into it, but also all modifications, alterations and revisions, in the light of practical and circumstantial requirements, will be carried out according to the characteristics of its ideal conceptualization.

In our study we have subordinated dialectical opposition between new and old architecture at various levels to the unity, the identity and the life of a particular setting considered as the "third term" for every dialectical opposition in it. Dialectical opposition has been seen against the harmonious coexistence of old and new in a meaningful environment. Beyond all dialectics there is an implicit belief that people should live together, communicate and interact in a meaningful way with the built environment they live in. The

supremacy of such an intention *vis a vis* the alienation and fragmentation of human life cannot be proved. Life in all its manifestations is implicitly considered as a positive phenomenon beyond the life-death dialectical opposition, which is the ultimate one. The third term of dialectics, the maintenance of life for a setting, is informed by such an intention or a moral bias. This belief penetrates the whole study, and the dialectic method on which the study is based (1). At this point, the positiveness of the life becomes the ultimate criterion for the evaluation of new architecture.

8. 2. CONTEXTUAL LIMITS AND ARCHITECTURAL CREATION

This study has suggested dialectical hermeneutics as a method of interpretation and evaluation of new architecture in old settings. Within such a theoretical framework it is obvious that new architecture in a setting cannot be anything. The context presents certain limits towards absorbing novelties. These limits should not be considered as restraints, reducing the spectrum of creative intervention but rather as enabling agents. A given setting is what it is due to these limits, which define its identity negatively and positively, i.e. as what it is and as what it is not. These limits make a setting particular, idiosyncratic and real. Contextual consideration does not tether architectural creation, but rather enhances it by endowing it with socio-cultural relevance and significance.

Every context is a living entity, constantly developing and as such it defies any analytical approach. Yet, even as a fictional entity - of which we know its characteristics rather than itself - it makes sense to reveal it and renew it. There is a potential in every context, what Louis Kahn described as what "it wants to be"; yet there is no single, predetermined way of developing for it. Architectural renewal may follow several paths provided that they are contextually orientated. Otherwise, irrelevant development might ensue.

Gyorgy Doczi in his study "The Power of Limits" investigates some issues related to the above remarks (2). In examining the properties of geometrical patterns he argues that although a pattern is a forming process operating within strict limits, it creates limitless varieties of shape and harmonies. In this sense he verifies once again the Pythagorean epigram "limits give form to the limitless" (3).

In designing a new building in an old setting, restraints and limits to the project come not only from the Building Regulations, the client, the structure, the materials and so forth, but also from the idea - whether it is contextually orientated or not - about how it should be done. If one wants to build two rows of houses alongside a river and the basic idea

is to provide a view to the river for everyone, then certain limits arise as to the height of the houses in the front row.

Limits imposed by contextual characteristics do not limit creativity but rather increase it as they turn the quantitatively possible into the qualitatively legitimate and appropriate. There can be more solutions springing out from the depths of a coherent identity than theoretically conceived in vacuum. If no contextual limits are acknowledged, then the assumed theoretical multiplicity of solutions for a particular case degenerate in a restricted, tautological typology. If contextual values are not acknowledged, there is no reason to differentiate new architecture from place to place, or if there is such a differentiation, for the sake of the *avant-garde* requirements of the architectural profession, it is equally meaningless or in any case inadequate. As was the case with the Modern Movement in architecture, the original intention for freedom, finally resulted in standardization, ecumenism and the subsequent commercial exploitation of the international ideal (4).

As with the notion of tradition in Gadamer's theory, examined in Chapter Five, the contextual limits are enabling for new architecture, not prohibiting. Local, contextual restraints increase creativity because they discourage ready-made solutions. So, there is an oxymoron here because limits are rather enabling than limiting, or rather are enabling because they limit.

8. 3. LIMITS AND PROSPECTS OF CONTEXTUALISM

Contextualism, as a theoretical framework and a strategy for design is based on certain assumption and bears several implications for the contemporary architectural debate. It attempts to break down the universal character of modernism as an unquestionable way for architectural development worldwide. It shows a disillusion with the prophecies of modernity as a bearer of an intelligible order to enhance social progress. Contextualism is clearly orientated towards the appropriation of the past.

It claims the importance of the locally cultivated and addresses the particular identity of a place by attempting to realize an ever-renascent unity. Yet, such claims often raise some difficulties.

Appropriation of the past can often be slavish, nostalgic or even politically dangerous. Contextualism can often be associated with ill-defined nationalism, cultural isolation or the distortion of history and political exploitation. The past can be treated as a lifeless repository of architectural forms and meanings deprived of its dynamics and

contextualism can enhance an idealization of the past or its selective appreciation at the expense of current development.

Contextualism might lead to architectural development serving the past more than the present, not to mention its adoption as a strategy for historic preservation. However good use of contextualism one could guarantee, it will be problematic if it is adopted as a new dogma (5).

The Italian architect and theorist Vittorio Gregotti in a thoughtful article dealing with the renewal of Venice provides some succinct points about contextualism (6). Although he acknowledges its value *vis a vis* the problem arising from the renewal of historic cities and its contribution to the contemporary architectural debate, he clarifies some warnings:

Contextualism is too often interpreted as a search for the "spirit" of the place, purged of all dialectic and historical contradiction and frozen at a moment regarded as typical in its development - a sort of mental construct of the place. Furthermore it is essential to disentangle contextualism from the prejudices associated with pure conservation or the ideal reconstruction of a world inhabited by the "noble savage". (7)

Gregotti conceives the dialectics between new and old architecture in a Marxian sense, i.e. as a constant conflict with no intention for unity and continuity between them until alienation is totally expunged (8). Nevertheless, he argues in a similar vein to this thesis that new architecture in specific environment should attempt a modification of the existing environment rather than total planning strategies. Despite the fact that Gregotti interprets the past as a series of conflicts, he argues that new architecture should relate to it through its context.

8. 4. ARTIST VERSUS THEORETICIAN: INTERPRETATION THROUGH CREATION

Interpretation and evaluation of new architecture in an existing setting or of a setting *vis a vis* a specific project for its renewal is one thing and creative architectural intervention in it another. In order to build an appropriate new building in a setting, a creative genius is also needed. The fusion between new and old in a successful intervention is a creative act beyond the interpretation of a setting, however adequate that would be. An intuitive grasp of the essence of a particular setting is also necessary, far from any methodic understanding of it.

Every context has to be addressed as one, a unity, even if in the sense of a narrative or ^{as} a fictional unity, *vis a vis* new architecture in it, because any change in it will necessarily affect it as a whole. Conversely, every new building has to be treated as an entity in itself *vis a vis* its contextual anchorage, because it is intended to relate to its context and be capable of renewing ^{it} as a whole. The identity of a setting cannot be pinned down and described. A setting is an entity in process and as such it can only be addressed as a whole by an architectural intervention which will relate at indefinite levels with it. This indefiniteness of describable levels of association is the best way to address what finally is an undefinable identity.

The gap between the wholistic nature of contextual identity and its partial interpretations can only be bridged by creative intervention. In this case understanding a particular problem of architectural renewal in a given setting and response to it are one process. We can call this process interpretation through creation. Although creative intervention cannot be rationalized, there is still a need for a theoretical framework to guide reflection or intuitive understanding and ^{the} testing of ideas. Such a theoretical framework cannot substitute ^{for} architectural creation, but it can evaluate it in its formation process. If provides ^a sort of negative definition of what appropriate new architecture for a given setting should be. A theory can only provide an answer to what is not a relevant new architecture in a given setting; it remains the task of the architect to create it. Otherwise theories can only suggest blueprints for architectural practice.

In fact, interpretation and intervention are not so remote as one might think. In Chapter Five we discussed already that understanding, interpretation and application are an indivisible trinity. They interact all the way during the whole process of architectural creation and limit, define and shape any novelty to be introduced in a given setting. The interpretation process does not stop to give its place to architectural *praxis*, but remains embedded in it. This unity between interpretation and application renders a theoretical framework useful to interpret, evaluate and guide architectural practice.

We have been so far interpreting and evaluating new architecture in old settings by following a methodic course, namely interpreting in dialectical terms at a diversity of architectural aspects. This does not imply that the architect has thought or has to think in such a way in order to produce an appropriate new architecture for a specific location. Successful architectural intervention can generate rational interpretation but no systematic way can be sufficient for its creation. Any conceptual approach cannot overcome the infinity of rational interpretations that creative new architecture is capable of generating.

Every theoretical conceptualization has rather to be considered as a tool extending the

potential of creativity and not as a substitute for it. Contextual consideration will help the architect to critically appraise and evaluate a project, but it cannot, and it should not, provide a blueprint for creative intervention. No theory can produce creative solutions, but on the other hand a theoretical framework can always help to enhance them.

Theoretical constructions cannot, by definition, approach the fact of an entity and for this reason they are inadequate as sources of art in themselves. Interpretation through creation avoids the inadequacies of any theoretical, systematic approach and addresses an entity directly and as a whole, yet we can make sense out of it only in some sort of systematic conceptualization. ~~As is with language~~ The inspiration of the artist ^{is one thing} and another ^{is} his critical ability to reflect on it in the continuous process of shaping it. Matisse referred to this point when he said:

When painting, an artist must be believing that he is imitating nature. But when he stands back to think, he must use abstraction. (9)

In Chapter Seven we discussed how the differences between theoretical and artistic interpretation relates directly to the way we experience things. Beyond the comprehensible and analyzable dialectic way of conceptualizing, sometimes it is a direct address of the whole that leads us to grasp the true nature of things. It is as if we preunderstand its wholistic nature, the fact of it, before intelligibly analyzing it. In such cases we envisage the unity and the complementarity underlying and projected in the dialectics of the opposites. Plato has expressed this point eloquently in his *LAWS* and appropriately resumes the difference between *theoria* and *praxis*:

There is, O lawgiver, an ancient saying - constantly repeated by ourselves and endorsed by everyone else - that whenever a poet is seated on the Muse's tripod, he is not in his senses, but resembles a fountain, which gives free course to the upward rush of water; and, since his art consists in imitation, he is compelled often to contradict himself..., and he knows not which of these contradictory utterances is true. But it is not possible for the lawgiver in his law thus to compose two statements about a single matter; but he must always publish one single statement about one matter.(10)

The theoretical framework proposed in this study claims its values and derives its power not from some unshakeable logic of objective foundation, but rather from a faith. As such, the theory proposed in this thesis is susceptible to change in view of a more adequate one or/and, in any case, may be overruled by architectural practice. What it will have

achieved by then, nevertheless, is to discourage any less adequate ~~theoretical~~ theoretical approach that will not do justice to the nature of human experience of the built environment in particular, and to the nature of human life in general. This theoretical approach, as any, should be rather left open to be surpassed by creative architectural practice, as any theory which "wants" to justify its role must give way to life (11).

8. 5. FROM THEORY TO PRAXIS: THE SEARCH FOR VALUES

It is in the nature of any theory, as a construction of the human mind, manifested in the form of rational explanation or theoretical formulation or speculation, to be double edged. The pre-Socratic philosophers were the first to formulate this theoretical view (12). Praxis instead, meaning action and the practice of a theory, cannot but be one-sided, even if it can be *ex post facto* conceptualized as double-sided. A theory can go as far as to acknowledge the antithetical aspects of life, while every *praxis* expresses a particular outcome of the interaction of the opposites, which characterizes human life and every life (13).

In the reality of human life it might seem that dialectics of the opposites, the theoretical basis of this study, is a fictional theoretical framework. So it is, by being a conceptual schema. Theory and *praxis* themselves are in dialectical opposition seeking their fulfillment only in their mutual interdependence and interaction (14). There cannot be *praxis* without theory and there cannot be theory without *praxis*, however differently we conceptualize of both in diverse contexts in place and time.

Telos, aim and purpose, appears to be the "third term" of dialectical opposition between theory and *praxis* (15). A particular purpose "moves" the dialectics towards a specific end, and stimulates purposeful theorizing and action based on a theory. *Telos* is the ultimate catalyst for dialectics to operate and produce meaning.

By adopting dialectics as the basis for theorizing about the relation of new architecture to old, we presuppose, as the pre-Socratics did, the ultimate connectedness, interrelation and interdependence of all things in a unified world view. Such an assumption, in turn, implies a moral attitude behind the intention to formulate a theoretical framework to guide architectural practice. Because of the double face of truth, we need something external to it in order to justify the choice. A code of morality, a social rule or scheme for cooperation and an intention towards maximizing it can provide such criteria (16). In the track of some morality, dialectics can be articulated as an open-ended inquiry, yet ever meaningful.

Morality has always been connected with architecture as with every other human activity and inevitably so. Romaldo Giurgola in a thoughtful article notes:

Aesthetics and ethics were [for the Classical Greeks] inextricably joined in the same practical system which provided the basis both for the construction of buildings and the creation of works of art. In such a synthesis of theory and practice, what could be more self-conscious than the Pythagorean conception of *symmetria*, a divine harmony or balance in which *to kallos* encompassed both the beautiful and the good?...In contemporary terms, the need to talk about the possible meaning of such a connection is urgent, in order that our architecture might acquire wider terms of reference than that provided by its form or by its content alone! (17)

Giurgola clearly stresses that the meeting point between theory and practice is a morality relating to both; inherent in theory and guiding practice. Throughout this study the conviction of a significant architecture has been such a moral assumption. A theoretical framework towards informing architectural practice should relate architecture to something broader than itself. A theory of architecture should tell us something about things outside architecture as well (18).

Architectural practice and theory alike have been exhausted in a self-referential game which has resulted to a mere tautology. Too much concentration upon the architectural object has resulted in a poorer and fragmented experience of the built environment. Instead, it is here suggested to view architecture as a process convivial to the life process in its setting, a field of continuous evolution.

J.Habraken has suggested that the process of architectural development should be conceived as cultivation of the built environment rather than making objects (19). Despite the fact that architecture is a finite act, it should rather be envisaged as a process of continuous interaction with its environment and reflecting the full spectrum of human experience. Morality in architecture, conscious or not on the part of the architect and implicit or explicit in the built environment, provides the criteria for its value judgement. However transient or culture bound these value criteria may be, they are the means to live by a meaningful, life-enhancing environment. Moral values along with aesthetic ones should be basic tools to guide architectural creation.

Questions concerning the identity of a setting, a hierarchy of its characteristics *vis a vis* a specific new project in it and its potentiality for change, can only be answered by a critical assessment of locally cultivated environment, physically and culturally. Thus, new

architecture in a setting remains contextually informed and open to interpretation at the same time.

8. 6. A THEORY OR NO THEORY?

It might be argued that architecture defies theorizing about it. We could accept it, if that was possible. But in fact, architecture has always been informed by specific principles and/or a vision of life. Today architecture is already theory-loaded and by inadequate theories too. Theories change as swiftly as fashion proving their lack of a broader perspective to inform architectural practice. In such a situation architects cannot be naïve claiming that they have no theory or/and they do not need one (20).

We can construct theories as easily as buildings or, perhaps more easily since we do not even have to consider gravity . . . Even when we seek for a theory, this is another theory too; the theory that we need a theory. Moreover, sometimes we are even unaware of the theories we base our assumptions on. Theories of architecture based on statistics or psychological perception are two examples. On the other hand we certainly need a theoretical framework and we have to look for it. Even if it is finally inevitable to abide with some set of ideas and beliefs , it is of particular importance to search for the most adequate one *vis a vis* the needs of human life.

This thesis claims that theories of architecture, like buildings, should be cultivated locally and change along with each particular socio-cultural development. This is as far as any general theory of contextual architecture can go. Theory thus is here conceived as a speculative field. It is not falsifiable - because there is no logical meta-system to falsify it - yet it is useful to guide creative architectural practice.

No other art exercises such an influence over our lives, as architecture does. Music, painting and sculpture, to mention here only the traditional division of the arts, can be experienced according to our will; architecture is the unavoidable art of everyday life. A theory of/for architecture must relate to life as a whole and it is in this sense that philosophy can provide useful insights for the proper understanding of architectural problems and an appropriate response to them and to architectural problems. Yet, there is a danger in architecture being over-conceptual and idealized. Architectural practice is finally the only reason for the existence of any architectural theory and the only touchstone for its evaluation.

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CHAPTER TWO: THE REHABILITATION OF IMITATION: A REVIEW OF THEORIES CONCERNING THE RELATION OF NEW ARCHITECTURE TO HISTORIC SETTINGS

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CHAPTER THREE: THE IMITATION - CONTRAST DIALECTICS IN RELATING NEW ARCHITECTURE TO OLD SETTINGS

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- 4) Tatarkiewicz, *op. cit.*, p. 17.
- 5) Beardsley writes that Herodotus used the term "mimesis" to describe the imitation of dead Egyptians by wooden statues although such an early use of mimesis as representation seems rather implausible. See: Monroe C. Beardsley, *Aesthetics from Classical Greece to the present*, University of Alabama press, 1982 (c/ 1966), p. 24. Tatarkiewicz draws a clear distinction between the separate kinds of art in ancient Greece. The expressive arts (poetry, music, dance) and the constructive ones (architecture, sculpture, painting). This distinction is different from Nietzsche's qualitative differentiation between Apollinian and Dionysian, which penetrated all arts. See: Tatarkiewicz, *op. cit.*, pp. 15 ff.
- 6) I. Sycoutris clarifies the notion of nature by stressing that nature for ancient Greeks must be understood as something active and spiritual. It was sort of spiritual energy in constant change. It was "natura naturans" and not "natura naturata". See: I. Sycoutris, Introduction to Aristotle's poetics in: Simos Menardos, *Aristotle's poetics with an introduction and interpretation* by I. Sycoutris, Academy of Athens: Greek Library no 2, Athens: HESTIA, 1938, p. 58*. See also for the notion of nature: R. G. Collingwood, *The idea of nature*, Oxford University Press, 1976 (c/1945), pp. 30 ff.
- 7) Tatarkiewicz, *op. cit.*, pp. 79, 89-90. *Mimeisthai* in Democritus terms means "ought to be", "pretend to be" and implies the inferiority of "mimeisthai" to nature's true being. See M. C. Beardsley, *op. cit.*, p. 24.
- 8) Tatarkiewicz, *op. cit.*, pp. 80-89.
- 9) *Ibid.*, p. 83.
- 10) *Ibid.*, p. 143.
- 11) *Ibid.*, p. 98.
- 12) *Ibid.*, p. 107.
- 13) *Ibid.*, p. 102.
- 14) *Ibid.*, pp. 103-104.
- 15) Manolis Andronikos, *Plato and art (In Greek)*, Athens: Nepheli, 1984.
- 16) Richard Robinson, *Plato's Earlier Dialectic*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1953.

- 17) M. Andronikos, op. cit., p. 23.
- 18) Ibid., p. 24, n. 6.
- 19) Panofsky intelligently remarks that it is the dialectician who is entrusted with the dialectics of revealing the world of "ideas". See: Erwin Panofsky, *Idea: A concept in art theory*, translated by J. S. Peake, N.Y.: Harper & Row (Icon editions), 1968 (c/1924), p. 6.
- 20) Plato, Republic X 596 d-e.
- 21) Plato, Cratylus 432 c-d. See: M. Andronikos, op. cit., p. 55, n. 34 - p. 62, n. 58 - p. 63, n. 62.
- 22) Tatarkiewicz, op. cit., pp. 121-122.
- 23) Ibid., pp. 121-123.
- 24) Plato, Cratylus 439 a.
- 25) Andronikos, op. cit., p. 56.
- 26) Ibid., p. 60, n. 49.
- 27) Ibid., p. 62.
- 28) Ibid., p. 63 - p. 76, n. 96. Plato's PHAEDO 61, p. 90, n. 8.
- 29) Ibid., p. 80, nn. 8,11.
- 30) Ibid., p. 83, nn. 23-24 and p. 84, n. 29.
- 31) Ibid., p. 82, n. 16.
- 32) For the notion of play as higher seriousness see: Francis Sparshott, *The Theory of the Arts*, Princeton University Press, 1982, p. 61.
- 33) Panofsky, op. cit., p. 126 and p. 81, n. 15.
- 34) Aristotle: PHYSICS II.2, 194 a 20 and METEOROLOGY IV.3.
- 35) Tatarkiewicz, op. cit., p. 157.
- 36) Ibid., p. 157.
- 37) It is in this sense that art differs from the typical and the abstract general. See: Sycoutris, op. cit., p. 63*. Also Tatarkiewicz, op. cit., p. 158 and p. 159, frag. 15.
- 38) Sycoutris, op. cit., p. 81*.
- 39) Menardos, op. cit., p. 44.

- 40) Aristotle: *Metaphysics*, 981 a 15.
- 41) Sycoutris, op. cit., pp. 60* - 67* and p. 147, n. 2.
- 42) Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, London: Sheed & Ward, 1975 (c/1960), p. 371.
- 43) Ibid., p. 103.
- 44) Ibid., p. 104 and Tatarkiewicz, op. cit., p. 140.
- 45) Kant by rejecting "the thing in itself", was forced to reject aesthetics as knowledge and mimesis lost its significance. See : Gadamer, op. cit., p. 104. See also : Panofsky, op. cit., p. 126.
- 46) Panofsky, op. cit., pp. 5-6. Also p. 12, for the relation between idea and logos (reason and intellect).
- 47) Sycoutris, op. cit., pp. 48*,67*.
- 48) Tatarkiewicz, op. cit., pp. 289-294, fr. 22 and p. 298, fr. 2.
- 49) Ibid., p. 290. Also Panofsky, op. cit., p. 12.
- 50) Allen McCormick's introduction to J. E. Shlegel, op. cit., p. IX.
- 51) Ibid., pp. XVI, IX, XI.
- 52) Ibid., pp. 21-23.
- 53) See for instance: Rafael Moneo, *On Typology*, in: *OPPOSITIONS*, Summer 1978: 13, MIT press. For a brief historical account on the notion of type in architectural thought see: Dina Demiri, *The notion of type in architectural thought in: Edinburgh Architectural Research* 10, 1983.
- 54) Quatremere de Quincy, *Encyclopedie Methodique*, vol. II, Paris : 1825, *IMITATION* (pp. 543-546). (My translation).
- 55) R. D. Archer-Hind, *The Timaeus of Plato*, London: Macmillan, 1888, p. 62, Plato's *Timaeus* 19 d.
- 56) Andronikos, op. cit., pp. 73-74.
- 57) Tatarkiewicz, op. cit., pp. 97-98 and p. 105, fr. 7.
- 58) See for instance : R. Venturi, *Complexity and Contradiction in Modern Architecture*, and Brent C. Brolin, *The Failure of Modern Architecture*, N.Y.: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1976.
- 59) Susanne Langer, *Feeling and Form*, N.Y.: Charles Scribners & Sons, 1953.
- 60) It is in this sense that Drama in ancient Greece should aim to express the *katholou*, an

ordered and logically coherent whole, because it had to address in an intimate and simultaneous way all the different people of the audience. Aristotle's *katholou* has only a logical existence ascribing a limit and a *telos* (aim) to mimesis, conceived as a *praxis* (action) of everyday life. See : Sycoutris, op. cit., pp. 61* - 67*.

61) Hintikka, Waterlow and Judson provide a useful discussion of the notions of infinite and possible : Chapter Seven, note 10.

62) Tatarkiewicz, op. cit., p. 103.

63) Nelson Goodman, *Reality Remade*, in: Joseph Margolis (Ed.), *Philosophy looks at the arts: contemporary readings in Aesthetics*, Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1978, p. 226.

64) See in Chapter Five Paul Ricoeur's designation of levels of interpretation.

65) Yi-Fu Tuan, *Space and Place: the perspective of experience*, London: Edward Arnold, 1977, chap. 13: Time and Place, and particularly pp. 190-191.

66) See: Conservation and rehabilitation of traditional buildings and urban complexes, Technical Chamber of Greece, Thessaloniki, 1982, and particularly p. 53 about the building regulations for the islands of Mykonos and Hydra.

67) Leaflet for the projects of Unit Seven at the Architectural Association.

68) Barbara Rose, *Claes Oldenburg*, N.Y.: Museum of Modern Art, 1969, pp. 103-114.

69) The same problem arises when archaeologists have to destroy existing settings in order to carry out excavation or even when archaeological remains of a particular period have to be destroyed in favour of earlier or more interesting historically ones, where no safe criterion for evaluation applies.

70) Sycoutris, op. cit., p. 62* and note 9.

71) See Appendix I.

72) Tatarkiewicz, op. cit., p. 89.

73) Bruno Zevi, *Where is modern architecture going?*, in: GA Document 3, Tokyo: Ada Edita, Winter 1981.

74) Heraclitus, fragment 51. For an excellent interpretation see: Kostas Axelos, *Heraclitus and Philosophy* (Greek translation of the original French edition of 1962), Athens: Eksandras, 1974, pp. 47-49.

Contrast, as treated in this thesis, relates also to Jaques Derrida's *différance*, which in turn relates to *the act of creating difference and to creating reference*. So, contrast is not the result of lack of imitation but an attitude of ontological significance. See: Jacques Derrida, "Différance", in: *Margins of Philosophy*, transl. by Alan Bass, Chicago University Press, 1982.

For the notion of ontological difference, i.e. imitation and difference as aspects of the identity of being see:

Martin Heidegger, *Identity and Difference*, transl. by Joan Stambaugh, N.Y.: Harper & Row, 1969.

Gianni Vattimo, *Le Avventure della Differenza*, Milano: Gauzanti, 1980, cap. VI: *Differenza Ontologica*.

Jacques Taminiaux, *Dialectic and Difference: Finitude in Modern Thought*, New Jersey: Macmillan, Humanities Press, 1985, especially pp. 79-90.

75) Peter F. Smith, *The Syntax of Cities*, London: Hutchinson, 1977, chap. 29: *The Urban Contrast*, pp. 248-252.

76) Hippolyte M. Rigault, *Histoire de la Querelle des Anciens et des Modernes*, Paris: Librairie de la Hachette, 1856.

77) Weinsheimer, op. cit., p. 71.

78) See Appendix I.

79) Patrice Goulet, *La troisieme generation ou le retour a la parole*, in: *L'ARCHITECTURE D'AUJOURD'HUI*, no 233, June 1984.

80) P.F.Smith, op. cit., passim.

81) Francis Strauven, *The Urban Conjugation of Functionalist Architecture*, in: Aldo Van Eyck, Amsterdam: Stichting women, 1982.

CHAPTER FOUR: TOWARDS A DIALECTIC CONCEPTUALIZATION OF TIME IN THE MAN - MADE ENVIRONMENT

1) The French encyclopaedists were the first to conceive history as such.

2) A similar approach is adopted in developmental psychology by Klaus F. Riegel. Riegel discusses the dialectics between absolute, objective and personal, subjective time for the sake of personal time, in: Klaus F. Riegel, *Toward a dialectic interpretation of time and change*, cited in: Bernard S. Gorman & Allen E. Wessman, *The personal experience of time*, N.Y.: Plenum Press, 1977. A profound discussion of time's qualification in social terms is in: Richard H. Grathoff, *The structure of social inconsistencies: A contribution to a unified theory of play, game and social activity*, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970, chap. 5. A dialectic consideration of time is also adopted by Elliott Jaques who conceptualizes time as 2-dimensional in: Elliott Jaques, *The form of time*, London: Heinemann, 1982.

3) As quoted in A. Smithson (ed.), *Team 10 Primer*, London: Studio Vista, 1968, p. 101.

4) René Guénon, *The Reign of Quantity and the Signs of the Times*, transl. by lord Northbourne, London: Luzac & Company, 1953, chap. V. *The qualitative determinations of time*, p. 52.

5) Even the quantitative aspect of time, time as undifferentiated temporal passage, is different between several societies whether that is consciously acknowledged or not. Western societies have adopted the clock-time while in agricultural societies celestial rhythms are more important. Whatever rhythm temporal passage follows, what is of importance to our study is that for all societies there is time as quantity and time qualified

in contextual terms, being that a historical event, a ritual, or the time of a significant for the society event.

6) Leonardo Benevolo, *The History of the City*, (transl. by Geoffrey Culverwell), London: Scolar press, 1980, p. 311.

7) *Ibid*, p. 326.

8) Frederick Hartt, *A history of Italian Renaissance art*, London: Thames and Hudson, 1984 (c/1980), p. 359.

9) *Ibid*, p. 166.

10) Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, London: Sheed & Ward, 1985 (c/1975), p. 100.

11) *Ibid*.

12) Passage from gradual change to an abrupt change in organisms is studied by Rene Thom in his catastrophe theory; see: Rene Thom, *Structural stability and morphogenesis*, Reading MA: W. A. Benjamin, 1975.

13) We take the term "time" as a unifying abstract concept. We do not question here dilemmas such as real/unreal or one/many. F. M. Bradley, Nelson Goodman and L. Wittgenstein, among others, in their occupation with such dilemmas seem to have followed only the Parmenidean "WAY OF TRUTH" and forgotten its complementary "WAY OF SEEMING". In other words they attempted to solve dilemmas which were created by the adoption of formal logic for the conceptualization of time. See appendix I, FORMAL vs DIALECTIC LOGIC.

14) An interested study on this matter has been: Paul Roubiczek, *Thinking in Opposites: an investigation of the nature of man as revealed by the nature of thinking*, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1952. Appendix I discusses relevant issues.

15) Fernand Braudel, *Capitalism and material life*, vol. 1: *The structure of everyday life*, trans. Miriam Kocham, revised by Sian Reynolds, N.Y.: Harper & Row, 1981. Also Fernand Braudel, *On History*, transl. by Sarah Matthews, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1980, particularly pp. 24-54.

16) Mircea Eliade, *Patterns in comparative religion* (transl. by Rosemary Sheed), London: Sheed & Ward, 1958, p. 373.

17) Proclus, *Elements of Theology*, cited in: Ian Hamilton Finlay, *Unnatural pebbles*, Edinburgh: Graeme Murray Gallery, 1981.

18) Giancarlo De Carlo in Urbino, in: *ARCHITECTURAL REVIEW*, vol. 986/1979, p. 212.

19) *ARCHITECTURAL DESIGN*, no 9-10/1980, Les Halles, London: Academy Editions.

20) Recently, even Barcelona Pavillion has been considered as contextual creation, despite its claim to universality. For instance: Ignasi de Solà-Morales, Fernando Ramos, Christian

Cirici, La ricostruzione del Padiglione di Mies a Barcelona, in CASABELLA, no 526, July-Aug. 1986, pp. 44-55.

21) Lucien Steil, Destruction and Reconstruction in Art and Design, vol. 2, Oct. 1986, pp. 10-11.

22) Alois Riegl, The Modern Cult of Monuments: Its Character and its Origin, transl. by Kurt Forster and Diane Ghirardo, in: OPPOSITIONS, vol. 25, N.Y.: Rizzoli, Fall 1982, pp. 31-34.

23) For instance: Brent Brolin, Architecture in context, Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1980.

24) Lecture by Maurice Culot, in: Architecture and the City, SYMPOSIUM 18-22 1984 in London. AD, vol. 47, no 3, 1977, pp. 189-99 .

25) Giancarlo De Carlo, op. cit., p. 212.

26) Paul Ricoeur, Time & Narrative (trans. by Kathleen McLaughlin and David Pellauer), University of Chicago Press, 1984 (c/1983, TEMPS & RECIT, ed. Seuil), vol. I., p. 228.

27) In: GIFFORD LECTURES 1986, University of Edinburgh, lecture V, The narrative identity of self.

28) Paul Ricoeur, Time & narrative, op. cit., p. X.

29) Paolo Portoghesi, The Brion Vega cemetery by Carlo Scarpa, in: GLOBAL ARCHITECTURE, vol. 50, Tokyo: A.D.A. Edita, 1979.

30) David Lowenthal, Age and Artifact: Dilemmas of Appreciation, in: D. W. Meinig (ed.), The interpretation of ordinary landscapes, Oxford University Press, 1979, p. 117.

31) A rough analogy with the consideration of objects in relativity theory could be drawn here. According to this theory an object is an intensification in the space-time field and although field and object constantly change, the object is inconceivable outside this field.

32) The notion of continuity in interpretation, as a measure of aesthetic value, will be discussed in Chapter Seven.

33) Colin Rowe & Robert Slutzky, Transparency : Literal and phenomenal, in: Colin Rowe, The Mathematics of the Ideal Villa and Other Essays, MIT, 1976, pp. 159-183 and especially pp. 160-161.

34) George Herbert Mead, Mind, Self, & Society, Edited and with an introduction by Charles W. Morris, Works of G. H. Mead, vol. 1, The University of Chicago Press, 1974 (c/1934).

35) Despite his dual aspect theory of self as "I" an "YOU" , Ricoeur attempts to resolve the dualism, or to advance it further, by adopting the notion of the "narrative self" to address and describe the unity of the self. Paul Ricoeur, "On selfhood. The question of personal identity", The 1986 Gifford lectures, Edinburgh University.

36) Marie-Louise Von Franz, Synchronicity and the I-CHING, in: ABOUT TIME, London:

Jonathan Cape, 1985, pp. 133-135.

37) See for instance: Rose Macalau, *The pleasure of ruins*, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1953.

CHAPTER FIVE: SPATIO - TEMPORAL CONTEXTUALISM AND PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS

1) Ignasi de Solà Morales, *From contrast to analogy: Developments in the concept of architectural intervention in LOTUS*, vol. 46, no 2/1985, p. 37.

2) Ibid.

3) We discussed in Chapter One how contrast emerged as a way of relating.

4) Paul Ricoeur, *Universal Civilization and National Cultures*, in: Paul Ricoeur, *History and Truth* (transl. by Charles A. Kelbley), Northwestern University Press, 1965.

5) Traditional societies are characterized only by imitation. There is no need in a traditional society for contrast to the existing values, since permanence is valued more. This is not to imply that traditional societies are stationary, but that change comes as a result rather than as conscious intention. For the notion of tradition see: Seyyed Hossein Nasr, *Knowledge and the Sacred*, Edinburgh Univ. Press, Edinburgh 1981, pp. 65-92.

6) The Indian poet Rabindranath Tagore and the Japanese architect Kurokawa disqualified the Greek Parthenon as a work of art. In: N. Kurokawa, *Architecture of the Road, Ekistics*, vol. 16, no 96, Nov. 1963, p. 288.

7) Bruno Queysanne, *One day my prince will come*, in: *International Laboratory of Architecture and Urban Design, Yearbook 1983/1984: Memories, Expectations and Actions*, Firenze: Sansoni, 1984, pp. 54-55.

8) Kevin Lynch, *What Time is this Place*, MIT Press, 1972.

9) Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, Sheed and Ward: 1985 (c/1975), (translated from the second German edition, 1975).

10) Ibid., p. 273.

11) Ibid., pp. 249-250.

12) Ibid., p. 273.

13) Richard J. Bernstein, *Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics and Praxis*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985 (c/1983), pp. 128-129.

14) For the dispute between Gadamer - Habermas See: Joseph Bleicher, *Contemporary Hermeneutics: Hermeneutics as method, philosophy and critique*, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980, pp. 3-4 and mainly pp. 153-158. Bleicher traces the steps of this debate in note 3 to his introduction, p. 260.

15) Gadamer, *op.cit.*, p. 273.

- 16) Ibid., pp. 239-240.
- 17) Gianni Vattimo, Project and Legitimization I, in LOTUS INTERNATIONAL, no 48-49, 1985-86, pp. 118-125.
- 18) H. G. Gadamer, op. cit., p. 275.
- 19) Ibid., p. 259.
- 20) Ibid., p. 261.
- 21) Ibid.
- 22) J. Bleicher, op. cit., pp. 114-116.
- 23) Joseph J. Kockelmans, Heidegger on Art and Art Works, Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1985, pp. 194-202.
- 24) Gadamer, op.cit., pp. 274-278.
- 25) R. Bernstein, op. cit., pp. 207-232.
- 26) Cited in Bernstein, op. cit., p. 220.
- 27) Pietro Derossi, Project and legitimization II, in LOTUS INTERNATIONAL, vol. 48-49, 1985-86, pp. 126-33.
- 28) Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, transl. by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, Basil Blackwell, 1983 (c/1962), pp. 188-195 & p. 358 ff. Also Gadamer, op. cit., pp. 238-240, p. 245, pp. 258-261.
- 29) Emilio Betti and E.D. Hirsh have been the main exponents of objectivity in interpretation. For the dispute between Gadamer - Betti See: Bleicher, op. cit., pp. 24-47. Also E.D. Hirsh, Jr: The Aims of Interpretation, The University of Chicago Press, 1978 (c/1976).
- 30) Jurgen Habermas and Karl-Otto Apel are the main exponents of critical hermeneutics. See Bleicher, op. cit., pp. 141-158.
- 31) Cf. the discussion in Chapter Four about the parts/whole problem.
- 32) Paul Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, transl. by Kathleen McLaughlin and David Pellauer, The University of Chicago Press, 1984, vol. I, p. 54.
- 33) Ibid., p. 57.
- 34) Hans-Georg Gadamer, Aesthetics and Hermeneutics, in: H.-G. Gadamer, Philosophical Hermeneutics, translated and edited by David E. Linge, University of California Press, 1976, p. 103.
- 35) Appendix I.

CHAPTER SIX: THE DIALECTICS OF HERMENEUTIC EXPERIENCE IN TWO CONTEXTS

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CHAPTER SEVEN: DIALECTICAL HERMENEUTICS AS A VALUE JUDGMENT THEORY

- 1) We are here using play as a metaphor, at the risk of idealizing actual play, i.e. childrens play.
- 2) See in Chapter Three a discussion of the notions of Play and seriousness.
- 3) Francis Sparshott, *The Theory of the Arts*, Princeton University Press, 1982, p. 61.
- 4) Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, London Sheed and Ward, 1985 (c/1975), pp. 91-119.
- 5) *Ibid.*, p. 91.
- 6) See Appendix II.
- 7) Gadamer, *op. cit.*, p. 319.
- 8) *Ibid.*
- 9) *Ibid.*, p. 454.
- 10) In a modal logic sense, Aristotle has argued that if something is infinitely possible, then it really exists. See for instance: Sarah Waterlow, *Passage and possibility: A study of Aristotle's modal concept*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982. Also, Jaako Hintikka, *Time and necessity: studies in Aristotle's theory of modality*, Oxford University Press, 1973, and Lindsay Judson, *Eternity and necessity in de caelo I.12*, in: Julia Annas (ed.), *Oxford studies in ancient philosophy*, vol. I, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983, p. 218.
- 11) Appendix II.
- 12) The Greek Classical Scholar Ioannis Sycoutris, provides an excellent interpretation of the Aristotelian *katholou*, in: *Aristotle's Poetics* (in Greek), translated by Simos Menandros, with introduction, text and interpretation by Ioannis Sycoutris, Academy of Athens Ed., 1936, pp. 60*- 65*. Gadamer calls the true nature of something "its truth", in: Gadamer, *op. cit.*, p. 446.

- 13) Unidentified source.
- 14) ARCHITECTURAL DESIGN, no 9-10, Les Halles, London: Academy Editions, 1980.
- 15) Aldo Rossi, A Scientific Autobiography, MIT Press, 1981, p. 66.
- 16) See n. 21 in Chapter Three. Cf. also Panofsky, Idea, p. 6.
- 17) Gadamer, op. cit., pp. 55-56.
- 18) Susan Sontag, Against interpretation, in: A Susan Sontag Reader, Penguin books, 1982 (c/1964), pp. 95-104.

CHAPTER EIGHT: POWER AND LIMITATIONS OF A THEORY CONCERNING ARCHITECTURAL CREATION

- 1) Norman O. Brown has argued that dualism is the philosophy of pessimism and dialectics the philosophy of optimism in: Norman O. Brown, Life Against Death: The Psychoanalytic Meaning of History, p. 84.
- 2) Gyorgy Doczi, The Power of Limits: Proportional Harmonies in Nature, Art and Architecture, Boulder & London: Shambhala, 1981.
- 3) Ibid., p. 7.
- 4) Giancarlo De Carlo, Beyond Postmodernism, in: Richard C. Hatch, The Scope of Social Architecture, New Jersey, 1964, p. VI.
- 5) Edson Armi, Contextualism: The New Dogma of American Architecture, in: ARTS MAGAZINE, vol. 56, Pt 2, Oct. 1981.
- 6) Vittorio Gregotti, Venice and the New Modernism, in: AA FILES (Architectural Association Files), no 10, Autumn 1985, pp. 13-17.
- 7) Ibid., p. 14.
- 8) See Appendix I.
- 9) Art After WW1, Open University transmission, 9/3/86, BBC 2.
- 10) Plato, LAWS (tr. by R. G. Bury), Book IV, 719c, in: Loeb Classical Library, Heinemann, vol. I, p. 305. See also Hans-Georg Gadamer, Dialogue and Dialectic: Eight Hermeneutical studies on Plato, Yale University Press, 1980, pp. 41-43.
- 11) T. S. Eliot, Tradition and Individual Talent, in: The Sacred Wood, Methuen, 1983 (c/1920), pp. 47-59.
- 12) Appendix I. See also in DIELS-KRANZ, Fragmente der Vorsokratiken, Weidmannsche Verlagsbuchhand, 1951, fragment 90 about *dissoi logoi*, work of an anonymous sophist of the 5th century.
- 13) The *ataraxia* of the sceptics, in this context can be seen as one *praxis* to abolish or

encompass all *praxeis*.

14) *Phronesis appears to mean practical wisdom, a form of interaction between theoria and praxis*. See Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Reason in the Age of Science*, MIT Press, 1982 p. XXIII. See also: Paul Ricoeur, *Time and Narrative*, transl. by Kathleen McLaughlin and David Pellauer, vol. I, The University of Chicago Press, 1984, p. 40.

15) For the notion of the third term in dialectics see Appendix I.

16) Paul Ricoeur, *The Gifford Lectures 1986, On Selfhood: The question of personal identity*, Fourth lecture; *"Moral imputation: The responsive self"*, Edinburgh 1986.

17) Romaldo Giurgola, *Notes on Architecture and Morality*, in: *PRECIS* (Columbia University Graduate School of Architecture), vol. II, 1980, p. 51.

18) Eisenman argues about the opposite in *PERSPECTA* 21, MIT Press, 1984.

19) N. John Habraken, *The General from the Local*, Key-note address for the 8th International Forum of the European Association for Architectural Education, Newcastle upon Tyne, England, April 13 1983, p. 8.

20) Daniel Libeskind distinguishes between theorists aiming to go back to the unselfconscious way of building (Schulz, Alexander) and theorists aiming at salvation through knowledge (Rossi, Aalto). In: *OPPOSITIONS*, no 21.